Pip: When a case turns out to have been void from the start, you might think everyone involved would quietly pack up and go home. Apparently not.

Mara: LauraLynnHammett documents exactly that scenario — a federal case that lacked subject-matter jurisdiction from day one, and what happened when the winning side still pushed for attorney fees against the pro se plaintiff who tried to fix the problem.

Pip: Let's get into the jurisdictional wreckage.

Ninth Circuit Fees on a Void Case

Mara: The core tension here is whether a court should exercise its discretion to award attorney fees against a pro se litigant who repeatedly tried to identify and correct the very defects that ultimately doomed the case.

Pip: The motion lays out the equitable argument directly. The filing states: "Because the litigation proceeded despite threshold jurisdictional defects, because Plaintiff acted in good faith to correct procedural errors once they became apparent, and because the record does not support several of the factual assertions advanced in support of the present motion, equity weighs heavily against any substantial fee award."

Mara: What that means in practice is that the plaintiff is arguing the fee-shifting purpose — deterring abusive litigation — runs exactly backward here. She's the one who voluntarily dismissed the defective claims. The Attorney Defendants are the ones who ran up six figures in fees on a case that lacked jurisdiction.

Pip: The jurisdictional defect itself is worth pausing on. The plaintiff filed in federal court naming an LLC as a defendant without knowing that an LLC shares citizenship with every one of its members. She was also a member. Diversity jurisdiction evaporated the moment the complaint was filed.

Mara: And the derivative malpractice claim against the Attorney Defendants was void ab initio for a separate reason — a non-attorney cannot prosecute a derivative claim on behalf of an LLC. The motion notes that the plaintiff moved for leave to retain limited-scope counsel specifically to sort out the derivative versus direct claim distinction, and that request was denied.

Pip: So the court denied the tool that might have fixed the problem, and now the same side wants fees because the problem wasn't fixed. That is a tidy little circle.

Mara: The motion also directly challenges the factual narrative in the fee request. The Attorney Defendants characterize the voluntary dismissal as a response to the anti-SLAPP motion. The plaintiff's own contemporaneous Notice of Voluntary Dismissal says otherwise — she dismissed because she recognized the derivative claim was a legal nullity, not because of the anti-SLAPP filing.

Pip: There's also a line-item dispute. Defense counsel billed at four hundred fifty dollars an hour, including for a motion the filing describes as substantially identical to a parallel fee motion filed the same day in a related appeal.

Mara: The motion's ask is precise: if any award is appropriate at all, it should be one dollar — enough to acknowledge the court's authority without producing what the filing calls a manifestly inequitable result.

Mara: The jurisdictional question here doesn't stay abstract for long — it connects directly to what courts owe litigants who are navigating complex rules without counsel.

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Pip: A case void from inception, a denied request for limited help, and a six-figure fee demand at the end of it. The equitable argument writes itself.

Mara: The discretion question is the one to watch — how courts calibrate fee-shifting when the procedural failures weren't all on one side.

1. Introduction

This motion presents an opportunity for the Court to exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with fairness and the interests of justice. Although this Court ultimately determined that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Attorney Defendants nevertheless seek an additional award of attorney fees against a pro se litigant who repeatedly attempted to identify and correct the jurisdictional and procedural defects in the case, starting before the anti-SLAPP motion was filed. See Exhibit A, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Retain Representation on Limited Scope filed July 22, 2019, ECF No. 11, 3:19-cv-00605-LL-AHG (anti-SLAPP motion filed July 30, 2019, ECF No. 21).

The motion for further attorney fees relies upon factual assertions that are contradicted by the record. Those assertions have been repeated by Defendants Ellis Roy Stern, Alan N. Goldberg, and Stern & Goldberg (collectively, the “Attorney Defendants”), through their counsel, Corinne C. Bertsche of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP. The relevant documents are matters of public record, including Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, attached as Exhibit B.

This Court possesses the authority to award attorney fees notwithstanding its determination that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking. The question presented here, however, is not whether the Court has that authority, but how it should exercise its discretion under these unusual circumstances. Because the litigation proceeded despite threshold jurisdictional defects, because Plaintiff acted in good faith to correct procedural errors once they became apparent, and because the record does not support several of the factual assertions advanced in support of the present motion, equity weighs heavily against any substantial fee award. At most, a nominal award of one dollar is appropriate.

While any award of fees is unreasonable on a macro level, the fees are overstated on the detailed time analysis.

1. Factual Background

The Attorney Defendants were named as defendants in an action involving a Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) that they represented, along with the plaintiff’s sisters, who were members of the LLC, and its manager.

The Attorney Defendants were named because they negotiated on behalf of the other individual members in an effort to induce the plaintiff to sell her membership interest to them for approximately one-sixth of its actual value.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the action in federal court without realizing the well-settled rule that an LLC shares the citizenship of each of its members. As a result, naming the LLC as a defendant destroyed diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff was also a member of the LLC. In addition, the derivative legal malpractice claim against the Attorney Defendants required the LLC to be represented by licensed counsel. Because the plaintiff was not an attorney and attempted to prosecute that claim on the LLC’s behalf, the derivative claim was void ab initio.

The Attorney Defendants’ motion for attorney fees contains factual assertions that are contradicted by the record.

First, the Attorney Defendants assert that “HAMMETT filed claims clearly barred by California’s anti-SLAPP statute against her litigation adversary’s counsel.” Mot. at 4. Plaintiff’s claims against the Attorney Defendants alleged legal malpractice and conversion. Plaintiff consistently argued that neither claim satisfied the first prong of California’s anti-SLAPP analysis because neither arose from protected activity. Rather than addressing the first prong, the district court proceeded directly to the second prong and concluded that Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal established, by operation of law rather than by adjudication on the merits, that the Attorney Defendants would have prevailed.

Second, the Attorney Defendants assert that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims “in response to the anti-SLAPP motion.” Mot. at 4. The record establishes otherwise. Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal expressly states that the dismissal occurred because Plaintiff concluded that the derivative claims filed by a non-attorney were a legal nullity and that the claims should instead be refiled as direct claims by Plaintiff individually. See Exhibit B, Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal. The dismissal was therefore prompted by Plaintiff’s recognition of a procedural defect, not by the filing of the anti-SLAPP motion.

The record further demonstrates Plaintiff’s efforts to correct that defect before dismissing the claims. Plaintiff moved for leave to retain counsel on a limited-scope basis because she could not afford full representation but needed legal assistance concerning the distinction between derivative and direct claims. See Exhibit A. Judge Janis L. Sammartino denied that request. Had limited-scope counsel been permitted, the procedural defect that necessitated the voluntary dismissal likely would have been avoided altogether.

The Attorney Defendants accurately state that Plaintiff attempted to appeal the district court’s interlocutory attorney-fee order before entry of final judgment. This Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and the appeal was dismissed because the order was not immediately appealable –not because of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional defect in the underlying action was not addressed until years later, after final judgment had been entered and the appeal had been fully briefed. As this Court ultimately held, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction was absent because neither a federal question nor complete diversity existed. An LLC is a citizen of every state in which one of its members is a citizen; therefore, when a member sues the LLC, complete diversity is lacking. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990); Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006).

Rather than promptly raising the threshold jurisdictional deficiencies—that Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, could not maintain derivative claims and that complete diversity was absent—the Attorney Defendants litigated the case extensively and accumulated attorney fees exceeding six figures. Plaintiff, by contrast, voluntarily dismissed the derivative claims after recognizing the procedural defect and sought dismissal by this Court based upon the lack of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, imposing an additional attorney-fee award on a pro se litigant would be inequitable.

Finally, the derivative complaint filed by a non-attorney was a legal nullity. If that complaint is treated as valid for purposes of determining legal fees, it cannot later serve as the basis for imposing consequences that effectively preclude Plaintiff from pursuing properly pleaded direct claims. Any contrary result, such as a claim that the savings statute should not apply because the original complaint was void,  would produce inconsistent treatment of the same pleading.

1. ARGUMENT

1. Although the Court Possesses Authority to Award Attorney Fees Following Dismissal for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, That Authority Is Discretionary and Should Be Exercised Equitably.

Plaintiff does not dispute that a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, award attorney fees or impose collateral sanctions notwithstanding a later determination that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).

The issue before the Court is therefore not whether it possesses the authority to award additional attorney fees, but whether such an award would further the purposes of fee-shifting under the extraordinary facts presented here.

“The Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of reasonable fees and the award of such fees is governed by equitable principles. Gorman v. Tassagara Development Corp., 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 92 (2009), quoting PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1094-1095 (2000).” Abselet v. All. Lending Grp., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00815-JFW(JEMX), 2018 WL 11696646, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2018). Among the relevant factors a court may consider is the necessity for and the nature of the litigation. Abselet, No. 2:11-CV-00815-JFW(JEMX), 2018 WL 11696646, at 2.

 That discretion should be exercised in light of the totality of the circumstances rather than by mechanical application of fee-shifting principles.

• Equity Does Not Favor a Substantial Fee Award Against a Pro Se Litigant Who Attempted to Correct Jurisdictional and Procedural Defects.

The record demonstrates that Plaintiff acted in good faith throughout the litigation.

After recognizing that a derivative action could not be maintained by a non-attorney, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the derivative claims and sought to proceed properly. See Exhibit B. Plaintiff also raised the absence of jurisdiction in her interlocutory appeal. Rather than attempting to prolong the litigation, Plaintiff sought to terminate proceedings that could not properly remain in federal court.

By contrast, the Attorney Defendants elected to litigate extensively despite threshold procedural and jurisdictional defects, resulting in attorney fees exceeding six figures. The subject matter jurisdictional defect that was overlooked by the Attorney Defendants and the court is a concept taught in 1L law school curriculums universally.

The purposes of fee-shifting—including deterrence of abusive litigation and compensation for unnecessary expense—are not served by imposing substantial additional fees under these circumstances. Instead, such an award would punish a pro se litigant who attempted to correct her own mistakes while rewarding years of unnecessary litigation.

• The Motion Relies Upon Factual Assertions That Are Not Supported by the Record.

An award of attorney fees should not rest upon factual assertions contradicted by the record.

The Attorney Defendants continue to characterize Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal as a response to the anti-SLAPP motion despite Plaintiff’s contemporaneous Notice of Voluntary Dismissal expressly stating otherwise.

Likewise, the Attorney Defendants characterize Plaintiff’s claims as “clearly barred” by California’s anti-SLAPP statute despite Plaintiff’s consistent argument that the claims failed the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because they did not arise from protected activity.

While Plaintiff recognizes that this Court need not revisit the merits of the anti-SLAPP ruling, the accuracy of the factual narrative advanced in support of additional attorney fees remains relevant to the Court’s exercise of equitable discretion.

• If Any Additional Fee Award Is Appropriate, It Should Be Nominal.

The Court has broad discretion when calculating and awarding attorney fees. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, several equitable considerations weigh strongly against a substantial award:

Plaintiff proceeded without counsel and attempted in good faith to comply with complex procedural rules. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the derivative claims after recognizing a procedural defect; Plaintiff challenged the existence of jurisdiction in her response to this Court’s order to show cause why the plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal should not be dismissed; The litigation continued for years before the subject matter jurisdictional defect was recognized; The courts failed to ever recognize that the derivative claim was a nullity from the inception; The present motion relies upon factual assertions that are contradicted by the record.

Under these circumstances, the purposes of fee-shifting would not be advanced by imposing additional substantial attorney fees against Plaintiff.

If the Court concludes that some fee award remains appropriate notwithstanding these circumstances, Plaintiff respectfully submits that a nominal award of one dollar adequately recognizes the Court’s authority while avoiding a manifestly inequitable result.

• The Calculated Fee Is Grossly Overstated

Corinne C. Bertsche is requesting $450 per hour. Yet, she pretended not to know that a derivative claim filed by a non-attorney is void ab initio and the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Further, Ms. Bertsche claimed that she spent 2.8 ours preparing the motion responded to here. The motion is substantially identical to the motion filed on the same day for fees on appeal 24-3621. The data in the declaration is different. This data is most likely contained in a software program and can be inserted by a clerk or quickly by the $450 per hour lead attorney. Therefore, if the Court finds it reasonable to charge fees for a case that was unreasonable to proceed on at all, then the Court should at least make a significant adjustment to the fees requested.

      Respectfully submitted,

Exhibit A

Exhibit B

“Immunity is given to crime, and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe).

Yesterday, 24 people downloaded a document I first posted in 2024. Or, one person downloaded it 24 times. There is no way of telling. Here is the document that seemed to fascinate.

This was an appropriate document to read in conjunction with yesterday’s post: The only ones getting rich are the attorneys. And the doctors.

I wrote the document almost two years ago. It was a year before starting law school. In particular, it was a year before starting Civ Pro I. The concept discussed in this Ninth Circuit letter brief was taught in Civ Pro I.

My letter brief sat on the court’s desk for two years. A month ago, Ninth Circuit Justices JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, LAWRENCE VANDYKE and SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR. decided that the federal court did not have jurisdiction after all, but that I should still pay the opposing parties’ attorney fees on an anti-SLAPP motion for claims I dismissed voluntarily because they were void ab initio. The attorney defendants and their attorneys should have and probably did know that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case – not just the claims against the attorneys that were void ab initio.

I wanted to post the court’s order for you, but I am having trouble saving a copy as a pdf. Here it is cut and pasted.

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURA LYNN HAMMETT, an individual,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

No. 22-56003

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00605-LL-AHG

v.

MARY E. SHERMAN, et al.,

Defendants – Appellees.

MEMORANDUM*

MAY 15 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 30, 2026**

Before: RAWLINSON, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

In this diversity action, Laura Hammett (Hammett) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her Third Amended Complaint (TAC) for failure to state a claim and the denial of her request for leave to amend, her request for limited scope representation, and her Motion to Vacate Void Orders Granting Attorneys’ Fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Hammett resides in Arkansas and “owns a 14.1571% interest in [Silver Strand Plaza, LLC (SSP)],” which is a named defendant. Hammett’s TAC asserted two causes of action: “(1) specific performance of [Hammett’s] right to inspect [SSP] company records and (2) dissolution of SSP.” Hammett also sought “declaratory and injunctive relief . . . for an inspection of financial records of SSP since 2013 . . . as well as costs and attorney’s fees.”

Previously, Hammett voluntarily dismissed claims against Defendants-Appellees Alan N. Goldberg, Ellis R. Stern, and Stern & Goldberg, Patrick C. McGarrigle, and McGarrigle, Kenney & Zampiello, a Professional Law Corporation (the Attorney Defendants-Appellees). The district court subsequently granted the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants-Appellees Diane Dennis, Linda R. Kramer, Erik Hunsaker, and SSP, and denied Hammett leave to amend. Hammett timely appealed.

1. “We have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear the case. We review questions of our jurisdiction de novo. . . .” Pizzuto v. Tewalt, 136 F.4th 855, 863 (9th Cir. 2025), as amended (citations omitted).

“Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts . . .” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a limited liability company is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens. . . .” 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants-Appellees Alan N. Goldberg, Ellis R. Stern, and Stern & Goldberg acknowledge that a limited liability company adopts the citizenship of its members.¹ Hammett is a citizen of Arkansas, and a member of SSP. Thus, SSP is also a citizen of Arkansas, see Horn, 880 F.3d at 465, and the complete diversity requirement is not satisfied. See Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 152 F.4th 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Section 1332(a) requires complete diversity—no plaintiff may be from the same state as any defendant. . . .”) (citations omitted).

In the absence of complete diversity, the district court had no jurisdiction to decide this case. See id. at 1185. Thus, we must vacate all orders going to the merits and remand for the district court to dismiss without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.²

2. “A final determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . does not automatically wipe out all proceedings had in the district court at a time when the district court operated under the misapprehension that it had jurisdiction. . . .” Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992); see also San Diego Cnty. Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, 65 F.4th 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2023), as amended.

For example, “[w]hen the district court grants a fee award that is collateral to the merits, it does not risk adjudicating the merits of a case or controversy over which it lacks jurisdiction.” San Diego Cnty. Credit Union, 65 F.4th at 1033 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the award of attorneys’ fees. See id.

3. “[W]e review questions of law concerning entitlement to attorneys’ fees de novo . . .” Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 52 F.4th 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Whether a party is a “prevailing party” is also reviewed de novo. See Weissburg v. Lancaster Sch. Dist., 591 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Attorney Defendants-Appellees request that we exercise our authority under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sever Hammett’s claims against them “in order to determine the appeal of the attorney fee order.”

However, because the fee award is “collateral to the merits” of the case, we have jurisdiction over the appeal of the attorneys’ fees award without severing the claims. San Diego Cnty. Credit Union, 65 F.4th at 1033.

The district court awarded attorneys’ fees to the Attorney Defendants-Appellees under Section 425.16(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Hammett does not challenge the district court’s analysis under Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 101 (1998), as modified, which applied Section 425.16(c).

Under Coltrain, a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal raises a presumption that the defendants are prevailing parties, absent evidence from the plaintiff rebutting the presumption. See id. at 107. Hammett failed to rebut the presumption that the Attorney Defendants-Appellees were prevailing parties. Rather, she expressed her intent to refile the action.

Thus, the district court did not err in determining that the Attorney Defendants-Appellees were prevailing parties, and awarding them attorneys’ fees. See Nerio Mejia v. O’Malley, 120 F.4th 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Coltrain, 66 Cal. App. 4th at 107.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION.³

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• This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

¹ Defendants-Appellees Patrick McGarrigle and McGarrigle, Kenney, & Zampiello joined this acknowledgment.

² And “[s]ince this case should never have made it into federal court, we have no reason to address” Hammett’s remaining arguments. Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, 831 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2016).

³ The motion for clarification of how to augment the excerpts (Dkt. #34) is denied, and the motion for leave to file supplemental authority (Dkt. #45) is denied as moot.

I absolutely challenged the District Court’s analysis under Coltrain in the underlying appeal. The letter brief, ordered a year after the appellate brief was filed, only ordered the issue of diversity jurisdiction to be briefed. Because a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be overcome, I must now challenge the ruling on the appeal one more time.