UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Laura Lynn Hammett, Plaintiff, v. MARY E. SHERMAN, et.al.                                                  Defendants

Case No.:            19-CV-0605-JLS-AHG   PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF THE HONORABLE JANIS L. SAMMARTINO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES WITHIN AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FILED CONCURRANTLY Date of Hearing: October 1, 2020 Time: 1:30 p.m. Place: Courtroom D Hon. Janis L. Sammartino presiding Hon. Magistrate Allison H. Goddard

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO EACH DEFENDANT AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

     PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on October 1, 2020, at 1:30 p.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Courtroom D of the above entitled court, located at 221 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101, Plaintiff Laura Lynn Hammett will, and hereby does, move for the disqualification of the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, on the grounds that there is evidence of bias in favor of the defendants and prejudice against the plaintiff. This motion will be based upon the memorandum of points and authorities within, the affidavit of Laura Lynn Hammett, the exhibit attached, the Certificate of the Plaintiff in pro se, and all pleadings and records on file in this action.

    Plaintiff requests determination by a judge other than Judge Samartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §144.

MOTION

     Plaintiff Laura Lynn Hammett (“Plaintiff” or “Hammett”) hereby moves to disqualify the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino as the sitting judge in the present case on the grounds of 28 USC Sections 144 and 455.  As set forth in more detail in the memo, this motion is based on evidence contained in the supporting Affidavit of Hammett. This includes Judge Sammartino’s refusal to allow the Plaintiff representation on a limited scope by special appearance for a derivative cause of action that Plaintiff could not legally argue pro se, which makes access to justice impossible for the modest means litigant; failure to require the derivative action to be advocated for by a person authorized to practice law, rendering it and the judgments based on it null and void, increasing the time and expense of litigation needlessly for all parties and the court; admonishment to the Plaintiff that chilled her First Amendment right to petition for presenting a grievance about a court staff member, after the Plaintiff presented written testimony and documentary evidence of backdating of a docket entry by the clerk; and decisions on this case that are contrary to reasons given for decisions she has made on other cases.

     The backdating clerk also told Plaintiff that Judge Sammartino told him what her decision on a motion was going to be before an opposition was filed, as discussed in the affidavit and memo.

     The combination of clerk backdating at the request of opposing counsel and the Court’s admonishment not to make accusations, on what the court called “gratuitous speculation”, is a violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights under color of law for which Plaintiff intends to file a separate suit.[1]

     Finally, the Court made a convoluted order, unlike any she ever made before, that “closed” and “terminated” the case before leave to amend had expired. Plaintiff was forced to file a notice of appeal to protect against a claim that the orders became final when “closed” and “terminated”, and the 30-day time to file a notice of appeal had passed, rendering the orders unappealable. This caused the plaintiff to pay filing costs for the appeal and hire an appellate attorney to write the brief if the appellate court found the odd closing procedure rendered the case “final”. The appellate court did not find the case to be final, and so defendants have filed motions for attorney fees for the appeal. In other words, Judge Sammartino’s bizarre closing with leave to amend caused Plaintiff more time, more stress and more money in violation of FRCP Rule 1. (Aff. ⁋⁋49-60)

     The only reasonable appearance left by the foregoing is that the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino has a bias that makes her unsuitable to preside on this case and an informed, rational, objective observer would doubt her impartiality.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities   Page 4

Affidavit Annotated    Page 6

Argument                     Page 10

1. The Affidavit of Laura Lynn Hammett is Timely Filed Under 28 U.S.C. § 144

                                                                                                                   Page 10

1. Hammett Set Forth Facts in Her Affidavit Requiring Recusal                 Page 12

1. Disqualification is Also Required Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) in Order to Avoid an Appearance of Bias or Partiality                                                           Page 14

1. Conclusion                                                                                                 Page 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 1999)…………………………………….10

Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 31 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1994)……….11

City of Downey v. Johnson, 263 Cal.App.2d 775, h.n. 3………………..7

 Davis Test Only Smog Testing v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 15 Cal.App.5th 1009, (2017) h.n.2)………………………..7

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (2015), as modified (Apr. 22, 2015)h.n.2……………….8

In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, h.n. 6 (8^th Cir. 1994)………………11

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988)….14

Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, h.n. 3 (SCOTUS 1994)………..12, 16

In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997)…….12, 16

McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 378, 379, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622 (2000) ……………….7

Melendres, 2009 WL 2132693, at *15, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, at *52-53…17

Morris v. U.S., 26 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1928………………11

People By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Malone, 232 Cal. App. 2d 531, 537, 42 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1965)……………………………………..8

Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 415 (2nd Cir. 1975)………….7

Reiffen v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2001)…………12

Tenants & Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment (TOOR) v. HUD, 338 F.Supp.29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1972)………………………………………………..10

U.S. v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2008)…………….16

United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 889 (1st Cir. 1983)…….12

United States v. Partin, 312 F.Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. La. 1970)….12

U.S. v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1980)………………14

United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996)……..15

28 USC 144………………..10, 12, 13

28 USC 455………………..12, 13, 14

18 USC 1001……………….10, 15

AFFIDAVIT ANNOTATED

     The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino was assigned to this matter when the complaint was filed on April 2, 2019. (Docket)

     Plaintiff did not serve summons on the defendants until after filing a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on May 29, 2019. (Docket)

     Herein the abbreviations will be used for each defendant named in the caption of the FAC, ECF No. 3:

     Mary E. Sherman, an individual, “Sherman”;

     Mary E. Sherman, as manager of Silver Strand Plaza LLC, “the Manager”;

     Mary E. Sherman as trustee of the various irrevocable trusts, collectively “the Grandchildren’s Trusts”;

     Mary E. Sherman and Jeffrey M. Sherman as co-trustees of the J&M Sherman Family Trust, collectively “the J&M Trust”;

     Diane Dennis, an individual, “Dennis”;

     Linda R. Kramer, an individual, “Kramer”;

     Linda R. Kramer and Erik Von Presintin Hunsaker as co-trustees of the Lynn and Erik’s Trust, “the L&E Trust”;

     Silver Strand Plaza, LLC, “SSP”;    

     Ellis Roy Stern, Esq., “Stern”, Alan N. Goldberg, Esq., “Goldberg”, Stern & Goldberg, Patrick C. McGarrigle, Esq., “McGarrigle” and McGarrigle, Kenney & Zampiello, APC, collectively “Attorney Defendants”.

     The Grandchildren’s Trusts, J&M Trust, Dennis and Kramer are collectively “the Member Defendants”.

     The clerk who customarily makes docket entries for cases presided over by Judge Sammartino is known to Plaintiff as “JPP” or “Jude”.

     In the FAC, Plaintiff included a “derivative” cause of action of legal malpractice against the Attorney Defendants who represented SSP and simultaneously, all the other defendants. (Affidavit (“Aff.”) ⁋⁋ 2)

      Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Retain Representation on Limited Scope on July 22, 2019. In it she stated she could not afford an attorney for all causes. One need was “for explanation of particularly complex issues like Derivative causes of action.” (Aff. ⁋⁋ 5, 6)

     Judge Sammartino denied the motion. (ECF No. 22)

     Plaintiff who is not authorized to practice law learned that a derivative action is “on behalf of an LLC. (Aff. ⁋⁋ 8, 9) “A derivative action, in contrast, does not transfer the cause of action from the corporation to the shareholders. Rather, the cause of action in a shareholder derivative suit belongs to, and remains with, the corporation.” (McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 378, 379, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622 (2000); also, Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 415 (2nd Cir. 1975))

     Judge Sammartino never admonished Plaintiff that a derivative suit is on behalf of an entity that must be represented by a person authorized to practice law. She did not, and still has not mentioned that derivative suits presented by persons who are unauthorized to practice law are null and void. (Aff. ⁋10; City of Downey v. Johnson, 263 Cal.App.2d 775, h.n. 3; Davis Test Only Smog Testing v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 15 Cal.App.5th 1009, (2017) h.n.2)

     Judge Sammartino did not acknowledge or comment on the reason why Plaintiff made the voluntary dismissal in the “Order Denying as Moot Motions to Strike or, Alternatively, to Dismiss Filed by [the Attorney Defendants]” which she made “[i]n light of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of her fifth and sixth causes of action against the Moving Defendants”.  (Aff. ⁋11, ECF No. 39, 2:3-4)

     Judge Sammartino erred by ignoring that dismissal required Court approval. (See ECF No. 39 in general; “Dismissal of a shareholder derivative claim requires court approval.” (Kennedy v. Kennedy, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (2015), as modified (Apr. 22, 2015)h.n.2))

     Judge Sammartino did make several other sua sponte arguments against Plaintiff when denying motions Plaintiff filed, such as denying a motion for an extension of time to amend the complaint due to the Coronavirus Pandemic, because Plaintiff neglected to provide notice to opposing council first. (Aff. ⁋12, ECF Nos. 118 and 119) All sua sponte arguments were adverse to the Plaintiff, or where they should have supported the Plaintiff’s position, were misapplied.

     Judge Sammartino knew or should have known the derivative cause was “on behalf of SSP” and Plaintiff was not authorized to proceed to advocate for the interests of SSP. “What [party unauthorized to practice law] purported to do for [other party] in place of an attorney was a nullity, and that fact should have been known to the court and to opposing counsel.” (People By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Malone, 232 Cal. App. 2d 531, 537, 42 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1965))

     By allowing Plaintiff to advocate for a limited liability company and denying the right to delegate that duty to a person authorized to practice law, Judge Sammartino was causing prejudice to the interests of SSP that Plaintiff wanted to protect, and was ordering the continued violation of law. She was increasing the costs of the administion of justice in violation of FRCP Rule 11, as the orders based on the derivative cause of action, such as attorney fees for the anti-SLAPP, are nullities. They were wasteful exercise.

      Jude made an error in entering the FAC defendants into the docket.

     He entered Linda R. Kramer without the tag, an individual or as co-trustee of the Lynn and Erik’s Trust”. He did reference Mary E. Sherman in all her capacities correctly, the number of times she was named. (Aff. ⁋14)

      On July 30, 2019, attorney Keith Cochran filed a Motion to Dismiss (“ L&E Trust MTD”). On the face above the caption it said “Attorneys for Defendants Linda R. Kramer and Erik Von Pressentin (sic) Hunsaker as Co-Trustees of the Lynn and Erik’s Trust”. No mention of “Linda R. Kramer, an individual”, was made on the face of the L&E Trust MTD, except in the caption. (ECF No. 19)

     Plaintiff filed a request for entry of clerk’s default on August 1, 2019. (Aff. ⁋20, ECF Nos. 23 and 25)

     Instead of entering clerk’s default, Mr. Cochran and Jude conspired together to alter the docket to reflect that Kramer had joined with the L&E Trust Defendants to file the L&E Trust MTD on July 29, 2019. They were going to deny Plaintiff equal protection under the law by altering the docket. (Aff. ⁋⁋21-28)

     When Mr. Cochran and Jude learned that there was a copy of the unaltered docket, the alterations were changed back, but clerk’s default was still not entered.

     This was a serious violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to due process.

     Shockingly, Judge Sammartino did not compel the Clerk to enter default.

     Instead she wrote an admonishment that chills the Plaintiff’s right to petition for redress of grievances.  (Aff. ⁋⁋30-34; ECF No. 111, f.n. 13)

     Further, Jude expressed belief that he knew that the Judge was going to deny the motion to compel before the motion was fully briefed. (Aff. ⁋⁋35-38)

39.          I noticed that all Judge Sammartino’s orders appear like she is representing the defendants, which is not usually a reason for disqualification. But as the defendants’ attorney, Judge Sammartino is making arguments that violate Rule 11.

     Judge Sammartino made sua sponte arguments against Plaintiff’s interests, which is allowed, but the arguments and application of law, if made by an attorney, would violate FRCP Rule 11. There is a huge difference between an honest difference of opinion and purposefully throwing a lawsuit. (Aff. ⁋⁋39-48)

     Judge Sammartino created confusion and misunderstanding when she wrote the Order of March 23, 2020. She used a rarely used procedure that seems to be exclusively used on pro se litigants who are usually incarcerated, often asking for appointed counsel, and often incoherent. The procedure screams “Go away! You lose!” (Aff. ⁋⁋49-60)

     Plaintiff does not know the reason for Judge Sammartino’s bias and prejudice. It may be that Plaintiff reported unflattering information about a colleague. It might be a bias against all pro se litigants. But the bias and prejudice is distinct and absolutely apparent. (Aff. ⁋⁋61-67)

ARGUMENT

I. THE AFFIDAVIT OF LAURA LYNN HAMMETT IS TIMELY FILED UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 144

     Since the United States District Court for the Southern District of California does not sit in specific sessions or terms, but is deemed to be in continuous session, there is no specific “timely” period for filing an Affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. By extension from the fact that there is no “term,” there is no ten-day period. Accordingly, even where there can be no good cause shown for delay, an affidavit will be considered timely filed, and timeliness will be dealt with as a matter of weight rather than admissibility. (Tenants & Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment (TOOR) v. HUD, 338 F.Supp.29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1972))

     “[A] litigant’s duty to investigate the facts of his case does not include a mandate for investigations into a judge’s impartiality.” (American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 1999)). In this case, Plaintiff did undertake a preliminary investigation of Judge Sammartino’s impartiality. However, in Plaintiff’s past experience, she has had four judicial officers voluntarily recuse themselves from cases involving the Plaintiff and two of those were unknown to Plaintiff before their recusal. (Aff. ⁋⁋61-64) Even with her hypervigilance due to past experience, Plaintiff did not find any reason to justify filing an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144. It was not until the Court made its absurd order of March 23, 2020 with the admonishment not to report alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and Plaintiff came upon the caselaw that shows it is the duty of the trial judge to advise the representative on behalf of an LLC that she may not advocate on behalf of the Company that the Plaintiff knew there is an actual bias.  (Morris v. U.S., 26 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1928) (affidavit was timely filed immediately before trial where “on several occasions defendant requested his attorneys to prepare and file application to disqualify the trial judge,” but attorneys disagreed with him until he obtained new information which was imparted to his attorneys)).

     Only in light of these more recent discoveries did a motion to disqualify appear fully justified and appropriate. “A lawyer who reasonably believes that the judge before whom he is appearing should not sit must raise the issue so it may be confronted and put to rest. Any other course would risk undermining public confidence in our judicial system.” (Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 31 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1994)).

     This must be weighed against the burden on the movant to show objective prejudice. “Judge is presumed to be impartial, and parties seeking recusal bears substantial burden of proving otherwise.” (In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, h.n. 6 (8^th Cir. 1994)) The Plaintiff waited until the evidence against the Judge was overwhelming to file this motion.

     The timing of the order granting all dismissals with leave to amend was also suspect. The Court waited five (5) months after the motions were fully briefed to issue her order on March 23, 2020. Then, in the beginning of the Coronavirus Pandemic lockdowns, Judge Sammartino issued her strange order. Plaintiff was overwhelmed with the rest of the country with physical illness and acute anxiety and asked for a stay of proceedings which was granted until August 7, 2020. (ECF Nos. 126 and132)

      While seventeen (17) months have passed since Plaintiff filed this case, twelve (12) of those were in a holding pattern. A hypersensitive person might suspect Judge Sammartino’s bias from the first denial of counsel to explain the derivative action. The Plaintiff did not know though that the denial was encouraging an illegal act. She thought the Court’s attitude did not promote adjudication on the merits or economics of resources, but she did not realize it was outright wrong.

     This motion and affidavit are filed two weeks after Plaintiff filed her SAC, which is the first amended complaint that was served on the defendants. This while Plaintiff is in treatment for acute situational anxiety.

     In view of the foregoing, this affidavit and motion are timely.

II. HAMMETT SET FORTH FACTS IN HER AFFADAVIT REQUIRING RECUSAL.

     A legally sufficient declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 144 must meet the following requirements: (1) the facts are material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts are such that, if true they would convince a reasonable person that a bias exists; and (3) the facts show that the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature. (Reiffen v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2001))

     Section 144 requires a district judge to accept the moving party’s affidavit as true. (In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997))  While a trial judge may not pass upon the truth of the matters asserted in the moving party’s affidavit, a trial judge is not required to recuse himself immediately, because the “judge must pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit.” (United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 889 (1st Cir. 1983))         Furthermore, “[s]ince sections 144 and 455 of 28 U.S.C. use similar language, and are intended to govern the same area of conduct, they have been construed in pari materia, and the test of the legal sufficiency of a motion for disqualification is the same under both statutes.” Id.

     If an affidavit of bias or prejudice complies with the statutory standards set forth in this section concerning timeliness and legal sufficiency, then the judge against whom it is directed is obligated to recuse herself. A judge is required to recuse herself even if the judge believes (or knows with certainty) that the allegations of bias and prejudice made against her are false. (United States v. Partin, 312 F.Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. La. 1970))

     “Recusal is required whenever impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).” Citing Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, h.n. 3 (SCOTUS 1994))

     “Favorable or unfavorable predisposition can serve to be characterized as “bias” or “prejudice” requiring recusal because, even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment; that is the “pervasive bias exception” to the extrajudicial source doctrine. (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455.”id. h.n. 9)

     “Fact that opinion held by judge derives from source outside judicial proceedings is not necessary condition for bias or prejudice recusal, as predisposition developed during the course of a trial will sometimes suffice; fact that opinion held by judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings is also not a sufficient condition for bias or prejudice recusal, as some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings will not suffice; it is thus more proper to speak of an extrajudicial source factor than of an extrajudicial source doctrine in recusal jurisprudence. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).” (id. h.n. 14)

     “Judicial remarks during course of trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge; they may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” (Id. h.n.17)

     The Judge’s actions complained of evidence such deep-seated favoritism or antagonism as would make fair judgment impossible. (Id. at 541)

     The facts stated in Hammett’s affidavit are material and are stated with particularity. As to their sufficiency to show bias for or against a party, Judge Sammartino’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to turn the derivative cause of action over to a licensed attorney, denial of counsel for the specific purpose of explaining a derivative action, from which the unlawful practice of law arose, and comments meant to keep an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001 by her clerk covered up are extraordinary measures that may be criminal, may be unethical, and are definitely signs of bias.

III. DISQUALIFICATION IS ALSO REQUIRED UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) IN ORDER TO AVOID AN APPEARANCE OF BIAS OR PARTIALITY.

     In 1974, Congress rewrote 28 U.S.C. § 455 to correct perceived problems in the disqualification statutes. Prior to 1974, both the technical and legal sufficiency requirements of section 144 had been construed strictly in favor of judges. Courts also operated under the so-called “duty to sit” doctrine which required a judge to hear a case unless a clear demonstration of extra-judicial bias or prejudice was made.  Consequently, disqualification of a judge was difficult under section 144. In passing the amended 28 U.S.C. § 455, Congress broadened the grounds and loosened the procedure for disqualification in the federal courts.

     Section 455 “is directed to the judge, rather than the parties, and is self-enforcing on the part of the judge.” (U.S. v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1980)) It “modifies section 144 in requiring the judge to go beyond the section 144 affidavit and consider the merits of the motion pursuant to section 455(a) & (b)(1).” (Id. at 868)

     In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988), the Supreme Court, quoting the lower court’s decision, stated:

The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. Under section 455(a), therefore, recusal is required even when a judge lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge.

     In sum, under section 455, “it is the appearance of bias or partiality that matters here, not actual bias.” (United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996)) In Tucker, prosecutors, relying “primarily on news articles,” sought the recusal of District Court Judge Woods from the trial of Governor Tucker, because of Woods’s close association with Hillary Clinton, wife of then-President Bill Clinton. Governor Tucker was indicted for financial crimes related to an investigation of President and Mrs. Clinton. (Id. at 1315, 1316) The news articles indicated that not only did the Clintons have a close relationship with Judge Woods, but also they had expressed their support of Governor Tucker, including after he was indicted.

     The Tucker court held:

The Independent Counsel argues that, because of the “unmistakable appearance” of bias or partiality here, “reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance and reality of justice.” [] We agree. Based on the information before us in this case, we conclude that the risk of a perception of judicial bias or partiality is sufficiently great so that our proper course is to order reassignment on remand. As we have discussed, Judge Woods’s link with the Clintons and the Clintons’ connection to Tucker have been widely reported in the press. Moreover, as the Independent Counsel has noted, “this case will, as a matter of law, involve matters related to the investigation of the President and Hillary Rodham Clinton.” [] Given the high profile of the Independent Counsel’s work and of this case in particular, and the reported connections among Judge Woods, the Clintons, and Tucker, assignment to a different judge on remand is required to insure the perception of impartiality.

     (Id. at 1324-1325 (citations omitted))

     In the instant case, Judge Sammartino has a longstanding and close working relationship with clerk Jude who Plaintiff alleges violated a criminal code 18 U.S.C. 1001 and who, in the least, should be disciplined and removed from this case for backdating a docket entry. Hammett further argues that the clerk conspired with counsel who represented the L&E Trust Defendants at the time, and subsequently, Kramer. A reasonable person would well question the ability of Judge Sammartino to be impartial in deciding the case in general, especially since a gravamen of the case is whom exactly the Attorney Defendants were representing.

     Moreover, a separate Bivens action may arise from the clerk’s conduct and Judge Sammartino’s threatening admonishment in this case. Judge Sammartino may be called as a hostile witness in that case. Again, a reasonable person would easily question whether Judge Sammartino is able to impartially assess the evidence that Hammett asserts against Kramer that she did not file a timely response to the FAC and is therefore subject to default.

     Moreover, judicial remarks during the course of litigation may also support a bias or partiality challenge “if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source.” (Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994))

      Footnote 13 of the March 23, 2020 order, has an implication that Hammett gave no evidence supporting her claims in the documents filed pertaining to the backdating of the docket, Judge Sammartino revealed her prejudice against Hammett and a belief that she files baseless claims.

     Courts have also noted, in the context of recusal motions, that “the whole is sometimes greater than the sum of the parts. The cumulative effect of a judge’s individual actions, comments and past associations could raise some question about impartiality, even though none (taken alone) would require recusal. (In re Martinez-Catala, supra, 129 F.3d at 221)

     “[A] judge may not sit in cases in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (U.S. v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2008) (original emphasis) (internal quotation marks omitted)) “If it is a close case, the balance tips in favor of recusal.” Id. For that reason, the court in Melendres decided that recusal was appropriate: “No Court should tolerate even the slightest chance that its continued participation in a high profile lawsuit could taint the public’s perception of the fairness of the outcome. Certainly, this Court is unwilling to take such a risk.” (Melendres, 2009 WL 2132693, at *15, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, at *52-53)

     While the underlying case is not high profile and of little concern to the public, the Bivens action arising from the case may become high profile. The Plaintiff has been on Fox News and contributed to a series regarding corruption in the family law courts and is likely to bring this case to media attention in order to advocate for the rights of low and moderate income citizens to have access to civil courts. Clerk JPP and Judge Sammartino have elevated a mundane business and libel matter to a matter of deep public concern…the integrity of our courts.

IV. CONCLUSION.

     The instant case involves an issue that is relevant in today’s political and societal climate. The common man, or woman, feels a lack of empowerment in our legal system. Unless misconduct committed by a police, lawyer or judicial officer is caught on video, it will too often go unpunished. In civil court, as Judge Sammartino pointed out, litigants don’t even have the Constitutional right to counsel. So, those without obscene wealth cannot afford justice. They are outlawyered. Unfortunately, as in this case, the court staff, including judges, may do favors for friends, such as backdating a docket entry. And no judge really cares to be called out on the bad behavior.

      Against that backdrop, there is considerably more than the “slightest chance” that Judge Sammartino’s variance from her usual course of conduct “could taint the public’s perception of the fairness of the outcome.”

     The Judge’s Bias and Prejudice is personal and Extrajudicial.

     Because the acts that demonstrate bias came early, when the Court failed in its duty to protect the LLC derivative interests by informing Plaintiff that the derivative action was on behalf of the LLC, there was really no reason within the four walls of the courtroom that Judge Sammartino could develop her bias.

     In fact, to date, Judge Sammartino has not spoken to the Plaintiff. The Court has no more experience with the Plaintiff’s demeanor than any other person reading the Plaintiff’s papers.

     The Plaintiff’s words are polite and respectful. Even when describing behavior that is reprehensible, like a clerk of the court backdating a docket entry, Plaintiff does not cuss. She does not throw bricks through storefront windows or spray-paint expletives on the courthouse. She merely speaks what she thinks is the truth.

     Plaintiff is not certain why Judge Sammartino was prejudiced.

     If Judge Sammartino dislikes that Plaintiff reports injustice, then she should disqualify herself, rather than shooting the messenger. The Plaintiff has standing to ask her to do so, but the more important beneficiary is the People of the United States of America who long for justice for all.

     Respectfully submitted,

Date ____8/22/2020_________ Signature__s/Laura Lynn Hammett___________

                                                   Plaintiff in Pro Se Laura Lynn Hammett

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[1] The Plaintiff will not name Judge Sammartino as a defendant in the suit due to absolute judicial immunity, but Judge Sammartino will be called as a witness. The fair administration of justice is a competing policy with absolute judicial immunity even in the case where misconduct on the bench is clear, and can only be preserved by disqualification of the judge, disciplinary action or criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Laura Lynn Hammett, Plaintiff, v. Mary E. Sherman, et al. Defendant.

Case No.:            19-CV-0605-JLS-AHG   AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE JANIS L. SAMMARTINO Date of Hearing: October 1, 2020 Time: 1:30 p.m. Place: Courtroom D Hon. Janis L. Sammartino presiding Hon. Magistrate Allison H. Goddard

1.      I, Laura Lynn Hammett, Plaintiff in pro se and Affiant, state the following, which is known to me to be true and correct, or where I do not have direct knowledge, to the best of my knowledge and belief.
2.      I did not use the words “on behalf of Silver Strand Plaza, LLC” when I wrote the FAC in this case. This is because I did not go to law-school except one semester online, had no experience with a derivative case and did not realize a derivative cause is “on behalf of” the entity, called herein “SSP”, in which I am a shareholder.
3.      I first heard the word “derivative” cause of action from SSP Counsel Patrick C. McGarrigle, who contended strongly that all my claims were “derivative”, and that I could not bring the derivative claims because I “do not have standing”.
4.      I was represented on contingency until January 22, 2019 in this matter by an attorney who charges over $475 per hour to non-contingency clients. I was willing to settle my claims against the defendants for about $54,000, less than my capital in SSP, about $78,000, and would split that with my counsel, but the defendants refused. My attorney did not want to take the economic risk of continuing to represent me on contingency.
5.      I could not afford an attorney for all causes, but there are particular areas where either I could be reimbursed by the defendants, if I prevailed, or that were beyond my ability to understand without advanced, time-consuming study. One need was for explanation of particularly complex issues like Derivative causes of action.
6.      I therefore moved Judge Sammartino for leave to obtain “limited-scope representation”, similar to that allowed by other Federal District Courts, including the sister court to the north, Central District of Southern California.
7.      Judge Sammartino denied my motion. (ECF No. 22)
8.      On August 20, 2019, while reading case law to answer the Attorney Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, one case cited by the Attorney Defendnats being McDermott, I learned that a derivative action is “on behalf of” the entity I was a shareholder to, and any award of damages would go to SSP as a whole, so the share to me would be diluted to 14.1571%, my share. This made no sense, as all the other living Members were also defendants who participated in the misconduct.[1]
9.      More importantly, as I was already aware, I could not represent an entity other than myself. Instead of waiting to correct my error after receiving leave to amend, and moving the court for leave to file an individual injury cause of action based on conspiracy between the Attorney Defendants and other defendants in the case, I immediately dismissed the Attorney Defendants without prejudice, stating my reason as above. (See ECF No. 38)
10.      Judge Sammartino never admonished me that a derivative suit is on behalf of an entity that must be represented by a person authorized to practice law. She did not, and still has not mentioned that derivative suits presented by persons who are unauthorized to practice law are null and void.
11. [2] (ECF No. 39, 2:3-4)

1.      Clerk JPP input the defendants on the docket incorrectly on May 29, 2019. The caption and summons list were correct. But on the docket, Linda R. Kramer had no tag, an individual or as co-trustee of the Lynn & Erik’s Trust, and she was only listed once. Mary E. Sherman who was named in several capacities was listed an appropriate number of times with different tags.
2.      When Attorney Keith Cochran or someone on his behalf filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 30, 2019, the face of the motion said “Attorneys for Defendants Linda R. Kramer and Erik Von Pressentin (sic) Hunsaker as Co-Trustees of the Lynn and Erik’s Trust”.
3.      According to a declaration by Mr. Cochran’s paralegal, Robert M. Wilson, there was only one party with the name Linda R. Kramer on the electronic filing system under “select a filer”. Instead of reporting this to the clerk, Mr. Wilson swore he checked only two boxes, one for Linda R. Kramer and one for Erik Von Pressintin Hunsaker. (ECF No. 80-3, ⁋4)
4.      Mr. Wilson said “I believed by selecting the single option for Linda R. Kramer on the system, it encompassed both Linda R. Kramer as an individual and as co-trustee of the Lynn and Erik’s Trust.” (id.)
5.      In the same paragraph, Mr. Wilson swears he has been a paralegal for over five years and has “never encountered a party not being listed on the ECF system”. The various Mary E. Sherman defendants were each listed separately on the same field on the docket. But Mr. Wilson did not ask for a correction to be made by clerk JPP.
6.      Mr. Wilson never explained why he made the same error as the clerk by writing on the face of the L&E Trust MTD that Mr. Cochran represented only the co-trustees, not the individual Kramer.
7.      When I noticed the lack of Kramer as an individual as being represented on the L&E Trust MTD and tried to file a request for entry of clerk’s default on August 1, 2019, I brought the error to the clerk JPP’s attention. He added a second Linda R. Kramer filer.
8.      I filed a request, errantly titled “Request for Entry of Clerk’s Judgment”. Jude called me, and informed me that I should correct the request, and gave me the case number of a request that was filed by an attorney to use as a template.
9.     When I filed the corrected request, I noticed the docket entry for July 30, 2019 was changed for the L&E Trust MTD to say it was filed for three separate defendants, including Linda R. Kramer an individual.
10.      I accused Mr. Cochran of making the change and told him that I had a copy of the docket with only the two co-trustees listed as filing the L&E Trust MTD on July 30, 2019.
11.      Mr. Cochran wrote that “we” didn’t alter the docket. “We called the clerk to report the issue, and the clerk made the correction.” (ECF No. 56, Exhibit 2)
12.      By the time I called two clerks franticly to report the alteration of the record, it was changed back.
13.      Instead of filing the entry of clerk’s default against Kramer and letting Mr. Cochran file a motion to set aside, the clerk and then Judge Sammartino maintain that no entry of default is required because it was Mr. Cochran’s intention to file for three defendants and his paralegal did not know what to do when there was only one Linda R. Kramer listed. Instead of doing what I did, asking that the error be corrected, he just clicked off two boxes. No explanation is given why he took the individual Kramer off the list of whom was represented if she ever was listed. (ECF No. 19, cover)
14.      On ECF No. 80, the opposition to entry of Clerk’s default filed by Mr. Cochran, the list of representation on the cover includes Linda R. Kramer in two capacities.
15.      My trust in the integrity of the Judge Sammartino’s clerk was destroyed on August 1, 2019.
16.      But I did not file a motion for disqualification, because when trying to make a complaint to the Clerk of the Court, I was told Judge Sammartino was the clerk JPP’s direct supervisor and I wanted to give her an opportunity to correct his error.
17.      Shockingly, Judge Sammartino did not compel the Clerk to enter default.
18.      Instead she wrote this footnote on the Order of March 23, 2020:

“The Court cautions Plaintiff against impugning the Clerk or other staff of this Court or District based on gratuitous speculation regarding relationships of favoritism toward litigants or their counsel. See, e.g., ECF No. 85 at 2, 4. Such accusations should not be made lightly and, absent evidence supporting such claims, the Court will not countenance them.” (ECF No. 111, f.n. 13)

•      This admonishment makes me believe that my testimony is not considered evidence. It will be given no weight by Judge Sammartino. I also gave more than six exhibits and referred to the docket, but apparently Judge Sammartino did not consider that evidence. Apparently Judge Sammartino did not consider an admission by Mr. Cochran to calling the clerk to have JPP make “the correction” [the alteration and backdating of a docket entry without a notation of new date of entry] was not evidence.
•      Because the Court will not tolerate me testifying as evidence and does not acknowledge documentation I submitted as exhibits as evidence, I not only think I will lose my case, but I was punished by Judge Sammartino making a ridiculous error of ordering $39,000 in attorney fees to the Attorney Defendants as discussed below, and now need to have that order vacated or reversed on appeal.
•      I am extremely anxious about what Judge Sammartino is going to order when I file complaints about her and Jude with Clerk of the Court John Morrill, the Chief Judge, the Commission on Judicial Ethics or the FBI. She is chilling my First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances until she is recused from the case. I want to see wrongdoers fired, fined or incarcerated, but I do not want to lose my retirement to do so. The only way I can save my retirement appears to be a recusal of Judge Sammartino.
•      I filed a reply to the opposition to my motions for the court to compel entry of default and sanctions under Rule 11 on October 4 and 5, 2019. (ECF Nos. 84 and 85) On October 1, 2019, before the matters were fully briefed, I had a discussion by telephone with Jude.
•     Jude told me Judge Sammartino told him she was going to rule against me on the motion to compel. I am not repeating this for the truth of Jude’s statement, but for the fact that he said it, which had the appearance to me that Jude believes Judge Sammartino prejudged the motion.
•      Even though my affidavit is supposed to be taken as true for the purposes of disqualification, in an attempt to appease Judge Sammartino in her admonishment to present evidence, other than my testimony, I am attaching exhibit ‘A’. It is an email I sent to myself on December 1, 2019, before the Order on motion to compel was issued, with a forward of an email from Dennis to me sent the night before.
•       Dennis wrote another outrageous and delusional email that sounds like she was stalking me. Since she had calmed down for several months, I mused as to what triggered her outburst. I wrote “I wonder if her attorneys already heard what the decision forthcoming will be. Clerk JJP or Jude told me what the decision regarding the default would be on October 1, 2019.”.[3]
•      I noticed that all Judge Sammartino’s orders appear like she is representing the defendants, which is not usually a reason for disqualification. But as the defendants’ attorney, Judge Sammartino is making arguments that violate Rule 11.
•      For example, Judge Sammartino misapplied Gottesman and Coltrain by neglecting to notice that Plaintiff stated her reason to dismiss the malpractice cause without prejudice was because she was not a licensed attorney and therefore not considered competent to proceed “on behalf” of a Limited Liability Company. (ECF No. 111, 46:13-24; ECF No. 38)
•      Here is the second paragraph of an order in Gottesman which Judge Sammartino presided over at *1043, with my commentary after added bolding:

“As just discussed, under Coltrain, Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of Attorney Defendants creates a presumption that Attorney Defendants are the prevailing party. 66 Cal.App.4th at 107, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600. As Attorney Defendants note, Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. [I did.] (MTS Opp’n 13.) Nor does Plaintiff, in his own motion to strike, explain why he dismissed Attorney Defendants while their anti-SLAPP motion was still pending. [I did.] (See generally MTS; MTS Reply.) [omitted irrelevant text] But the California anti-SLAPP statute, as interpreted and applied by Coltrain and its progeny, allows the Court to inquire into Plaintiff’s reasons for dismissing these Defendants. And he has given none.[I did.] [omitted repetitive text] See, e.g., Fleming v. Coverstone, No. 08CV355 WQH (NLS), 2009 WL 764940, at *6 S.D. (Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (finding that a defendant was a prevailing party within the meaning of California’s anti-SLAPP statute where the plaintiff “d[id] not assert that he dismissed the defamation claim because Plaintiff has substantially achieved his goals through settlement, because Defendant was insolvent, or for other reasons unrelated to the probability of success on the merits”).[I did.] (Exhibit ECF No. 111, 46:18-22; Gottesman, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1043; Coltrain, 66 Cal. App. 4th at 107, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600; ECF No. 38, 2:10-22).

•      Another example is Judge Sammartino’s inconsistency in insisting defendants who do not answer timely need to file a motion to set aside entry of default instead of just jumping in as Kramer did in this case.

“The Court denies the motion [to dismiss] because the Court cannot consider any of Ms. Cohen’s arguments on the merits unless and until the entry of default against her is set aside. Pursuant to FRCP 55(a), the Clerk entered default against Ms. Cohen on January 12, 2006, when the first amended complaint (“FAC”) was the operative pleading in the litigation. (Doc. No. 40.) Plaintiff filed the SAC on March 5, 2007. (Doc No. 62.) Without previously moving to set aside the default, Ms. Cohen answered the SAC on June 5, 2007. (Doc. No. 83.) The Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller granted plaintiff’s unopposed FRCP 12(f) motion to strike on August 14, 2007. (Doc. No. 96.) In that Order, Judge Miller explained the effect of the default entered against Ms. Cohen prior to the filing of the SAC: ‘Since default has already been entered against the [defendants], they are no longer permitted to answer. This is true even though they were defaulted in connection with the now-inoperative FAC, which in all material terms is identical to the SAC as far as the Cohens are concerned.’ (Id. at 2.)

“Unless and until Ms. Cohen files a noticed motion to have the entry of default set aside (pursuant to FRCP 55(c)) and then prevails on that motion, she cannot litigate the merits. ‘ “[O]nce a default is entered, a defendant on default has no further standing to contest the factual allegations of plaintiff’s claim for relief.” ‘ Taylor v. City of Ballwin, Mo., 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Caribbean Produce Exch. v. Caribe Hydro-Trailer, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 46, 48 (D.P.R. 1974)); accord New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996); Twist & Shout Music v. Longneck Xpress, N.P., 441 F. Supp. 2d 782, 783 (E.D. Tex. 2006); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. M.J. Menefee Constr., Inc., 2006 WL 2522408, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006); see also TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001) (‘[f]or had there been no default, the plaintiff would of course have had to litigate the merits of the case’).”(Kremen v. Cohen, 2008 WL 11508541 at 1 and 2)

•      In the order granting attorney fees (ECF No. 11, Fee Motions Section at page 45) Judge Sammartino did not mention the first prong of the two-step test for anti-SLAPP motions.
•      I discussed the first prong thoroughly in my opposition. (ECF No. 78-1, 2-6)
•      I concluded: “Just in case the Court decides the Attorney Defendants motion survives the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test, Plaintiff will present compelling evidence by declaration that she will prevail on her claims when she revives them.”
•      I know that Judge Sammartino analyzes anti-SLAPP motions using the first prong of the test. She has written:

“Deciding an anti-SLAPP motion requires a two-step analysis. First, the court decides if the defendant “has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 67, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685 (Cal.2002). If the defendant meets this burden, then, second, the Court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Moser v. Triarc Companies, Inc., No. 05CV1742 JLS (WMC), 2008 WL 2705159, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 2008)

•      In fact, the case Judge Sammartino cited in her order, Gottesman, has this headnote:

“On motion to strike under California’s anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) statute, a defendant must make an initial prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s rights of petition or free speech. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.16(b), 425.16(c)(1).”

(Gottesman v. Santana, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1034 (S.D. Cal. 2017))

•      In each and every order found on Westlaw by Judge Sammartino dealing with a motion to strike pursuant to CCP §425.16 except this case, Judge Sammartino addressed the first prong. The Attorney Defendants motion should fail on the first prong, and therefore, the error looks intentional.
•       Judge Sammartino created confusion and misunderstanding when she wrote the Order of March 23, 2020, inter alia:

“Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint within forty-five (45) days of the electronic docketing of this order. Should Plaintiff fail timely to file an amended complaint, this action shall remain closed without further Order of the Court.” (A1: ECF 111, 54:7-10 (Attachments are designated “A#”; EFC refers to the district court docket electronic case filing number))

•      For three weeks, I understood this to mean the order was not final, because I could amend my complaint. Finality would come 45 days later. That is how it is done the vast majority of the time.
•      But on April 14th, I noticed that the Clerk of the Court wrote “closed” and “terminated” on the header of the docket.
•      I made a written inquiry of the clerk.
•      Joseph Diaz, CM/ECF Coordinator responded. “Yes. The case was terminated on 03/23/2020 per the following order: [followed by the order]”.
•      “Closed” means “(Of a class or organization) confined to a limited number”. (Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)) “Terminate” means “1. To put an end to; to bring to an end. 2. To end; to conclude.” (id.)
•       My appellate attorney had never seen a case closed this way in 18 years of practice, but she had me sign a retainer agreement and read through the case file in anticipation of the Ninth Circuit deciding “terminated” meant the case was final, or if I got too sick to write an amended complaint and just appealed the parts of the order of March 23, 2020.
•      I found some orders granting leave to amend by Judge Sammartino. Here is a typical sample: “Plaintiffs MAY FILE an amended complaint on or before thirty (30) days of the electronic docketing of this Order. Should Plaintiffs choose not to file an amended complaint by this time, this case shall be dismissed and the file closed.” (Barvie v. Bank of America, N.A., 2018 WL 4537723)
•      In Barvie, if the order was issued on March 23rd, the amended complaint would need to be filed on April 22nd. If no amended complaint was filed, the case would then be dismissed on April 23rd. The clerk would mark it “closed” and “terminated” on the docket. The notice of appeal would be due on May 23rd or the next Monday if it fell on a weekend.
•      In Hammett, the order was issued on March 23rd. If I decided against the amendment, the notice of appeal would be due April 22nd. March 23rd is the day the case was “closed” and “terminated”. It never opened back up. There would be an argument if the plaintiff tried to file a notice of appeal 30 days after the day the amendment was due.
•      Because of the appearance of bias of Judge Sammartino, I anticipated that if I did not file my notice of appeal the Court would allow the Attorney Defendants to reapply for a judgment and grant it on April 23^rd.
•       It cost me $505 and now I need to oppose the Stern and Goldberg motion for attorney fees on appeal.
•      I never heard of Judge Sammartino before this case was assigned to her.
•      I do have a history of Judges and appointed collaterals voluntarily recusing for cause from cases I was involved in including but not limited to Former Commissioner Alan H. Friedenthal, Commissioner Steff Padilla, Judge Hank Goldberg, Minor’s Counsel John Carlson and Minor’s Counsel Kenneth Sherman.
•      I have been featured on and consulted with Fox News to produce a series on ills in the family law and dependency courts. The Metropolitan News-Enterprise errantly attributed a recall campaign of Judge Elizabeth Feffer to me. The AP picked up a story I broke about court evaluator Dr. Joseph Keenan, after the Los Angeles Times repeated the information.
•      It is plausible Judge Sammartino had heard of me and should have recused herself and didn’t.
•       It is also plausible that Judge Sammartino has a prejudice against pro se litigants. I’ve surveyed at least a hundred of her orders involving pro se litigants and it appears I have more chance of dying from COVID-19 than making it to a jury trial or reasonable settlement if Judge Sammartino is presiding.
•      Therefore, because of the appearance of bias for the defendants and prejudice against me, I pray the Court will disqualify Judge Janis L. Sammartino from this case.
•      I swear the foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge and belief, signed under penalty of perjury according to the laws of the United States of America.

Dated August 22, 2020                      s/Laura Lynn Hammett

                                                           Laura Lynn Hammett, Plaintiff in Pro Se 

CERTIFICATION

I, Laura Lynn Hammett, Plaintiff in pro se, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing affidavit is made in good faith.

Dated August 22, 2020                                   s/Laura Lynn Hammett

                                                                          Laura Lynn Hammett, Plaintiff in Pro Se

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[1] One Member would be a defendant but was deceased in 2017 and I think it is too late to name her estate.

[2] I could have proceeded on the fifth cause of action for conversion, but wrote that I would reinstate that cause after adding conspiracy causes of action against the Attorney Defendants for their economy.

[3] The email Dennis sent is not being complained of in this suit. It is just evidence that Jude made a comment to me on October 1, 2019 and that I wonder if he made a similar comment to the defendants.

Kamala Harris may be one heart beat away from being our next President of the United States. Joe Biden is not a spring chicken.

Demographically, I’m all for having a woman of other than Western European descent in the Whitehouse. But those are characteristics Senator Harris has no control over. Her policies and performance she does control…and they are abysmal.

As my Arkansan friend Doug Weaver said, “people who are from California are smart.”

I fled California with good reason.

Unaffordable housing. Record homelessness. Rising crime. Failing schools. Independent contractors thrown out of work. Exploding pension debt. And now, a locked down population while the prisons are emptied.

When I left, Kamala Harris was State Attorney General.

My life’s work was writing about corruption in the California courts and with Department of Child and Family Services. The people who had problems in the system, each and every one, despised Kamala Harris.

If you are “on the fence” or just don’t like to vote, make this the year you do. Please. Fill out an absentee ballot and mail it in. Do not let America become an extension of California.

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