I’m not an attorney—just a law student—but here’s my take.

Forced catheterization is not rape. It is battery.

That distinction matters legally, even if it doesn’t make the experience any less invasive or traumatic. Battery is an intentional, non-consensual touching. A catheter is a physical intrusion. That fits squarely within traditional tort doctrine.

Some have argued that the patient’s drug use—cannabinoids, methamphetamine, amphetamine, and benzodiazepines—made him incapable of rational decision-making. But in Arkansas, physicians generally must seek court authorization before overriding a competent adult’s autonomy for non-emergency physical treatment. A 72-hour psychiatric hold allows providers to detain and evaluate a patient, not to perform any procedure they wish with impunity. And Mr. Hurst was released after only a few hours, not held under a full 72-hour commitment.

Procedurally, Hurst made several mistakes that the defense and the court were quick to exploit. He framed his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies only to actions taken under color of state law. Private hospitals and staff are not automatically state actors, so that theory was not going to work in Hurst.

There is also no indication that Hurst sought production of the emergency room surveillance footage. If such video existed and had been preserved, it could have provided objective evidence of what occurred. At the summary-judgment stage, however, a plaintiff’s sworn testimony describing specific physical acts is typically enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact. The absence of corroborating video should not automatically end the case.

Eventually, Hurst appeared to recognize the real issue: forced catheterization is a question of medical battery, not rape. Some jurisdictions define rape in ways that exclude penile penetration, which makes the battery theory not only more accurate but more legally viable.

Hurst attempted to amend his complaint to reflect that shift. According to Judge Timothy L. Brooks, the amendment was untimely and would have been futile in any event because no § 1983 liability attached to the defendants’ conduct. The court characterized the proposed amendment as merely relabeling the same facts—from “rape” to “medical battery”—without curing the jurisdictional problem.

In other words, Hurst discussed tort concepts but never clearly moved to assert a state-law battery claim in a way that satisfied procedural rules. In litigation, that kind of technical omission can be fatal. Courts are not required to rewrite pleadings for a party just because the underlying facts might fit a different cause of action or reason to dismiss.

It is done; but usually not to benefit a pro se litigant.

Magic words aren’t supposed to matter in modern pleading. But sometimes it feels like if you don’t say abracadabra in exactly the right format, your case disappears anyway.