A Little Light Reading for Your Sunday Evening

Atheists call it “coincidence” or “kismet”. I call it a God thing.

God is good, all the time.

So, I was pulling up caselaw on Thursday at the Arkansas Supreme Court Library. They let patrons use their Westlaw subscription. There is an email function. This is a pro se litigant’s lifeblood.

Praise break: The staff at the library is great. Especially Ava. She and the rest of the crew go out of their way to help dig for the truth.

The wind finally calmed down this evening and I got a walk in. Then I sat down to read the emails from Thursday.

The first email from Westlaw was a case out of Massachusetts. The case discussed was the end of a line of dicta and persuasive law that I will use in my case against the greedy and obnoxious debt buyer, Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC.

Once you learn the legal shorthand and style preferred by the courts, caselaw is so interesting. I may never read fiction again. (Though I am coming to find that much of what judges write is fiction also. Hint: Judge Susan Kaye Weaver, Judge Billy Roy Wilson, etc.)

I asked a therapist once if she thought I am litigious. She said no. She explained that because I had to protect important rights in court once, I learned about other rights and just try to protect them also. One case teaches me that I have another case.

Thus, I read a case to glean what I can about the Portfolio Recovery dispute, and it is as if this learned judge in Massachusetts is sitting with me, chatting about the Pietrczak and Shelter Insurance cases presided over by Judge Weaver. Here is what Judge Angel Kelley told me: (I did not make this up; her name really is Angel.)

“But Lotus Foods’ interests in this case are ‘aligned closely enough’ to Zhuang’s that the company’s interests elsewhere will be adequately protected by Zhuang’s positions here. Merrill Lynch, 11 F.4th at 17 (‘We have explained that where the interests of an absent party are aligned closely enough with the interests of an existing party, and where the existing party pursues those interests in the course of the litigation, the absent party is not required under Rule 19.’); see Pujol v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 877 F.2d 32, 135-36 (1st Cir. 1989) (‘The mere fact … that Party A, in a suit against Party B, intends to introduce evidence that will indicate that a non-party, C, behaved improperly does not, by itself, make C a necessary party.’). Although Zhuang bears the burden to show that Lotus Foods should be joined, he fails to demonstrate why his own defense—ostensibly, that he did not commit fraud, intentionally interfere with New Ming’s business relations, or convert New Ming’s funds—will not protect Lotus Foods’ interests as well. Roy v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., No. 3:17-30116-KAR, 2020WL3799203, at*6-7(D. Mass. July 7,2020) (”'[A]n absent party’s interests cannot be harmed or impaired if they are identical to those of a present party.”‘ (quoting Bacardí, 719 F.3d at 11) (internal alternations omitted)). Presumably, the two would want to prove the same things. None of the cases defendant cites demonstrate that a corporate entity must be joined if one of its officers or directors issued individually for tortious conduct. Cf. Rivera Rojas v. Loewen Group Intern., Inc., 178 F.R.D.356,361-62(D.P.R. 1998) (finding subsidiary necessary party in contract dispute against parent company); Urquhart v. Wertheimer, 646 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213(D.Mass.2009) (finding partnership necessary and indispensable party where (i) plaintiff’s claims were derivative, and (ii) the general partner’s and the partnership’s interests were not aligned). Taking New Ming’s allegations as true, Lotus Foods is not necessary under Rule 19(a), and the court need not address Rule 19(b) at this time.”

Thank you, Judge Kelley. Can I pour you a glass of Moscato or do you prefer a cup of dandelion tea?

Judge Silly Sue Weaver demanded that I join my own living trust, of which I was sole trustee and non-contingent beneficiary, to a case against Shelter Insurance Company and Jeff Jennings Insurance. No attorney would represent the trust, because it would be professional suicide. The trust held no liquid assets, anyhow, so the trust would need to obtain funds for an attorney from me. I named the trust as a defendant, arguing that I paid for the insurance out of my individual funds, and will be harmed by the trust’s inability to retain counsel. I told the court that she was free to name the trust as an involuntary plaintiff.

While on another case Judge Silly Sue said I could not defend myself as an individual during a hearing to determine the amount of default damages awarded against the very same trust. After the kangaroo court hearing Judge Weaver dismissed me as an individual with prejudice. Then she went on to decide I personally did some illegal things. She gave the real property held in trust, my individual rights to use that property and my personal property that was on the real estate to a man who had sued me maliciously, twice, and had the case against me dismissed both times.

The Pietrczak case is on appeal and the Shelter insurance case will certainly need to be appealed, also. Hopefully, someday, an old lady or a modest means family that is fighting to keep the little they have will come across the writings of the Arkansas Court of Appeals on my cases and be able to say, “Praise God”. We can pray.