Pip: When a hospital bills you over a hundred thousand dollars for care you never consented to, the least they could do is spell your name right on the invoice. LauraLynnHammett has been doing something harder — building the legal record.

Mara: This episode follows the opposition filings in the UAMS case, specifically the response to Charge Nurse Susan Norsworthy's motion to dismiss. We're covering confinement without consent, the battery and false imprisonment claims, and the immunity arguments. Let's start with what Norsworthy actually did and what the plaintiffs say must now be answered in court.

Norsworthy, the ICU, and a Case That Won't Be Dismissed

Pip: The core question here is whether a charge nurse can participate in holding a patient for two weeks without consent or a court order, administer sedating drugs over his objection, and then walk away from the lawsuit by arguing the complaint wasn't specific enough.

Mara: The filings lay out the timeline precisely. On January 24, 2024, Norsworthy personally administered Dexmedetomidine — a heavy sedative sold as Precedex — to Sean at around 11:44 a.m., without his consent and without consent from his mother Laura. That same afternoon, Laura video recorded a conversation with Norsworthy, and the complaint quotes it directly: "Zaleski said to Hammett again, 'we don't give benzos to TBIs.'"

Pip: So she administered a sedating drug and then told the patient's mother no sedating drugs were being given. That is the definition of the problem.

Mara: And the filings document that Norsworthy did not record the approximately nineteen-minute conversation, nor the one from the day before. On January 21st, she had also chased Sean down a hallway and stairwell with another staff member, and failed to request preservation of the surveillance video afterward.

Mara: The complaint covers Sean's confinement from January 13 through January 27, 2024, during which over seventy-two UAMS clinicians are alleged to have worked in concert to hold him without legal authority, resulting in a bill exceeding $115,000.

Pip: Norsworthy's own motion argued that Sean's communication disabilities meant he wasn't really representing himself. The filings turn that around hard.

Mara: Right. The response notes that Norsworthy had justified Sean's continued confinement by saying he needed to be "with it 100% of the time so he can leave," and then in the motion to dismiss argued those same disabilities don't give rise to compensable damages. The filing calls that position directly inconsistent.

Pip: You used his disability to keep him. You can't then say the disability doesn't count when he wants redress for it.

Mara: On immunity, Norsworthy claimed statutory protection under Arkansas law for non-malicious acts within the scope of employment. The response points out that under Arkansas law, the party asserting immunity bears the burden of proving it — including proving no liability coverage exists. The filing cites City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang on that point. Norsworthy attempted to shift that burden to the plaintiffs, who say they simply have no way to know about her insurance until discovery.

Mara: The outrage claim is also detailed. The filings allege Norsworthy knew or should have known that Laura would suffer severe emotional distress from witnessing Sean held without consent, and that Norsworthy committed fraud by misrepresenting Sean's condition — including repeating a claim that he had fallen thirty-five feet when the actual fall was approximately ten feet.

Pip: The plaintiffs are willing to amend the complaint to add seventy-one defendant-specific subsections if that's what specificity requires. That's not a bluff — that's a filing strategy.

Mara: The request is clear: deny Norsworthy's motion to dismiss, or grant leave to amend. The filings argue amendment is not futile, and that the existing complaint already states sufficient facts to proceed on claims of false imprisonment, battery, negligence, and outrage against Norsworthy individually.

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Pip: What stays with me is the video. Laura recorded it despite being threatened with removal from the premises, and that recording is now exhibit evidence.

Mara: The next filings will address the other defendants. Each one, the plaintiffs say, will get their own subsection — and the same level of detail.

Amendments of our complaint about UAMS doctors and nurses imprisoning and battering a man for two weeks will be cumbersome, but clearly describe the conduct by each individual defendant. This is in response to motions to dismiss by several of the doctors and nurses, through their attorneys.

Here are our responses to the motion to dismiss by Charge Nurse Susan Zaleski, who now goes by Susan Norsworthy. There are sections that list some significant conduct that was included in the original complaint and a section that lists additional conduct that will be added in the amended complaint. This document will also be given to law enforcement. We allege that it is criminal conduct to restrain a person physically and chemically for two weeks without consent or a court order. Susan Zaleski knew there was no consent, and she did not petition a court for permission before she administered drugs. She also lied about what drugs were administered.

I. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges facts against Norsworthy sufficient to state claims upon which relief can be granted to Sean.

Both Plaintiffs named defendant Susan Zaleski as one of over 72 UAMS “clinicians” who worked in concert to confine Sean in ICU without consent or legal authority from January 13, 2024 through January 27, 2024 and then charge him in excess of $115,000. See Compl., in general and at p. 5, 16, 69.

On January 21, 2024, Norsworthy chased Sean down a hallway and stairwell assisted by Shannon Cobb and other defendants as yet unidentified. Norsworthy failed to request preservation of the surveillance video, compl., at p. 51, but described the incident to Laura. Ex. 18, Pls.’ Produc. May 13, 2026, thumb drive PF. 000404 video at about 9:10. Amendment of the complaint will include this fact.

During Sean’s confinement, Norsworthy personally administered  Dexmedetomidine (Precedex) to Sean on January 24, 2024 at about 11:44 a.m., against Sean’s will and without consent from Laura. Compl., at P. 35. This had a heavily sedating effect. (Amendment will include this notation found on Ex. 18, Pls.’ Produc. May 13, 2026, thumb drive PF. 002190)(Electronically signed S.Z).

On the afternoon of January 24, 2024, Laura insisted on having a conversation with Norsworthy. Compl., at p. 43.  Despite earlier threats of being removed from the premises for video recording, Compl., at p. 54-55, Laura video recorded Norsworthy. This was one of many times that a defendant made false statements that Sean was not drugged.  “Zaleski said to Hammett again, ‘we don’t give benzos to TBIs.’” Compl., at p. 43, 70; Ex. 18, Pls.’ Produc. May 13, 2026, thumb drive PF. 000404 video at about 6:40.

Norsworthy also said that she and Laura had previously discussed Laura’s concerns that using restraints was retraumatizing Sean. Laura said “I know we did.” Id., at about 9:00.

Norsworthy did not document the approximately 19-minute conversation, nor their conversation the day before.

On January 24, 2024, Norsworthy relied upon Sean’s communication-related impairments and need for prompting as justification for continuing his confinement. Norsworthy acknowledged that Sean had “periods of lucidity” and could at times engage in normal conversation, but maintained that he needed to be “with it 100% of the time so he can leave.” PF. 000404 at ~10:05. Norsworthy further stated, “If he could make great decisions 100 percent of the time then we wouldn’t even have this conversation.” PF. 000404 at ~10:39. Thus, Norsworthy treated Sean’s communication disabilities and need for assistance with communication-related functions as grounds to deprive him of autonomy.

Norsworthy now takes the inconsistent position that Sean’s communication disabilities do not give rise to compensable damages. The need for assistance with communication, record maintenance, paperwork, and other instrumental activities of daily living does not divest a person of the ability to direct his own affairs any more than the use of an interpreter or other ADA accommodation transfers decision-making authority to the person providing assistance. Having relied upon those impairments to justify Sean’s continued confinement, Norsworthy cannot now dismiss them as legally insignificant when Sean seeks redress for the harms arising from them.

Finally, Norsworthy calls her own ability to reason into doubt when she insinuates that because Sean needs assistance with communication, record maintenance, paperwork, and other instrumental activities of daily living, he is not representing himself.

II. Though there are enough facts to proceed against Norsworthy on the operative complaint, the courts must give liberal leave to amend, and the Plaintiffs intend to amend.

The Court must “treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000); Arkansas Tech Univ. v. Link, 341 Ark. 495, 17 S.W.3d 809 (2000).” Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark. 148, 155–56, 72 S.W.3d 85, 89 (2002).

Norsworthy suggested rather than describing what each “clinician defendant” did as plaintiffs set up with Complaint ¶ 3, that the plaintiffs should replace “clinician defendants” with each of the 81 individual names. While cumbersome, the Plaintiffs are willing and able to do that.

Therefore, plaintiffs ask for leave to amend with permission to keep Norsworthy as a defendant. Rather than using the detailed timeline that mentions Norsworthy and each defendant by name, the plaintiffs plan to have 71 subsections that go into more specificity for each known defendant and two sections for the Doe defendants.

The following sections show that amendment is not futile by changing the structure of the complaint:

Norsworthy is liable to Sean for the following claims subsumed under medical injury: gross negligence (if Norsworthy has insurance), criminal^[1] and civil false imprisonment, criminal^[2] and civil battery, and outrage.

1. Negligence

To establish liability in tort, a plaintiff must show that damages were sustained, that the defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc. v. Cooper, 345 Ark. 136, 142, 44 S.W.3d 336, 340 (2001); Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 412, 947 S.W.2d 780, 784 (1997). Negligence is the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do. Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc., 2010 Ark. 466, 4, 369 S.W.3d 717, 719 (2010). To prove negligence, it must be shown that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in carrying out a legal duty owed to the plaintiff under the circumstances. Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 158, 947 S.W.2d 349, 356 (1997). A negligent act occurs when a reasonable person in the same circumstances would recognize a significant risk of harm to others and would either refrain from acting or proceed with greater caution. Ouachita Wilderness, 329 Ark. at 412, 947 S.W.2d at 784.

Proximate cause is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Chambers v. Stern, 347 Ark. 395, 406, 64 S.W.3d 737, 744 (2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 940 (2002). There must be a causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and the damage shown by the evidence to prove negligence. Chambers, 347 Ark. at 406, 64 S.W.3d at 744 (2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 940.

Negligence is the proximate cause of an injury only if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act and ought to have been foreseen in the light of attending circumstances. Lindle Shows v. Shibley, 249 Ark. 671, 675, 460 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1970). To prove negligence in this state, the injury must have been reasonably foreseeable. Benson v. Shuler Drilling Co., 316 Ark. 101, 112, 871 S.W.2d 552, 558 (1994).

Norsworthy had a legal duty not to commit battery on Sean, but she did as shown below. Norsworthy had a duty not to falsely imprison Sean, but she did as shown below. Norsworthy had a legal duty to petition a court, or verify that someone on her “team” had petitioned a court for permission to hold and treat Sean against his will. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-604; Compl. ¶¶ 91, 264. Norsworthy failed to do this, did not make any notes that showed she considered her duty.

Norsworthy caused a significant risk of harm to Lynn by injecting him with Precedex. Sean suffered side effects that are listed on the FDA approved Precedex insert.

Norsworthy caused a significant risk of harm each time she chased and tackled Sean and supervised other nurses who chased and tackled Sean. Sean sustained several head injuries during his capture.

Norsworthy caused a risk of electrolyte imbalance by withholding the foods that Sean wanted to eat; foods that brought his sodium level to normal within four days of going home. Sean suffered hyponatremia while under Norsworthy’s control.

• Civil Battery

 Battery is when a person intends to cause some harmful or offensive contact with another person, and that harmful or offensive contact results. Mann v. Pierce, 2016 Ark. 418, 7, 505 S.W.3d 150, 154 (2016). Liability for battery is not limited to the individual who makes the contact; an accomplice that enables or assists the act is liable as a principal and responsible for its full consequences. Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 156, 121 S.W.3d 164, 170.

Norsworthy had no legal authority to keep Sean restrained nor inject him with Precedex without consent. Compl. ¶ 62. These were harmful and offensive contacts that Norsworthy meant to make.

Norsworthy is also liable for each contact made by each defendant who was supervised by Norsworthy, the nurse in charge on at least January 24, 2024.

• Criminal Battery

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–118–107 (Supp.2001), which was enacted in 1997, provides:

(a)(1) Any person injured or damaged by reason of conduct of another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law may file a civil action to recover damages based on the conduct.

(2) The burden of proof for showing conduct that constituted a felony shall be a preponderance of the evidence.

(3) If the person who is injured or damaged prevails, he or she shall be entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees.

(b) The action may be maintained by the person who was injured or damaged or, after the person’s death, the executor, administrator, or representative of his or her estate.

 (c) The remedy provided in this section shall be in addition to any other remedies in law or equity.

Costner, 82 Ark. App. 148, 157, 121 S.W.3d 164, 170–71 (2003).

A person commits battery in the first degree if acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit a felony; and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony the person or an accomplice causes serious physical injury to any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201.

Norsworthy attempted and indeed committed the felony of false imprisonment (discussed below) by using physical and chemical restraints or having an accomplice use physical or chemical restraints on Sean, showing complete indifference to the fact that Sean might be allergic to the drugs administered. Also, that Sean had a history of substance abuse that he recovered from 10 years earlier and reintroducing drugs into Sean’s system might cause him to start using again, or reverting to other addictive behavior. In the later case, Sean might eventually die and have a traumatic life in the meantime.

A person commits battery in the second degree if the person recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202. “Deadly weapon” means anything that in the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102.

Controlled substances are controlled for a reason. UAMS doctors diagnosed Sean as in “critical” condition after the forced medication, dehydration and starvation caused severe hyponatremia. The UAMS “team” would not allow Sean to have free sodium level testing on an outpatient basis from January 28 to 31. This indifference to their victim’s life illustrates the recklessness with which Norsworthy acted.

• Civil False Imprisonment

False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another consisting of detention without sufficient legal authority. Headrick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 Ark. 433, 435, 738 S.W.2d 418, 420 (1987). Norsworthy detained Sean with no lawful authority.

• Criminal false imprisonment

A person commits the offense of false imprisonment in the first degree if, without consent and without lawful authority, the person knowingly restrains another person so as to interfere substantially with the other person’s liberty in a manner that exposes the other person to a substantial risk of serious physical injury. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-11-103. False Imprisonment in the second degree does not expose the victim to serious bodily injury. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-11-104.

Norsworthy had no lawful authority to restrain Sean, and did so, which exposed Sean to serious physical injury.

• Outrage

To establish an outrage claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” was “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and was “utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 470, 963 S.W.2d 583, 585 (1998).

Norsworthy should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of holding Sean in the hospital tied naked to a cot, drugged against his will, kept from his daughter, isolated from his mother as punishment for protesting. Now Norseworthy is making it difficult to resolve the dispute, hoping to get the case thrown out based on a bald accusation that only Laura served Norsworthy.

III. Norsworthy Fails to Establish Insufficient Service or Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

Norsworthy’s individualized argument is notably sparse. Aside from asserting that she received a summons from Laura Hammett but was not served by Sean Lynn, Norsworthy presents no facts or legal analysis unique to her circumstances. Norsworthy Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss., at 4. Instead, she purports to incorporate by reference the facts and arguments contained in another defendant’s brief pursuant to Rule 10(c).

Rule 10(c), however, permits incorporation by reference of matters contained in “pleadings.” The pleadings authorized by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 7 do not include motions or briefs. Plaintiffs have raised this issue in prior oppositions to motions to dismiss in this case. Thus, while criticizing Plaintiffs for purported “group pleading,” Norsworthy herself relies upon generalized arguments adopted from a separate defendant rather than presenting defendant-specific facts and authority supporting dismissal.

IV. Immunity does not extend to defendants named as individuals for intentional acts.

While sovereign immunity under Article 5, Section 20 may bar official-capacity claims against state officers in certain circumstances, the plaintiffs have expressly stated in the Complaint that clinician defendants, including Norsworthy, are named as individuals. Compl. ¶ 3. Norsworthy’s own brief concedes this point by framing the official-capacity immunity argument as made only “out of an abundance of caution.” Norsworthy Br., at p. 2. Because the Complaint expressly names Norsworthy as an individual defendant and not in her official capacity, the sovereign immunity doctrine applicable to official-capacity suits is simply inapplicable here. The Court need not reach the official-capacity immunity question at all, and Norsworthy’s preemptive argument on this point should not be used to recharacterize the nature of the claims or to extend immunity protections beyond their intended scope.

Norsworthy argues that in her individual capacity, she is entitled to statutory immunity under Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-44-305(a), the statute that immunizes state officers and employees from liability and suit for non-malicious acts occurring within the course and scope of their employment, except to the extent covered by liability insurance. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-44-305(a); Norsworthy Br., at p. 2-3. Norsworthy argues that Sean was required to assert Norsworthy maintains liability insurance; and Norsworthy concludes that she acted in good faith in performing her duties as an ICU room nurse and is entitled to statutory immunity. Norsworthy Br., at p. 2.

            When a defendant pleads an affirmative defense of immunity, that defendant must plead and prove no liability coverage. City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18, 5, 509 S.W.3d 632, 635 (2017). Norsworthy attempts to shift that burden to the plaintiffs. Norsworthy Br., at p. 3 (“Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no allegation that Norsworthy maintains liability insurance that would subject him to this lawsuit.”). There is no way for the plaintiffs to know if Norsworthy has insurance coverage until given an opportunity to ask her by interrogatory or requests for admission. Because neither plaintiff was able to work full time on this case, the plaintiffs hope to serve discovery requests in the next month, after Laura catches up with the backlog. (Sean is pursuing a life goal that ends in August, and cannot work at a desk or computer, but he is in daily communication with Laura, leads plaintiffs’ discussions, drafts sections as best he can within the limitations of aphasia and working on a cell-phone, and makes all corrections to plaintiffs’ joint documents as he deems appropriate.)

Under Arkansas law, immunity is an affirmative defense, and the party asserting it bears the burden of proving it. Camden – Progressive Eldercare Servs., Inc. v. Robinson, 2025 Ark. App. 562, 14, 726 S.W.3d 645, 655 (2025). Norsworthy did not present evidence to support her assertion that she acted in good faith. See Norsworthy Br.

For these reasons, the Plaintiffs ask that Susan Zaleski now Norsworthy’s motion to dismiss be denied, or in the alternative, that the Plaintiffs be granted leave to amend the complaint.

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[1] Civil Action by Crime Victim, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 (2011).

[2] Id.

***** Would you trust the medical care provided by Nurse Susan Norsworthy and the other UAMS providers who forced fentanyl on a TBI patient? Do you think UAMS should be able to keep the $20,000 they ultimately collected from Medicaid to treat Sean’s hospital-acquired conditions and unlawful physical restraint?

I. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges facts against Norsworthy sufficient to state claims upon which relief can be granted to Laura Hammett.

Both Plaintiffs named defendant Susan Zaleski (now Norsworthy) as one of over 72 UAMS “clinicians” who worked in concert to confine Sean in ICU without consent or legal authority from January 13, 2024 through January 27, 2024 and then charge him in excess of $115,000. See Compl., in general and at p. 5, 16, 69. Laura Hammett was given the option of abandoning her son to his captors or witnessing the traumatic events over the course of two weeks. Norseworthy also committed fraud on Laura, causing higher anxiety and convincing Laura to refrain from the focused and deliberate action required to help Sean leave the hospital without more violence.

On January 21, 2024, Norsworthy chased Sean down a hallway and stairwell assisted by Shannon Cobb and other defendants as yet unidentified. Norsworthy failed to request preservation of the surveillance video, compl., at p. 51, but described the incident to Laura. Ex. 18, Pls.’ Produc. May 13, 2026, thumb drive PF. 000404 video at about 9:10. Amendment of the complaint will include this fact. Norsworthy knew or should have known that police were not allowed to arrest Sean or tackle him. She failed to correct her cohort who told Laura that was a possibility.

During Sean’s confinement, Norsworthy personally administered  Dexmedetomidine (Precedex) to Sean on January 24, 2024 at about 11:44 a.m., against Sean’s will and without consent from Laura. Compl., at P. 35. This had a heavily sedating effect. (Amendment will include this notation found on Ex. 18, Pls.’ Produc. May 13, 2026, thumb drive PF. 002190)(Electronically signed SZ). Then Norsworthy told Hammett that Sean’s affect was caused by the initial injury of falling from what she misrepresented as 35 feet.

On the afternoon of January 24, 2024, Laura insisted on having a conversation with Norsworthy. Compl., at p. 43.  Despite earlier threats of being removed from the premises for video recording, Compl., at p. 54-55, Laura video recorded Norsworthy. This was one of many times that a defendant made false statements that Sean was not drugged.  “Zaleski said to Hammett again, ‘we don’t give benzos to TBIs.’” Compl., at p. 43, 70; Ex. 18, Pls.’ Produc. May 13, 2026, thumb drive PF. 000404 video at about 6:40.

Norsworthy also said that she and Laura had previously discussed Laura’s concerns that using restraints was retraumatizing Sean. Laura said “I know we did.” Id., at ~ 9:00. Despite the earlier conversation, Norsworthy did not request a patient advocate assist Laura in pursuing Sean’s rights.

Norsworthy said Laura was “prompting” Sean. Id.  at ~ 13:40. Norsworthy continues here to try to intimidate Laura into withholding communication accommodations to Sean. It is note-worthy that Norsworthy did not request a specialist in aphasia or hearing loss assist Sean instead.

Norsworthy did not document the approximately 19-minute conversation, nor their conversation the day before.

Assisting a person with communication, record maintenance, paperwork, and other instrumental activities of daily living does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Further, Norsworthy calls her own ability to reason into doubt when she insinuates that when Laura  assists Sean with communication, record maintenance, paperwork, and other instrumental activities of daily living, she is committing the unauthorized practice of law. Norsworthy is intimidating Laura, Sean’s primary, non-hostile witness.  This intimidation, that should be evident to the Court, gives credibility to Laura’s claims that she was intimidated while trying to advocate for Sean while he was restrained.

II. Though there are enough facts to proceed against Norsworthy on the operative complaint, the courts must give liberal leave to amend, and the Plaintiffs intend to amend.

The Court must “treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000); Arkansas Tech Univ. v. Link, 341 Ark. 495, 17 S.W.3d 809 (2000).” Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark. 148, 155–56, 72 S.W.3d 85, 89 (2002).

Norsworthy suggested rather than describing what each “clinician defendant” did as plaintiffs set up with Complaint ¶ 3, that the plaintiffs should replace “clinician defendants” with each of the 81 individual names. While cumbersome, the Plaintiffs are willing and able to do that.

Therefore, plaintiffs ask for leave to amend with permission to keep Norsworthy as a defendant. Rather than using the detailed timeline that mentions Norsworthy and each defendant by name, the plaintiffs plan to have 71 subsections that go into more specificity for each known defendant and two sections for the Doe defendants.

The following sections show that amendment is not futile by changing the structure of the complaint:

Norsworthy is liable to Laura for gross negligence (if Norsworthy has insurance), and outrage.

1. Negligence

To establish liability in tort, a plaintiff must show that damages were sustained, that the defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc. v. Cooper, 345 Ark. 136, 142, 44 S.W.3d 336, 340 (2001); Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 412, 947 S.W.2d 780, 784 (1997). Negligence is the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do. Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc., 2010 Ark. 466, 4, 369 S.W.3d 717, 719 (2010). To prove negligence, it must be shown that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in carrying out a legal duty owed to the plaintiff under the circumstances. Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 158, 947 S.W.2d 349, 356 (1997). A negligent act occurs when a reasonable person in the same circumstances would recognize a significant risk of harm to others and would either refrain from acting or proceed with greater caution. Ouachita Wilderness, 329 Ark. at 412, 947 S.W.2d at 784.

Proximate cause is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Chambers v. Stern, 347 Ark. 395, 406, 64 S.W.3d 737, 744 (2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 940 (2002). There must be a causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and the damage shown by the evidence to prove negligence. Chambers, 347 Ark. at 406, 64 S.W.3d at 744 (2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 940.

Negligence is the proximate cause of an injury only if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act and ought to have been foreseen in the light of attending circumstances. Lindle Shows v. Shibley, 249 Ark. 671, 675, 460 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1970). To prove negligence in this state, the injury must have been reasonably foreseeable. Benson v. Shuler Drilling Co., 316 Ark. 101, 112, 871 S.W.2d 552, 558 (1994).

Norsworthy had a legal duty not to misinform Laura about Sean’s condition. To the extent Norsworthy can prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the misinformation was not purposeful, it was negligent. For example, Norsworthy might not have known that Defendant Nathan Ernst’s narrative that Sean fell 35 feet was wrong. It was reckless to tell Laura that Sean fell 35 feet, instead of saying she did not know. Sean’s physical condition without drugs did not look anything like would be expected from a three-story fall. Sean looked healthy for a person who hit his head from 10 feet. The 35 foot fall scenario would be a miracle.

Norseworthy had a legal duty not to criminally imprison and battery Laura’s son in front of Laura. Norsworthy should have known that severe emotional distress would be caused by witnessing those crimes.

B. Outrage

To establish an outrage claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” was “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and was “utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 470, 963 S.W.2d 583, 585 (1998).

Norsworthy should have known that Laura’s emotional distress was the likely result of seeing Sean in the hospital tied naked to a cot with blood and feces dried onto his genitals, drugged against his will, being told that she, Laura, might have to care for Sean 24/7 for the rest of his life.

III. Immunity does not extend to defendants named as individuals for intentional acts.

While sovereign immunity under Article 5, Section 20 may bar official-capacity claims against state officers in certain circumstances, the plaintiffs have expressly stated in the Complaint that clinician defendants, including Norsworthy, are named as individuals. Compl. ¶ 3. Norsworthy’s own brief concedes this point by framing the official-capacity immunity argument as made only “out of an abundance of caution.” Norsworthy Br., at p. 2. Because the Complaint expressly names Norsworthy as an individual defendant and not in her official capacity, the sovereign immunity doctrine applicable to official-capacity suits is simply inapplicable here. The Court need not reach the official-capacity immunity question at all, and Norsworthy’s preemptive argument on this point should not be used to recharacterize the nature of the claims or to extend immunity protections beyond their intended scope.

Norsworthy argues that in her individual capacity, she is entitled to statutory immunity under Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-44-305(a), the statute that immunizes state officers and employees from liability and suit for non-malicious acts occurring within the course and scope of their employment, except to the extent covered by liability insurance. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-44-305(a); Norsworthy Br., at p. 2-3. Norsworthy argues that Laura was required to assert Norsworthy maintains liability insurance; and Norsworthy concludes that she acted in good faith in performing her duties as an ICU room nurse and is entitled to statutory immunity. Norsworthy Br., at p. 2.

            When a defendant pleads an affirmative defense of immunity, that defendant must plead and prove no liability coverage. City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18, 5, 509 S.W.3d 632, 635 (2017). Norsworthy attempts to shift that burden to the plaintiffs. Norsworthy Br., at p. 3 (“Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no allegation that Norsworthy maintains liability insurance that would subject him to this lawsuit.”). There is no way for the plaintiffs to know if Norsworthy has insurance coverage until given an opportunity to ask her by interrogatory or requests for admission. Because neither plaintiff was able to work full time on this case, the plaintiffs hope to serve discovery requests in the next month, after Laura catches up with the backlog. (Sean is pursuing a life goal that ends in August, and cannot work at a desk or computer, but he is in daily communication with Laura, leads plaintiffs’ discussions, drafts sections as best he can within the limitations of aphasia and working on a cell-phone, and makes all corrections to plaintiffs’ joint documents as he deems appropriate.)

Under Arkansas law, immunity is an affirmative defense, and the party asserting it bears the burden of proving it. Camden – Progressive Eldercare Servs., Inc. v. Robinson, 2025 Ark. App. 562, 14, 726 S.W.3d 645, 655 (2025). Norsworthy did not present evidence to support her assertion that she acted in good faith. See Norsworthy Br.

Norsworthy acknowledged that malice is implied in a conscious violation of the law. Norsworthy Br., at 3. Plaintiffs pled that Norsworthy and all the defendants failed to petition a court for permission to hold Sean against his will (causing Laura to have to stay in the hospital or abandon Sean.) Norsworthy knew or should have known that there was no consent to hold Sean and no petition filed. Lying to Laura about Sean not being on “benzos” was malicious. Failing to make an inquiry to the legal department after Laura said that she was concerned that Norsworthy was violating Sean’s rights was malicious. PF. 000404. Now, UAMS General Counsel is refusing to admit that Norsworthy’s conduct was criminal, or even outrageous. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs ask that Susan Zaleski now Norsworthy’s motion to dismiss claims against Laura be denied, or in the alternative, that the Plaintiffs be granted leave to amend the complaint.