Podcast Episode: Judge Lee P. Rudofsky Nomination for 8th Circuit COA
Pip: When a federal judge gets nominated to a higher court, the official record is one thing — but the litigants who actually stood before him have a different kind of evidence entirely.
Mara: Today we're covering LauraLynnHammett's detailed account of Judge Lee P. Rudofsky's nomination to the Eighth Circuit — his corporate background, a Voting Rights Act ruling, and her firsthand experience as a pro se plaintiff in his courtroom. Let's start with the nomination itself and what the record actually shows.
Judge Rudofsky's Nomination and the Record Behind It
Mara: Judge Lee P. Rudofsky is a federal district judge in the Eastern District of Arkansas, nominated by President Trump — for the second time — now to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The question the post puts directly to readers is whether his record, not his résumé, holds up to scrutiny.
Pip: The résumé is substantial — associate general counsel at Walmart, Arkansas solicitor general, foreign corruption compliance work. The concern is whether that background shaped how he handled a case between an individual and a major debt-collection company.
Mara: That case is Hammett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates. The post's central charge is specific: "Judge Rudofsky mischaracterized my statements about the underlying debt. He took language that described consumer debt and presented it as an admission that I owed money."
Pip: That distinction matters enormously for a pro se litigant. Saying you incurred consumer debt is not the same as admitting you owe a particular balance to a particular collector — especially when, as the post notes, neither party had a record of how the account reached over two thousand dollars.
Mara: There's also a protective order issue. The post argues the order was far broader than necessary, allowed Portfolio Recovery Associates to seal extensive material, and that a lecture the judge gave about it never made it into the transcript. Attempts to unseal documents were unsuccessful.
Pip: And then there's the recusal — which came after the judge reviewed the blog, apparently without notifying the parties first. By that point, significant proceedings had already concluded.
Mara: On the Voting Rights Act, Judge Rudofsky ruled that private individuals could not bring a particular enforcement claim — leaving it to the state. The post frames the problem plainly: if enforcement belongs to the state, and the state drew the district lines being challenged, the practical availability of judicial review depends entirely on whether officials will sue themselves.
Pip: Meanwhile, the CFPB later settled with Portfolio Recovery Associates for roughly twenty-five million dollars over conduct that substantially overlapped with the original complaint. The gates analogy the post ends on — that confirming Rudofsky "locks the gates around our courts" — lands harder with that number attached.
Mara: The post invites journalists, researchers, and anyone examining the nomination to review the case record directly and reach their own conclusions.
Pip: Which is a reasonable ask. The record is public. The nomination is live. The questions are specific enough to follow.
Pip: Access to courts, who gets to sue, and what happens when the record is sealed — these aren't abstract questions.
Mara: They're the ones that determine whether the system is actually available to the people it's supposed to serve.
Judge Lee P. Rudofsky Nomination for 8th Circuit COA
Judge Lee Rudofsky’s Nomination to the Eighth Circuit: A Look at His Record in My Case
Judge Lee P. Rudofsky, currently a federal district judge in the Eastern District of Arkansas, has been nominated by President Trump to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This is the same president who nominated him to his current position, where his confirmation received 51 votes in favor and 41 against.
I have serious concerns about this nomination. Those concerns are not based solely on his professional background or his views on particular legal issues. In fact, they are primarily rooted in my personal experience as a litigant before him in a case involving Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC.
A Background Closely Tied to Corporate Interests
Judge Rudofsky has substantial experience in corporate law and government service. He worked as an associate general counsel for Walmart and later returned to the company, where he held a position involving foreign corruption compliance. He also served in government, including as Arkansas solicitor general.
His professional background raises questions worth considering about how his experience shaped his approach to cases involving corporations and individuals.
He has also been involved in litigation concerning Planned Parenthood. While people hold differing views on abortion, judicial nominations should be evaluated in part by examining a nominee’s actual legal record rather than assuming how he will rule based on a general political label.
One decision of particular concern to me involves the Voting Rights Act and the ability of private individuals to bring lawsuits challenging alleged violations.
The Voting Rights Act and the Right to Sue
Judge Rudofsky issued a decision rejecting the ability of private individuals to bring a particular Voting Rights Act claim, concluding that enforcement in that context belonged to the state.
This raises an important question: What happens when the state itself has little incentive to challenge the way its own legislative districts are drawn?
Gerrymandering can affect political representation by manipulating district boundaries. In some circumstances, district lines are drawn to concentrate or disperse racial groups in ways that affect their ability to elect candidates of their choice.
The issue is particularly complicated when the government responsible for drawing district boundaries is also the government expected to challenge those boundaries in court.
If private individuals cannot bring a lawsuit and enforcement is left to state officials, the practical availability of judicial review may depend on the willingness of those officials to challenge the very system in which they operate.
That is why I believe the legal question of who has the right to sue deserves serious attention during Judge Rudofsky’s confirmation process. The issue is not simply whether one agrees with a particular outcome in a voting rights case. It is whether the legal system provides a meaningful avenue for challenging alleged violations.
My Experience as a Litigant Before Judge Rudofsky
My concerns about Judge Rudofsky are also personal.
I was a plaintiff in Hammett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, a case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas involving a major debt-collection company.
During the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act litigation, Judge Rudofsky mischaracterized my statements about the underlying debt. He took language that described consumer debt and presented it as an admission that I owed money.
My distinction was straightforward: I had explained that any credit-card debt I had incurred was consumer debt, because I had not borrowed money for a business at that time. I did not admit that I owed the debt Portfolio Recovery Associates was attempting to collect. I said neither PRA nor I had a record of how the balance on the account went from zero to over $2K.
I also disagreed with the way the court treated my use of the word “belief.” In legal pleadings, statements made on information and belief are common. Even attorneys representing the government use that language in formal court documents.
Yet I believed the court used my wording to justify an interpretation of my statements that I had not made.
These disagreements matter because a judge’s treatment of a litigant’s words can have significant consequences, especially when the litigant is representing herself.
The Portfolio Recovery Associates Litigation
Portfolio Recovery Associates has faced significant regulatory scrutiny over its debt-collection practices.
After I filed my complaint, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau brought its own action against the company. The government action addressed alleged similar violations of consumer-protection laws to my complaint and ultimately resulted in a settlement of about $25 million.
I saw substantial overlap between the issues raised in my complaint and those pursued by the CFPB. From my perspective, the government’s later action reinforced the importance of the concerns I had raised.
My experience left me questioning whether the court gave sufficient consideration to the claims of an individual litigant challenging a large corporate defendant.
I appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s ruling. Judge Rudofsky later recused himself from the case.
A Protective Order and Questions About Public Access
Another issue that concerns me is a protective order entered during the litigation.
I believe Judge Rudofsky encouraged me to agree to a protective order that was far broader than necessary. The lecture I remember him giving me did not find its way into the transcript. In practice, the protective order allowed Portfolio Recovery Associates to place extensive material under seal.
I attempted to have certain documents unsealed, but those efforts were unsuccessful.
Court records are not merely private paperwork between litigants. Public access to judicial proceedings is an important part of accountability, particularly when a case involves allegations concerning the conduct of a large corporation.
The scope of the protective order in my case deserves closer examination. The public should be able to evaluate whether the sealing of documents was justified and whether the order unnecessarily restricted access to information relevant to the litigation.
A Recusal After Reviewing My Blog
Judge Rudofsky eventually recused himself from my case after reviewing material I had published on my blog.
My concern is not simply that he read my writing. It is that, to my knowledge, the parties were not given notice or an opportunity to address the blog material before he reviewed it.
I also questioned the timing of the recusal. By the time it occurred, significant proceedings had already taken place.
A judge’s impartiality is fundamental to public confidence in the judicial system. When a judge reviews material outside the record concerning a litigant and then recuses, questions naturally arise about the circumstances and timing of that decision.
The circumstances surrounding his recusal deserve scrutiny.
Why This Matters for an Appellate Court Nomination
A federal appellate judge has an important role in shaping how the law is interpreted and applied. The Eighth Circuit hears appeals involving constitutional rights, federal statutes, government conduct, and disputes between individuals and powerful institutions.
My experience with Judge Rudofsky has left me with serious concerns about his handling of litigation involving an individual plaintiff and a large corporation. His decision concerning private enforcement of the Voting Rights Act raises additional questions about access to the courts.
These are matters that senators and the public can examine through the judicial record, the parties’ filings, and the judge’s own decisions.
I am not asking anyone to take my word for what happened. I encourage interested readers to review the documents from my case and form their own conclusions.
Help Bring the Record to Public Attention
I have published blog posts and documents relating to my litigation against Portfolio Recovery Associates. Those materials may be useful to journalists, legal researchers, public-interest organizations, and anyone examining Judge Rudofsky’s record.
The case is Laura Lynn Hammett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
If you are researching Judge Rudofsky’s nomination or are interested in examining the underlying court records, I welcome you to contact me at bohemian_books@yahoo.com.
I would also be willing to assist anyone seeking to understand the case or prepare a concise presentation about the issues it raises.
Judicial nominations deserve careful scrutiny. That scrutiny should include not only a nominee’s résumé and public statements, but also the decisions he has made and the way he has handled the people who have appeared before him.
The public deserves a judicial system in which individuals, regardless of their resources or legal representation, can expect their claims to be heard fairly.
A confirmation of Judge Lee P. Rudofsky to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals locks the gates around our courts.
Podcast Episode: Dr. Damalcheruvu’s Impermissible Request for Admissions
Pip: What stays with me is how much of this hinges on a single question: is restraining a conscious, refusing patient medicine or is it battery?
Mara: Arkansas law has an answer, and Lynn is betting a jury will too — without any expert to explain it to them.
AI podcast. Not perfect.
Pip: When a doctor earning over six hundred thousand dollars a year decides to fight a twenty-seven-five settlement by copying someone else’s discovery requests — and gets the pronouns wrong — you have to wonder what they teach in the strategy seminars.
Mara: LauraLynnHammett has been covering a pro se lawsuit against UAMS physician Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, and today’s episode walks through the plaintiff’s responses to the doctor’s requests for admissions — a window into how this case is being argued and why the procedural choices matter.
Pip: Let’s start with what those requests actually asked, and why the plaintiff says every single one of them misses the point.
When “No Expert Needed” Is the Whole Argument
Mara: The central tension in this segment is a procedural one: Damalcheruvu’s requests for admissions all assume the plaintiff needs a qualified medical expert to prove his case. The plaintiff, Sean Lynn, argues that assumption is simply wrong under Arkansas law.
Pip: The response to the very first request lays out exactly why. Lynn had been told after his initial CT scan that no surgery was needed, then was sedated and restrained when he refused a second scan. His response to Request No. 1 reads: “I do not need an expert because the asserted negligence lies within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge. Expert testimony is not required when the asserted negligence lies within the comprehension of a jury of laymen, such as a surgeon’s failure to sterilize her instruments or to remove a sponge from the incision before closing it.”
Mara: What this means in practice is that Lynn is not framing this as a medical malpractice case requiring specialized testimony. He is framing it as battery and false imprisonment — claims a jury can evaluate using ordinary understanding of consent, restraint, and bodily autonomy.
Pip: And he builds that argument across every single request. Requests two and three ask him to admit he has no expert on standard of care or causation. His answer is the same: a jury can read the UAMS patient rights form, watch blood test numbers deteriorate during confinement and recover within four days of leaving, and understand the labels on the drugs that were forced into him.
Mara: UAMS’s own internal record is particularly pointed here. The complaint quotes UAMS staff acknowledging that Arkansas has no law and UAMS no policy covering so-called medical holds, meaning confinement can only happen under a very narrow set of conditions.
Pip: Requests four, six, and eight ask Lynn to admit Damalcheruvu was not negligent, not a proximate cause, and not liable — all of which Lynn objects to as legal conclusions, not factual matters. He cites Hardesty v. Baptist Health, where a circuit court refused to consider an identically structured request on exactly those grounds.
Mara: And here is where the copy-paste problem surfaces. The requests served on Lynn use feminine pronouns throughout — she, her — despite Damalcheruvu being listed elsewhere with masculine pronouns. Lynn notes the discrepancy and simply adopts the pronoun preference the requests themselves reflect.
Pip: Request nine asks whether Lynn has a reasonable-cause affidavit under a specific Arkansas statute. His response: that statute was ruled unconstitutional in Summerville v. Thrower, and even if it weren’t, it only applies when expert testimony is required — which, again, he argues it is not.
Mara: By request seven, Lynn is direct about the repetition. He points out that requests five and seven ask substantially the same thing with only a word swap, and he writes that the defendants already took two weeks of his life and he will not keep answering the same question.
Pip: The post also notes that Damalcheruvu refused certified mail service until the deadline passed, then claimed service was late. The opening settlement ask was two hundred seventy-five thousand dollars against a defendant earning over six hundred thousand a year with insurance.
Mara: The surveillance video is another thread running through the responses. Lynn argues that Damalcheruvu failed to preserve footage of her interactions with him in the emergency department, and that a jury needs no expert to understand what the destruction of that evidence implies.
Pip: What stays with me is how much of this hinges on a single question: is restraining a conscious, refusing patient medicine or is it battery?
Mara: Arkansas law has an answer, and Lynn is betting a jury will too — without any expert to explain it to them.
Dr. Damalcheruvu’s Impermissible Request for Admissions
UAMS doctor Damalcheruvu forced a man to undergo a second CT Scan after he determined no immediate surgery was needed after the first scan. Because the patient refused, the staff at UAMS, where Damalcheruvu is an assistant professor, used Fentanyl and benzodiazepines to try to knock him out.
When the patient still protested, the UAMS staff member bound him naked to the hospital bed with four-point restraints.
The patient is suing Dr. Damalcheruvu. The doctor is paid over $600,000 per year and has insurance. There were over 80 individuals involved in what ended as two weeks of unlawful imprisonment and battery. The first ask made by the patient turned plaintiff was a settlement of $275,000.
Damalcheruvu would rather fight and win on a procedural issue. For example, he refused to accept service that came by certified mail, until the service period expired. Then he claimed that service was late.
It appears that Dr. Damalcheruvu’s attorney cut and pasted requests for admissions from a female defendant. The doctor’s requests use feminine pronouns. It is possible that Prashanth Damalcheruvu identifies as she/her, so the plaintiff followed suit.
Similar responses were given to the female defendant and two male defendants who had identical requests (except the name and pronouns). For RFAs, the response repeats the request before the answer. Therefore, only the responses are posted here.
Comes now Pro Se Plaintiff Sean Lynn in response to requests for admission propounded by Defendant Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu and emailed to Lynn on September 3, 2026:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that you do not have testimony from a qualified medical expert to support the allegations of negligence against Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu in your Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Objection. Irrelevant. I do not need an expert because the asserted negligence lies within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(a). Expert testimony is not required when the asserted negligence lies within the comprehension of a jury of laymen, such as a surgeon’s failure to sterilize her instruments or to remove a sponge from the incision before closing it. Mitchell v. Lincoln, 366 Ark. 592, 598, 237 S.W.3d 455, 460 (2006). I am questioning Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D.’s decision to force me not to recover from my initial head injury at home without the use of pharmaceuticals; and her failure to follow UAMS policy as explained in language lay persons can understand on the form UAMS PATIENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBLITIES. A copy of the 2023 version of the form is attached as Exhibit 22. Neither Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. nor any other UAMS employee gave me a copy or alerted me to its existence. My mother found it on the internet after I returned home.
The law regarding involuntary confinement and non-consensual harmful or offensive contact is easy to understand. There are model jury instructions that are understood by jurors without any expert, other than the judge, explaining the law.
Arkansas law is clear that when a patient seeks release but is held against his will, he must be treated as an involuntary detainee with full due process protections, including a meaningful hearing with clear and convincing evidence. Von Luce v. Rankin, 267 Ark. 34, 39, 588 S.W.2d 445, 449 (1979). As in Von Luce, I was never afforded any hearing, judicial review, or due process before being confined for 14 days against my expressed wishes to leave.
The need for expert testimony specified in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(b) does not apply here. Informed consent presupposes that a patient consented to the procedure but may have done so without all information necessary to make a reasoned decision. Millsap v. Williams, 2014 Ark. 469, 14, 449 S.W.3d 291, 300. I refused treatment after the first CT Scan and blood test, when I was told there was no need for surgery. My suit is about lack of consent; not informed consent.
A jury can understand that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. did not invoke an emergency exception at any time.
The State has a due process obligation to provide appropriate medical care to persons in its custody, which must look to the intent of the State in its decision to involuntarily medicate the confined person. Singleton v. Norris, 338 Ark. 135, 138, 992 S.W.2d 768, 769 (1999). Here, it is easy to understand that chemical restraints were used by Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. to hold me for observation and to participate in the second CT scan, made on the morning of January 14, 2024.
Arkansas courts distinguish between medical negligence requiring specialized knowledge and ordinary negligence involving basic safety measures that laypeople can understand. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu’s failure to ask for preservation of the surveillance video of her interactions with me in the Emergency Department is comprehensible to any reasonable jury member. A juror can make a reasonable inference that the evidence would show that whatever “treatment” Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. performed on me was adverse to standard of care. These are not complex medical decisions requiring expert interpretation, but rather basic administrative functions that any doctor must perform competently. The systematic destruction of video evidence particularly demonstrates consciousness of wrongdoing and violates fundamental principles of evidence preservation that any layperson can understand. UAMS’s own policies required preservation of such evidence because my mother clearly stated that there would be litigation and UAMS counsel was consulted before my release. The deliberate destruction suggests Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D.’s awareness that the recorded conduct was legally problematic. Such ordinary negligence in documentation falls outside the specialized medical knowledge requiring expert testimony.
Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation; and it has long been the rule that spoliators should not benefit from their wrongdoing. Kelsay v. Wise, No. CA98-1487, 1999 WL 1203724, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1999).
A jury can comprehend as a matter of common knowledge the evidence that indicates that accepting an EMT’s unverified statement unattributed to a witness, claiming that I had a death defying 35-foot fall yet still presented with no other indicator for level 1, 2 or 3 activation, was a breach of Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D.’s duty. Compl. at ¶¶ 95, 11-58. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. had access to my medical record and an obligation to read it. Apparently, she[1] did not.
A jury can comprehend as a matter of common knowledge the well settled law that the violation of a safety statute is evidence of negligence. Bussell v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 237 Ark. 812, 817, 376 S.W.2d 545, 548 (1964). A jury can comprehend, without expert testimony, that it is imprudent to commit a criminal battery and false imprisonment against a man who is already injured.
For example, a person commits battery in the first degree if acting alone or with one or more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit a felony; and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony the person or an accomplice causes serious physical injury to any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life or another person who is resisting the felony or flight causes serious physical injury to any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201; Compl. at ¶¶ 346-354.
A jury can comprehend as a matter of common knowledge that using physical and chemical restraints to confine a person, me, to a hospital without consent and without a lawful order is the felony of false imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-11-103 (“A person commits the offense of false imprisonment in the first degree if, without consent and without lawful authority, the person knowingly restrains another person so as to interfere substantially with the other person’s liberty in a manner that exposes the other person to a substantial risk of serious physical injury.”); Compl. at ¶¶ 346-354.
A jury can understand, without expert testimony, that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. committed the crimes of battery and false imprisonment against me. While confining me without consent and without a lawful order, she ordered staff under her supervision and control to drug and bind me. A jury can understand that committing these crimes was negligence per se, allowing for an inference of negligence.
A jury can understand that because the medical record contains no petition or physician certification under Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-604—and no psychiatric hold petition—there was no legal authority to hold me. Compl. at ¶¶ 57, 58, 107-114.
Regardless of which party has the burden of proof, a jury can understand that an emergency exception did not apply, without any testimony from an expert. Arkansas law establishes that medical treatment without consent constitutes battery, but provides a narrow emergency exception. See Millsap, 2014 Ark. 469. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-603:
“Emergency” means a situation in which, in competent medical judgment, the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures are immediately or imminently necessary and any delay occasioned by an attempt to obtain a consent would reasonably be expected to jeopardize the life, health, or safety of the person affected or would reasonably be expected to result in disfigurement or impaired faculties.
The emergency exception operates under a conjunctive two-pronged test established in Millsap: “Consent is not required when an emergency exists AND there is no one immediately available who can provide consent for the patient.” Millsap, 2014 Ark. 469 at 13, 449 S.W.3d at 299. Both conditions must be satisfied for the exception to apply, meaning the plaintiff can defeat the emergency doctrine by disproving either prong. Here, I was of sound mind when I initially refused treatment, subsequent intoxication was caused by the medical providers’ battery, of which Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. was an active conspirator, and my mother was available to inform the defendants that I did not want treatment by the defendants. Further, it was clear to all but the most cognitively impaired individuals that I wanted to leave and I had reason and the right to leave.
A jury can comprehend, using a small amount of common knowledge, that damage is caused by being forced to be hospitalized overnight so Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. could force me to have my head scanned a second time. Besides the physical violation of detainment, my medical condition is an extremely private matter and Damalcheruvu required chemical sedation to be administered on me in order to obtain the expensive images she wanted to look at.
For example, courts find that mental anguish, an affront to personality, indignity, disgrace, humiliation and mortification to which the victim is subjected by battery is compensable. Browder v. Gahr, 258 Ark. 992, 996–97, 530 S.W.2d 359, 362 (1975).
A jury can comprehend that damalcheruvu, owing me a duty, failed to act to release me from imprisonment, therefore was a proximate cause of the damages I sustained from the time she should have tried to release me. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. is particularly liable. She was an assistant professor collecting $584,976 per year salary. Yet she approved of the imprisonment and battery committed on January 13, 2024 that continued to January 27, 2024.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that you do not have testimony
from a qualified medical expert willing to testify that Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu failed to meet the applicable standard of care in his medical care and treatment of Sean Lynn.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Objection. Irrelevant. I do not need an expert because the standard of care that I assert Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. failed to meet lies within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge.
A jury can understand that the majority of doctors in Arkansas studied or did a residency at UAMS. UAMS set the standard in Arkansas, as dismal as it is. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. violated almost every one of the patient rights defined by UAMS, including the right to refuse treatment and to leave UAMS against the advice of the health care providers, to the extent permitted by law. Compl. at ¶ 93.
UAMS admitted on the record generated by UAMS staff: “Arkansas has no law (and UAMS, no policy) that covers so-called ‘medical holds,’ which means that the ability to hold a patient who wants to leave AMA can only happen in a very limited set of conditions where the team can show a significant risk of imminent harm could befall the incapacitated patient should they leave the hospital.” Compl. at ¶ 94. It does not take a brain surgeon to explain that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. violated this standard.
A procedure performed without a valid consent would be outside the standard of care. Haupt v. Kumar, 103 Ark. App. 298, 300, 288 S.W.3d 704, 706 (2008).
Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. did not petition a court with a statement that claimed a need to override patient autonomy. Presumably, a competent doctor in Arkansas files a petition before overriding authority, unless the doctor knows the petition will be denied. It is easy to understand the triage report, initial test results and the words Dr. Bruce wrote at about 10 p.m. on the first night of the confinement: “Suspect his exam will get worse – ICU for close monitoring[.]” Compl. at ¶¶ 55, 56. Suspicion is not imminent need that would allow Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. to vary from the standard of care of allowing me bodily autonomy.
A jury will also understand that every drugging and procedure that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. subjected me to after my right to leave UAMS Medical Center was violated by her1 was harmful or offensive.
The need for expert testimony specified in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(b) does not apply here. Informed consent presupposes that a patient consented to the procedure but may have done so without all information necessary to make a reasoned decision. Millsap v. Williams, 2014 Ark. 469, 14, 449 S.W.3d 291, 300.
A jury can understand the reasonable inference from the failure to ask for the preservation of surveillance video. Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation; and it has long been the rule that spoliators should not benefit from their wrongdoing. Kelsay, No. CA98-1487, 1999 WL 1203724, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1999).
Further, a jury needs no expert to explain Damalcheruvu’s failure to check for consent, ask for consent or contact my family, whose numbers were in my cell phone.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that you do not have testimony from a qualified medical expert that there was an act or omission on the part of Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. that was a proximate cause of injury or damage to Sean Lynn.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Objection. Irrelevant. I do not need an expert because the fact there was an act or omission on the part of Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. that was a proximate cause of injury or damage to me lies within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge.
Advertisements for the drugs Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. forced into me are required to be written comprehensible to an ordinary person. They include side effects, warnings, precautions, and contraindications of the drugs. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1. I intend to read the warnings from each drug Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. forced into me to the jury. I am not an expert and I understand those labels. So will the jury.
The jury can easily comprehend that there was foreseeable harm and injury to a person who wants to go to sleep in his own bed, to be bound in one position for days at a time, woken as often as captors torture their prisoners, starved, dehydrated and humiliated, instead. I accused Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. of this conduct.
A jury can easily comprehend Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu’s violation of my right to have a family member or representative of my choice notified promptly of my admission to the hospital. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(4).
Further, courts find that mental anguish, an affront to personality, indignity, disgrace, humiliation and mortification to which the victim is subjected by battery is compensable. Browder, 258 Ark. at 996–97, 530 S.W.2d at 362. No expert is required to show that it was foreseeable that being battered at Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D.’s direction was reasonably certain to cause the mental anguish, affront to personality, indignity, disgrace, humiliation and mortification that it caused me.
A jury can comprehend using common knowledge that it was foreseeable that forced dehydration, starvation, lack of uninterrupted sleep, administration of a pharmacology of controlled substances and being bound in one position for days at a time would foreseeably cause injury and damage. The same jury can easily understand that my claim that because Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu was a supervising assistant professor at the time of the false imprisonment and battery, she did not discourage those working under her from continuing with the false imprisonment and battery, and she “ordered” the conduct, that she was a proximate cause of the injury and damage.
A jury can comprehend using common knowledge that the numbers on the blood tests recorded by the defendants started in healthy range and got much worse, then within four days of leaving against medical advice, my blood was in the healthy range again.
It was foreseeable that I would be traumatized by being falsely imprisoned and battered as that is a natural consequence of Damalcheruvu’s conduct. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Yancey, 178 Ark. 147, 10 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1928).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. was
not negligent in any way in connection with the care and treatment provided to Sean
Lynn.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Objection. This request should not be considered because it is legal in nature. The firm representing Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. knows or should know that this request is impermissible. The Damalcheruvu requests are identical to the requests for admission filed and answered by the now dismissed defendants who were represented by Wright, Lindsey and Jennings LLP. (Those defendants will be named in my 42 USC 1983 federal case.) It is reasonable to believe that when Amelia H. Sandrock on behalf of Damalcheruvu accessed the WLJ requests, Ms. Sandrock also read my answers. To proceed otherwise would violate Rule 11’s admonishment to make a reasonable inquiry before certifying a document.
As per my filed answers to the WLJ defendants, Wright, Lindsey and Jennings LLP represented Baptist Health and Dr. Patrick O’Connell in a medical malpractice case in 2013. The firm propounded, “REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that Baptist was not negligent in the care and treatment of Vernon Hardesty.” Hardesty v. Baptist Health, 2013 Ark. App. 731, 3, 431 S.W.3d 327, 330. The circuit court did not consider Baptist’s fourth request, finding that it was legal in nature. Hardesty, 2013 Ark. App. at 4, 431 S.W.3d at 330. The same request was made on behalf of Dr. O’Connell and the lower court did not invalidate that request, erroneously, but not prejudiciously. Id. at 5, 431 S.W.3d at 331.
Objection. This is an improper request for admission because Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. knows or should know that I would not admit this; it is in direct contradiction to my complaint. The purpose of requests for admission is to decrease the costs of litigation by narrowing the issues. It is not meant to be a tool to cause busy work for a pro se litigant in the hopes that the litigant fails to respond timely.
The request for admissions within our discovery procedure is intended to eliminate the effort, expense and time involved in proving such facts as are admitted and is not intended as some new or modern legal method of winning law suits without trial. The object of the civil court trial still remains to attain justice between the parties as nearly as possible, and the rules of civil procedure, including discovery, are intended to aid in that object.
Widmer v. Fort Smith Vehicle & Mach. Corp., 244 Ark. 626, 632, 427 S.W.2d 186, 190 (1968).
Notwithstanding my objections, I deny that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. was
not negligent in any way in connection with the care and treatment provided to Sean
Lynn.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu did not fail to meet the applicable standard of care in his medical care and treatment of Sean Lynn.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: I deny that Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu did not fail to meet the applicable standard of care in his medical care and treatment of Sean Lynn.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that there was no act or omission by Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. that was the proximate cause of injury or damage to Sean Lynn.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Objection. This request should not be considered because it is legal in nature. The firm representing Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. knows this request is impermissible. The Damalcheruvu requests are identical to the requests for admission filed and answered by the now dismissed defendants who were represented by Wright, Lindsey and Jennings LLP. (Those defendants will be named in my 42 USC 1983 federal case.) It is reasonable to believe that when Amelia H. Sandrock on behalf of Damalcheruvu accessed the WLJ requests, Ms. Sandrock also read my answers. To proceed otherwise would violate Rule 11’s admonishment to make a reasonable inquiry before certifying a document.
As per my filed answers to the WLJ defendants, Wright, Lindsey and Jennings LLP represented Baptist Health and Dr. Patrick O’Connell in a medical malpractice case in 2013. The firm propounded, “REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that any actions or inactions on the part of Dr. Patrick O’Connell were not the proximate cause of any damages or injuries alleged in your complaint.” Hardesty, 2013 Ark. App. at 3, 431 S.W.3d at 330. The circuit court did not consider Dr. O’Connell’s fifth request, finding that it was legal in nature. Hardesty, 2013 Ark. App. at 4, 5, 431 S.W.3d at 330, 331.
Notwithstanding my objection, I deny that no act or omission by Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu was the proximate cause of injury or damage to me.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. complied with the standard of care required of him in the medical care and treatment provided to Sean Lynn.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Objection. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. asked substantially the same request for admission No. 5, “Admit that Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu did not fail to meet the applicable standard of care in his medical care and treatment of Sean Lynn.” The only difference is using “complied with” in place of “did not fail to meet the applicable[.]” Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. and the other defendants already stole two weeks of my life and I will probably die sooner than if I had been allowed to heal properly in my home after jumping 10 feet from a falling ladder. Stop asking the same questions over and over.
Notwithstanding the objection, I deny that Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. complied with the standard of care required of him in the medical care and treatment provided to Sean Lynn.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that Dr. Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu is not liable in any way to you.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Objection. As the firm representing Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. knows or should know from reading my answer to requests for admission to the exact requests (other than defendant’s name) filed in this case by the WLJ defendants, a request for admission of a purely legal matter is impermissible. A request for admission that asks a party to admit that a person is not liable is also legal in nature, as it pertains to a legal conclusion rather than a factual matter.
Where there are no facts mentioned in the request, it cannot be called an “application of facts to law.” Matter of Adoption of Dailey, 30 Ark. App. 8, 11, 784 S.W.2d 782, 783 (1989).
Notwithstanding the objection, I deny that “Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. is not liable in any way to” me.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that you do not have a reasonable cause affidavit against Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. from a qualified expert as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-209(b).
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Objection. Irrelevant. It is also unclear as to what the affidavit would address.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-209(b) was ruled as unconstitutional, because the legislature was infringing on the court’s ability to make rules concerning procedural law. See Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007). The court concluded that § 16–114–209(b) is procedural and turned to its asserted conflict with Rule 3. Summerville, 369 Ark. at 238, 253 S.W.3d at 420. The Arkansas Constitution is clear that rules of pleading, practice, and procedures for our courts fall within the domain of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 3.
Summerville, 369 Ark. at 238, 253 S.W.3d at 420.
Further, before being deemed unconstitutional, the statute would not be applicable to this case. It begins, “In all cases where expert testimony is required under § 16-114-206[.]” § 16-114-209(b). I am not required to have expert testimony because the issues addressed by my claims are within the comprehension of a jury of my peers. § 16-114-206. No expert testimony is required to understood that I was falsely imprisoned and battered by Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D. A jury can read the UAMS patient rights, exhibit 22, and understand that Damalcheruvu violated my right to have a family member or other person of your choosing to be notified promptly upon my admission to UAMS Medical Center; know the name of the physician who had primary responsibility for coordinating my care and the names of other health care providers who cared for me; to be informed that I was injected with Fentanyl, Benzos and other medication during the time Damalcheruvu was actively involved in my non-consensual treatment; refuse treat; and almost every other one of the listed rights.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Admit that you have no evidentiary support for the allegations made in your Complaint against Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D..
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: I deny that I have no evidentiary support for the allegations made in my Complaint against Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu, M.D..
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit you have no evidentiary support for the damages claimed in your Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: I deny that I have no evidentiary support for the damages claimed in your Complaint.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit Sean Lynn’s injuries and
damages as alleged in the Complaint were due to his pre-existing medical conditions
and not a result of the medical care and treatment he received from Defendants.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Objection. This request is compound and the second clause is pregnant. Damalcheruvu is referring to non-consensual, harmful and offensive contact as “medical care and treatment” instead of “battery.”
Notwithstanding my objection, I deny that my injuries and damages as alleged in the Complaint were due to my pre-existing medical conditions and not a result of the battery by the defendants as alleged in my complaint.
I, Sean Lynn, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Arkansas that the foregoing Responses to Requests for Admission are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
[1] The requests for admission served on behalf of Prashanth Reddy Damalcheruvu show a preference for using the pronouns “She/her” so I am using her preferred pronouns.
Podcast Episode: Justice Delayed is Justice Denied
This podcast is AI generated from the YouTube video it describes. There a few small errors. For instance, the state court complaint that the sheriff held onto was not the civil rights complaint. It was state torts only.
Pip: There’s a legal maxim so old it’s practically load-bearing — justice delayed is justice denied — and it turns out the delay can start before you even get a hearing date.
Mara: That’s exactly the territory LauraLynnHammett is mapping on A Higher Law — what happens when the machinery of process service fails a pro se civil rights plaintiff at the very first step. Let’s start with that breakdown at the sheriff’s department.
Justice Delayed is Justice Denied
Pip: The question here is deceptively simple: what happens to a civil rights case when the defendants never get served? Not because the plaintiff failed to act, but because the office responsible for service quietly ran out the clock.
Mara: The post documents a recorded exchange at the sheriff’s department, and the clerk’s position is stated plainly: “We have up to 120 days to get any paperwork that we get served. We have up to 120 days.”
Pip: So the upshot is this — a plaintiff operating under the court’s 120-day deadline hands papers to the sheriff’s office, not knowing that office considers itself entitled to that same window. The deadlines don’t stack; they collide, and the plaintiff loses defendants.
Mara: And the collision is documented in the transcript. The deputy noted on the returned paperwork that service would not happen in time — but that notation came after the window closed, not before. The clerk’s explanation: it’s essentially first come, first served, and when he got to the paper, it was already too late.
Pip: Nobody told the plaintiff at intake that eight days was functionally zero days for that office. A private process server, she points out in the exchange, can do same-day or two-to-three-day service. That information arrived about nine minutes too late to be useful.
Mara: The practical damage is specific. Three defendants — Dr. Elizabet Brown, Dr. Mary “Katie” Kimbrough, and Emily Gray, SLP — were not served state court summonses. The post states they will now be named in a federal suit for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law instead.
Pip: She also flags what she sees as a Monell angle — the clerk confirmed on camera that this is standard policy and practice, not a one-off error. That confirmation, offered almost casually, is the kind of thing that turns a frustrating afternoon into a federal filing.
Mara: The post closes with a direct ask: the plaintiffs — the blogger and her adult son — are seeking legal representation on contingency from any Arkansas-licensed attorney willing to take on the case against UAMS staff. Contact is listed as bohemian_books@yahoo.com.
Pip: Due process lives downstream of service. If service fails, everything else is moot.
Mara: The gap between how process is supposed to work and how it actually moves through a sheriff’s office on a busy Tuesday — that gap is where this case is being fought.
Pip: Next time, we’ll see where the federal track takes it.
Justice Delayed is Justice Denied
The defendants who were not served state court summonses – Dr. Elizabet Brown, Dr. Mary “Katie” Kimbrough, and Emily Gray, SLP – will be named in the federal suit for deprivation of Constitutional rights under color of law.
As of September 24, 2026, the plaintiffs, this blogger and her adult son, are asking for legal representation on contingency. If you are licensed to practice law in Arkansas and are interested in getting involved with the case against UAMS staff, please contact us at bohemian_books@yahoo.com.
TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO
Hello. Hi.
0:07
7 secondsWhat can I do for you? Um, well, I had a I guess you could call it an incident
0:14
14 secondswhere uh I paid for three services and um
0:22
22 secondsthey would they were like my last day to serve would be I think it was seven or
0:29
29 secondseight days out from when I uh paid for it. And so what you’re saying is you gave it to
0:36
36 secondsus too late for us to in order for us to get it serve serve it in a timely manner. Is that what you’re saying?
0:42
42 secondsNo, I’m saying that I wasn’t told that it was too late because if I had been told that it was too late, then I would
0:51
51 secondshave gone to a private um server because they can do it in same day, they do it
0:58
58 secondsin two days or three days. Um, I’ve never had anybody say that it takes more
1:04
1 minute, 4 secondsthan three days to serve someone at, you know, US, which is like a easy service.
1:11
1 minute, 11 secondsUnderstand that your paper is not the only paper that we get. We get so many, we might get up to 2,000 papers a day.
1:19
1 minute, 19 secondsAnd so nothing’s going to get served.
1:22
1 minute, 22 secondsYeah. in 8 days and we have actually up to 120 days to actually serve any paperwork that we get.
1:31
1 minute, 31 secondsUh there’s only 120 days to serve for the plaintiff only has 120 days. No, that’s for us.
1:40
1 minute, 40 secondsWhat do you mean like you have 120 days?
1:43
1 minute, 43 secondsWe have up to 120 days to get any paperwork that we get served. We have up to 120 days. Is there some policy that
1:53
1 minute, 53 secondssays that or tell me what policy I could look for?
1:57
1 minute, 57 secondsIf you go read the uh the statute, you can you can find out. Which statute?
2:03
2 minutes, 3 secondsI don’t know the number by heart. But yeah, we have up to 120 days. Ma’am, uh could you find that statute for me?
2:10
2 minutes, 10 secondsAnd No, ma’am. I’m working on other stuff. I Well, I was gonna finish my sentence and say and get it to me like sometime like maybe send me a letter or an email.
2:21
2 minutes, 21 secondsI’m not gonna do that.
2:23
2 minutes, 23 secondsSo, you basically caused me to cause uh lose some of the defendants out of a
2:31
2 minutes, 31 secondsimportant cause anything ma’am civil rights case and we didn’t cause anything. You bring those papers when you had eight days
2:38
2 minutes, 38 secondsleft to have it served. We didn’t cause anything.
2:42
2 minutes, 42 secondsSo why don’t you tell people when they come and give you the documents that you for us to are not going to be able to serve them.
2:51
2 minutes, 51 secondsThey’re not attorneys. They’re not attorneys. Okay. They’re here to take papers, right? But like isn’t it sort of like a
3:00
3 minutesSo what you’re saying is you want us to you want to bring the paper to us and you want us to go through and read your paper fine tooth and comb and to let you
3:08
3 minutes, 8 secondsknow oh this is going to be expired and we can’t do that. No ma’am you see the papers on your desk. We don’t have time for that. No, I’m just saying that
3:16
3 minutes, 16 secondsnobody told me that it would be more than like a normal amount of time for service and
3:25
3 minutes, 25 secondsthey So like Yes, ma’am.
3:30
3 minutes, 30 secondsyou you wouldn’t tell somebody that like you need to bring these to a private process server
3:38
3 minutes, 38 secondsbecause we aren’t going to be able to do it or you could go put it in the mail cuz the same day I put three in the mail as well and you know because I just
3:47
3 minutes, 47 secondswanted to see which one would get there um you know and I so some of the defendants got served by mail
3:55
3 minutes, 55 secondsand some of them I didn’t really know their address. So like that’s the ones that I brought here, but
4:04
4 minutes, 4 secondsyou know, if I had known I could have made some kind of accommodation for it or at least gone to a private
4:11
4 minutes, 11 secondsSo you’re just saying that you don’t have any specifi you’re you’re saying that your specified time to serve is 120 days.
4:20
4 minutes, 20 secondsYes, ma’am.
4:21
4 minutes, 21 secondsBut you don’t know the statute that that comes out of.
4:29
4 minutes, 29 secondsthat like that would be great is if you have some kind of a um just a time the cost.
4:36
4 minutes, 36 secondsYeah, this is just a cost. Do you have anything printed that is I don’t have anything printed on that
4:44
4 minutes, 44 secondslike when people come in here and they say I don’t know anything about this you know process service I’m a prosay
4:52
4 minutes, 52 secondslitigant can you give me something that explains it to me what you do I’m I’m pretty sure
5:02
5 minutes, 2 secondsonly if you ask but ma’am again they’re not going to go through your paperwork to look and see how how much time you have on there before it expires.
5:10
5 minutes, 10 secondsRight. So, I’m asking for that right now like because I have other I’m going to be serving more people. Mhm.
5:18
5 minutes, 18 secondsUm, I’m going to probably have to uh file like I I dismissed some people
5:28
5 minutes, 28 secondsand then I’m going to refile against them um for claims against deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law.
5:38
5 minutes, 38 secondsYes, ma’am.
5:39
5 minutes, 39 secondsUm because that has a three-year statute of limitations. But the claims that were in that packet that I brought for you,
5:48
5 minutes, 48 secondsyou know, to serve was claims that are too late for me to file again at
5:56
5 minutes, 56 secondsthis point because, you know, so I’m trying to find out now.
6:01
6 minutes, 1 secondUsually when somebody does paperwork pro, they usually know what they’re doing or they have
6:08
6 minutes, 8 secondscontacted an attorney to get or find out how they should Have the papers served or not served?
6:17
6 minutes, 17 secondsWell, if they’re prosay, then they’re not contacting an attorney. I mean, you can look it up.
6:24
6 minutes, 24 secondsI I That’s what I’m doing. I’m coming here and asking you because you do this all the time.
6:29
6 minutes, 29 secondsYou’re not looking it up. You want me to go look it up. I’m not No, I’m asking you if you have that.
6:34
6 minutes, 34 secondsOkay. And so you have no no information that you will uh typically give to I
6:42
6 minutes, 42 secondsmean they didn’t give me any information but I have gone to other in fact I’ve gone in in um Faulner County
6:50
6 minutes, 50 secondsthey do have like an information packet when you go to get service done.
6:55
6 minutes, 55 secondsLet me see. You could probably go upstairs to the clerk’s office. They will probably have that paperwork for you. Okay. We don’t have any down here.
7:02
7 minutes, 2 secondsOkay. So you you’re just saying 120 days is like and because the other thing was
7:09
7 minutes, 9 secondsthey never even attempted the service because they and he wrote on there the de the deputy wrote that um
7:18
7 minutes, 18 secondsno they could serve in time for that it was not going to be served in time. Mhm.
7:23
7 minutes, 23 secondsSo he looked to see when it was supposed to be served after it was too late, but he didn’t look before.
7:33
7 minutes, 33 secondsAgain, it’s almost like a first come, first serve situation. And with that being said,
7:42
7 minutes, 42 secondswhen he got to the paper, it was too late for him to make an attempt on it. So that is why he sent it back to court.
7:51
7 minutes, 51 secondsOkay.
7:53
7 minutes, 53 secondsAnd I’m sorry I’m wearing sunglasses. I just forgot [laughter] I forgot to bring my clear glasses and I really didn’t even expect to come and talk to you. I
8:01
8 minutes, 1 secondcame to file some papers in the case cuz they aren’t the only defendants.
8:06
8 minutes, 6 secondsYes, ma’am. But um you know like we’re potentially gonna lose those defendants
8:12
8 minutes, 12 secondsand I want to know what re like what I can
8:20
8 minutes, 20 secondsdo what the sheriff’s department is going to do because I don’t think that
8:27
8 minutes, 27 secondsit was properly handled. Um but you’re saying that that is your policy and practice is exactly what you
8:35
8 minutes, 35 secondsdid to me. So you didn’t like single me out. I wasn’t singled out as like, oh, she’s suing our friends, so we’re not
8:43
8 minutes, 43 secondsgonna serve them or it’s not about not serving anybody. If we get it in a timely manner, then we have enough time to actually make
8:51
8 minutes, 51 secondsattempts on it. But you brought us paperwork that was going to expire in 8 days. So that’s your policy and practice. Yes.
8:58
8 minutes, 58 secondsOkay, then I’ll just file a manel claim. Thank you.
9:09
9 minutes, 9 secondsOh, okay. So, that does seem like, you know, I’m going to try to flip this around.
9:18
9 minutes, 18 seconds[snorts]
9:18
9 minutes, 18 secondsThat does seem like a good manel case because she’s saying that that’s their policy and practice is that they, you
9:26
9 minutes, 26 secondsknow, take people’s summons and they don’t tell them uh
9:33
9 minutes, 33 secondslike that it’s going to be potentially 120 days before they get to serve it,
9:41
9 minutes, 41 secondswhich is seems really odd to me, but Um,
9:51
9 minutes, 51 secondsand then that she wouldn’t tell me the statute or look it up and email it to
9:58
9 minutes, 58 secondsme. So like even when you get a parking ticket, it’s got the statute printed on it. Even when you get like if you get
10:07
10 minutes, 7 secondsany kind of a ticket for motor vehicle uh you know speeding or didn’t come to a
10:15
10 minutes, 15 secondsfull and complete stop at a stop sign, whatever it is, they’re going to give you a beautiful courthouse, isn’t it?
10:25
10 minutes, 25 secondsBut they’re going to give you a ticket that has a statute printed on it. like they’re not just going to say, “Oh, you
10:34
10 minutes, 34 secondsknow, this is just the way we do things here.” that they actually have to have
10:41
10 minutes, 41 secondslike a reason to do things the
Pro Se Prisoner v. Pulaski County Sheriff Deputies
If I had to bet money, the sheriffs will win. But should they?
Procedurally, the pro se falls way below the mark. But the sheriffs, who are represented by a licensed attorney, have the lazy defense.
For one thing, the sheriffs made a blanket denial. These are rarely allowed. And an averment not denied (properly) is an averment admitted.
Anyhow, this case came to my attention as I began my research about the Pulaski County Sheriff’s liability for failing to attempt service on three of the defendants in my case against UAMS. 60cv-26-216 in Pulaski County Circuit Court.
Hopefully a licensed attorney will try to help Mr. Rice, and a licensed attorney will try to help my son Sean Lynn.
UAMS Doctor Jordan Greer Admitted to Use of Chemical Restraints
The medical record contains a striking admission by UAMS physician Jordan Greer concerning the use of powerful sedating drugs on a patient who was trying to leave the hospital:
“Patient lacks capacity and continues to try and elope. Will give zyprexa, phenobarb, and ativan PRN. Will add precedex as needed for safety of patient and staff.”
The significance of this statement becomes clearer when the medications are identified.
Zyprexa (olanzapine) is an antipsychotic medication that can cause sedation. Phenobarbital is a barbiturate and central nervous system depressant used as a sedative and anticonvulsant. Ativan (lorazepam) is a benzodiazepine with sedating effects. Precedex (dexmedetomidine) is a sedative administered by infusion and used in intensive-care and procedural sedation.
In other words, Dr. Greer’s note did not merely describe an attempt to persuade a patient to remain in the hospital. It documented a plan to use multiple medications capable of depressing the central nervous system because the patient was attempting to leave and was considered unable to make his own decisions.
The medical record itself is therefore important. It uses the language of “safety,” but it also expressly connects the proposed administration of these drugs to the patient’s attempts to “elope.” When medication is used to prevent a person from leaving rather than to treat a medical condition, the question of whether the medication is functioning as a chemical restraint deserves careful scrutiny.
This is not an assertion that every use of these medications constitutes a chemical restraint. Their legitimate medical uses are well established. The question here is what purpose they served in this particular case—and the doctor’s own words provide unusually direct evidence of that purpose.
After a clear threat of litigation, the patient was allowed to leave the hospital against medical advice, without further battery by the UAMS staff. He rested comfortably at home and expressed his understanding that he was a prisoner at UAMS for the prior two weeks, despite the drug cocktail forced on him.
Podcast Episode: Police Try the Old Switch-a-Roo With Excessive Force Photos
Pip: There's a certain audacity to submitting a photograph as evidence of someone's condition after an arrest — and then having that photograph turn out to be from three months earlier. Bold strategy.
Mara: This episode covers a case from LauraLynnHammett's reporting at A Higher Law — an excessive force lawsuit where the key evidence turned out to be the wrong photograph entirely. Let's start with what the documents actually show.
Police Try the Old Switch-a-Roo With Excessive Force Photos
Pip: The central tension here is a simple one: two booking photographs, two completely different stories, and a court trying to figure out which one reflects what actually happened the night of Jacob Earls' arrest on August 11, 2009.
Mara: The setup matters. Earls, representing himself, produced Exhibit 1 — a jail document showing him beaten and unconscious. He explained how he found it, and the court quoted him directly: "I found it in my — the day I was leaving to go to Brickeys, Arkansas, to start my six-month PD, I found it in the trash bag in my clothes and it was in my personal property. They have plastic Ziplock bags that they seal when they — like your wallet, your watch. The picture was in there, folded in half. I took it and I slipped it in my pocket because I knew it was crucial. It was crucial evidence. I knew that."
Pip: He found his own evidence in a Ziploc bag in a trash bag in his clothes. And he was right — it was crucial.
Mara: Exhibit 2, by contrast, showed Earls without a scratch, wearing what the court describes as a very colorful button-down dress shirt. Officer Ring and his witnesses insisted that was the August 11 booking photo. A detainee named William Shaw directly contradicted them, testifying that when Earls arrived at the detention center that night, he "was totally out" — and that staff were laughing while holding his head up for the picture.
Pip: Officer Ring's own account of that evening has a very relaxed quality — chatting about parents and grandmothers, wishing Earls good luck on the way out. A courteous arrest, by all accounts.
Mara: The court wasn't satisfied with the record and ordered defense counsel to produce a full accounting of all photographs. What came back was an affidavit from Brian Agee, a software developer at the company running the detention center's system. Agee confirmed that the colorful-shirt photo — Exhibit 2, the one Ring's entire defense rested on — was taken May 18, 2009. Nearly three months before the arrest.
Pip: So the photograph offered to prove Earls had no injuries after the August arrest was taken in May.
Mara: And Exhibit 1, the one showing Earls beaten and unconscious, was confirmed to come from a document created August 11, 2009, at 2:12 a.m. The court called Ring's reliance on Exhibit 2 "wholly rejected" and denied summary judgment, finding that real questions of fact remained about whether excessive force was used.
Pip: The system usually makes it hard to prove what happened. Earls found his proof in a Ziploc bag in a trash bag — and it held up.
Mara: That's the through-line here: accountability is difficult, documentation matters, and sometimes the evidence survives anyway.
Pip: When the photograph you submitted as proof of innocence predates the arrest by three months, the court tends to notice.
Mara: The deeper question is what happens in cases where the documentation doesn't survive — or was never found in a pocket. That's the territory worth watching.
Police Try the Old Switch-a-Roo With Excessive Force Photos
This case started with the plaintiff representing himself. The police officers acted as if no one would discover their ruse.
Why do police in Arkansas think they can get away with covering up misconduct by government actors? Probably because they usually get away with it.
Outtakes from the proposed findings:
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant Matthew Ring’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37). Plaintiff, Jacob Thomas Earls, an inmate at the Delta Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction, initiated this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges that Officer Ring of the Paragould Police Department used excessive force when arresting him on August 11, 2009.
II. HEARING
On August 16, 2010, the Court held an evidentiary hearing and took sworn testimony from the parties and their respective witnesses. The hearing centered on two book-in photographs received into evidence.¹ Exhibit 1 is an undated jail document entitled “Inmate Information Sheet,” which contains a photograph showing Earls beaten and unconscious. (Def.’s Ex. 1.) Exhibit 2 is another jail document entitled “Booking Sheet,” which contains a photograph showing Earls without a scratch and wearing a very colorful, button down, dress shirt. (Def.’s Ex. 2.) Exhibit 2 also showed a “Book In” date of August 11, 2009.
¹ Both were admitted as Defendant’s exhibits (Hr’g Tr. 44), but Exhibit 1 came from Plaintiff.
With regard to how Mr. Earls came to possess this document, he testified as follows:
“I found it in my — the day I was leaving to go to Brickeys, Arkansas, to start my six-month PD, I found it in the trash bag in my clothes and it was in my personal property. They have plastic Ziplock bags that they seal when they — like your wallet, your watch. The picture was in there, folded in half. I took it and I slipped it in my pocket because I knew it was crucial. It was crucial evidence. I knew that.”
A. Plaintiff’s Evidence
Mr. Earls testified that in the early morning hours of August 11, 2009, Ring arrested him and, during the course of the arrest, slammed him against the police vehicle and then the ground, rendering him unconscious. (Hr’g Tr. 13.) Earls testified, “That’s the last I remember.” Id. Earls stated he believes the photograph in Exhibit 1 was taken after Ring arrested him and booked him into the Green County Detention Center on August 11, 2009.
William Shaw, a detainee at the Green County Detention Center on August 11, 2009, testified that he remembered when Mr. Earls arrived at the Detention Center that night and Earls “was totally out.” Id. at 49. Shaw stated, “When they took his picture they took his head like this and held it back, and they’re laughing and stuff because he was out.” Id. Shaw testified that the Exhibit 1 photograph accurately depicted Earls’ condition on August 11, 2009, at the Green County Detention Center. Id.
B. Defendant’s Evidence
Officer Ring testified that he had, in fact, used force to arrest Earls because he was trying to flee. (Hr’g Tr. 88.) Ring stated he took Earls to the ground using a “arm-bar take down” and handcuffed him. Id. at 89. He further stated, “Once I set him in the seat, I got my flashlight out of my pocket and looked at his face. . . . There were like two small scratches but they were so minor they didn’t even draw blood. There was no blood dropping so he appeared fine.” Id.
Ring then told the Court about his interactions with Earls after the arrest. He testified as follows:
“We sat out in the patrol car taking a jaw. I don’t really remember. We talked, but I don’t remember what we talked about. I do recall once we got to the jail, Jailer Cody Oost was there behind the booking desk. Soon as we come in the door Cody Oost had made a comment about Jacob’s shirt being colorful or something and I kind of snickered back and said, yes, it’s colorful, but once I set Jacob down at the stool, I took his handcuffs off and stood just to the right of him and probably two feet from him, filled out my paperwork I had to fill out for the jail. We conversed there. I think he asked me how my parents were doing. I asked him how his grandmother was doing, and that was pretty much the end of that.”
Hr’g Tr. at 93.
Later Officer Ring told the Court the following:
“I recall [Earls] wearing a dark-colored button-up shirt. . . . Because once we got to the jail and I got him out of the car, he walked in on his own and sat down. . . . I recall briefly some of our conversations because he asked me about my parents; I asked about his grandmother, and I believe on my way out I wished him good luck, and that’s the last I saw him.”
Id. at 100-101.
Throughout the hearing, Officer Ring asserted that Mr. Earls looked as pictured in Exhibit 2 after his arrest. When shown Exhibit 1, he steadfastly denied this photograph was taken after the August 11, 2009, arrest. Id. at 99.
Officer Marcoe testified she arrived on the scene a few minutes after Earls’ arrest. (Hr’g Tr. 112.) When asked if she took a “good look” at Mr. Earls, she stated, “I mean, I looked [at] him about as much as I would at any other person that’s under arrest, didn’t – – there was really nothing out of the ordinary from a normal day so I didn’t really take a particular look at him.” Id. She further testified that had Mr. Earls looked as pictured in Exhibit 1, “I probably would have been like, Hey, does he need an ambulance or something. I mean, from that it appears that he would have somewhat serious injuries.” Id. at 115.
Lieutenant Baldridge served as Ring’s supervisor on August 11, 2009. Id. at 121. He arrived at the scene after Ring had arrested Mr. Earls. Id. at 123-124. Lieutenant Baldridge described the scene as a “non-event.” (Hr’g Tr. 124.) When asked if the Exhibit 1 photograph depicted Earls’ condition that night, Lieutenant Baldridge answered, “Absolutely not.” Id. at 126. When asked how he could be so sure, Baldridge testified, “Because I would have noted any injuries like that and, then, that would not have been a non-event for me.” Id.
Defense witness, Officer Cody Oost, testified that he served as a jailer at the Greene County Detention Center in August 2009. The Court asked Oost if he was present when the photograph in Exhibit 1 was taken and Oost stated, “I’m believing I was because – – I mean, I’m not saying I took the picture.” Id. at 157. When defense counsel asked if the photograph was taken after Earls’ arrest, Oost testified that:
“I couldn’t testify when that picture was taken. I have no – – I just remember that picture. I don’t remember if I was even there when that picture was taken. I just remember everybody looking at that picture because, you know – – Just because of the picture. I mean it’s not every day we have a, you know, an inmate come in looking like that, you know, just acting how he was, you know, just all, you know — I don’t even remember; I couldn’t tell you why he came in looking that – -”
Id. at 162-163.
C. Post-Hearing Evidence
After hearing from the parties, the Court concluded the record was incomplete because serious questions remained about Exhibits 1 and 2, and ultimately Jacob Earls’ condition after the August 11, 2009, arrest. Therefore, the Court entered an order directing defense counsel to provide a detailed accounting of all photographs taken of Mr. Earls by the Green County Sheriff’s Department, Green County Detention Center, and Paragould Police Department. (Doc. No. 65.)
In response, defense counsel provided an Affidavit from Brian Agee, Software Developer at Tiger Correctional Services, the software company used at the Green County Detention Center. (Doc. No. 73.) Agee gave a detailed accounting of all photographs of Earls from the Green County Detention Center. He stated the Exhibit 2 photograph – that Officer Ring and his law enforcement witnesses asserted was the book-in photo from the August 11, 2009 arrest² – was actually taken May 18, 2009. (Agee Aff. p. 2 of 3; Doc. No. 73.) Agee further stated the Exhibit 1 photograph showing Earls beaten and unconscious – comes from a document “created on August 11, 2009, at 2:12:46 at the Green County Detention Center.” Id.
² Jailer Cody Oost testified he distinctly remembered this photograph from the August 11, 2009 arrest because he and Defendant Ring made fun of the shirt (Hr’g Tr. 148-149). Officer Ring testified, “Soon as we come in the door Cody Oost had made a comment about Jacob’s shirt being colorful or something and I kind of snickered back and said, yes, it’s colorful. . . .” Id. at 93.
III. ANALYSIS
In his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37), Ring submits essentially the same evidence presented at the August 16, 2010, evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No. 38.) He argues that during the arrest on August 11, 2009, Mr. Earls only received minor scratches and that he (Ring) did not use excessive force. Ring proposes Exhibit 2 as evidence that Jacob Earls had no notable injuries when he was booked into the Green County Detention Center. In support of his Motion, Officer Ring offers his sworn Affidavit wherein he states, “Mr. Earls did receive a few minor scratches on face (sic) from going to the ground. He did not appear to need any medical attention for the scratches.” (Doc. No. 38, p. 11). Officer Ring offers as further support of his Motion the incident report he wrote several months later, on January 30, 2010. Id. at p. 15. In this report, Officer Ring provides the same information found in his Affidavit.
While Ring vigorously defends his position that he did not use excessive force when he arrested Mr. Earls, the Exhibit 1 photograph calls into serious question the veracity of Ring’s defense. Agee has provided incontestible evidence that Jacob Earls did not appear as depicted in the photograph from Exhibit 2. This photograph was taken nearly three months earlier, on May 18, 2009. (Doc. 73-1, p. 3 of 3.) Therefore, Officer Ring’s reliance on Exhibit 2 as evidence of Earls’ post-arrest condition is wholly rejected by the Court.
Agee was unable to provide a date stamped copy of the photograph of Exhibit 1 because it is no longer in the system.³ Mr. Agee was only able to verify that the document marked as Exhibit 1 was created on August 11, 2009, at 2:12 a.m. Despite the lack of date stamp on the photograph, the Court finds Exhibit 1 highly persuasive evidence in support of Jacob Earls’ allegation of excessive force.
Accordingly, questions of material fact remain as to whether Officer Ring used excessive force when he arrested Jacob Earls on August 11, 2009. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:
- Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment should be DENIED.
