Archive | December 2023

Appearances Do Matter in Court and Backgammon

I wanted to post this YouTube video, but it didn’t seem to have anything to do with court corruption. It is just a cool thing my son invented; Double Board Backgammon. If you love the game, watch.

Here is the commonality. Appearance of fairness matters.

Sean and I disagree about how the dice must be rolled. I looked up rules at https://bkgm.com/articles/BowerHortonSimborg/RulesAndStandardsGuide/Gibson2013.html#sec-5.5

I was right. Of course.

You can see in the video where I try to reproduce non-random rolling by turning the cup upside-down on the board the way Sean does, instead of shaking and rolling the dice from a distance above the rolling surface. I would gain no advantage. But that is not to say someone with better dexterity and more practice than me could not cheat by rolling like Sean rolls.

I refuse to play, even with my son, if the other player appears to have an improper advantage, even if slight.

Backgammon is only a game.

How much more important is it that our judicial officers refrain from any appearance of impropriety?

When Judge Susan Weaver refuses to give a continuance to a pro se defendant when summons was not even issued in one case and, in a separate case, sua sponte gives a represented defendant a continuance because service of summons might have a technical impropriety, it is not a good look.

When Judge Lee P. Rudofsky misquotes lines against a pro se plaintiff and quotes every other line from evidence, distorting the truth in favor of the Big Money defendant, it is not a good look.

In court and backgammon, appearances matter.

Federal District Judge disturbed by “sealing documents in run-of-the-mill cases”.

Thank you to Judges like the Honorable Ed Kinkeade and Honorable Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:

This is the text of an order filed in the 5th Circuit, which is available as FREE Doc of the Day for download below:

This Order governs requests to file materials in this case under seal. The Fifth Circuit has recently addressed in great depth an increasing trend of courts “sealing documents in run-of-the-mill cases where the parties simply prefer to keep things under wraps.” Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 2021); see also June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed
that “[t]he public’s right of access to judicial proceedings is fundamental.” Le, 990 F.3d at 418; see id. at 421 (“Legal arguments, and the documents underlying them, belong in the public domain. American courts are not private tribunals summoned to resolve disputes confidentially at taxpayer expense.”). Thus, courts must be “ungenerous with their discretion to seal judicial records” and remain mindful that “the working presumption is that judicial records should not be sealed.” Id. at 418–19. It is an abuse of discretion where the court makes “‘no mention of the presumption in favor of the public’s access to judicial records’ and fails to ‘articulate any reasons that would support sealing.’” Id. at 419 (quoting SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1993)).


During the discovery stage, the parties may agree to designate documents as confidential. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to issue a protective order “for good cause” which may be used by the parties to govern the exchange of information at the discovery stage. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). However, the fact that a protective order governs the designation of documents as “confidential”
during discovery does not automatically permit the parties to then file those documents under seal with the Court. “At the discovery stage, when parties are exchanging information, a stipulated protective order under Rule 26(c) may well be proper. Party-agreed secrecy has its place—for example, honoring legitimate privacy interests and facilitating the efficient exchange of information. But at the adjudicative stage, when materials enter the court record, the standard for shielding records from public view is
far more arduous.” Le, 990 F.3d at 420.


The standard under Rule 26(c) “for keeping unfiled discovery confidential” should not be conflated with the standard for sealing materials filed with the court. Id. at 420; see also id. 419 n.31 (citing Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001)). The court “must undertake a case-by-case, ‘document-by-document,’ ‘line-by-line’ balancing of ‘the public’s common law right of access
against the interests favoring nondisclosure’” and conduct an analysis which demonstrates a “grappling with public and private interests” and provides an “assurance that the extent of sealing was congruent to the need.” Id. at 419-20. To be sure, “[t]he secrecy of judicial records, including stipulated secrecy, must be justified and weighed against the presumption of openness that can be rebutted only by compelling countervailing interests favoring nondisclosure.” Id. at 421. Sealing judicial records without the required showing and explanation “harms the public interest, however interested the public is likely to be.” Id.

If a party wishes to file a specific document with the Court under seal, the party must first move for leave to do so, sufficiently “showing that secrecy is warranted or why the public’s presumptive right of access is subordinated.” See id. Although “line-by-line” balancing is a duty ultimately reserved for the Court, the Court will not engage in this analysis absent robust briefing from the party seeking the sealing order. The
Court also acknowledges that parties sometimes seek leave to file the confidential materials of other parties under seal without any particular interest in having the materials sealed, and that the parties with an interest in sealing are best positioned to explain why sealing is appropriate.

Accordingly, the following requirements govern motions to seal in this matter:

If a party seeks leave to file documents under seal, the party shall file a motion for leave to file the documents under seal accompanied by either (1) supporting briefing and exhibits as described below, or (2) a certification that another party will file the supporting briefing and exhibits within fourteen days of the filing of the motion. The briefing and exhibits or the certification, as applicable, must be filed separately from the motion. A movant that fails to file briefing and exhibits complying with this order
concurrently with its motion consents to the unsealing of all documents covered by the motion. A nonmovant that fails to file briefing and exhibits complying with this order within fourteen days of
the filing of the motion likewise consents to the unsealing of all documents covered by the motion.

A party filing briefs and supporting exhibits urging the Court to file documents under seal shall file (1) a public, unsealed brief, (2) a public, unsealed attachment to the public brief, (3) a sealed brief, and (4) sealed attachments to the sealed brief.

In the public brief, the party shall describe generally, for each sentence, paragraph, page, figure, chart, etc. of the document(s) sought to be sealed, why the risks of disclosure outweigh the public’s common law right of access without disclosing the substance of the material sought to be sealed.

In the public attachment to the public brief, the party shall provide a chart listing in one column the citation for each portion of each document the party seeks to seal and listing in an adjacent column a generalized description of the material to which each citation refers.

In the sealed brief, the party shall, for each sentence, paragraph, page, figure, chart, etc. of the document(s) sought to be sealed, provide a detailed argument with supporting legal authority as to why the risk of disclosing the material outweighs the public’s common law right of access to the material.
This sealed brief must be as specific and detailed as possible.

In the sealed attachments to the sealed brief, the party shall file unredacted versions of the document(s) sought to be sealed. The party may rely upon other evidence that is relevant to whether the document(s) should be sealed, but the party must file such evidence unsealed unless it is among the material sought to be sealed.

See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 79.3.

Within twenty-one days of the filing of the briefing described above, any party opposing sealing shall file (1) a public, unsealed brief, (2) a public, unsealed attachment to the unsealed brief, and (3) a sealed brief.

In the public brief, the party shall, for each sentence, paragraph, page, figure, chart, etc. of the document(s) whose sealing is at issue, describe generally why the risk of disclosing the material does not outweigh the public’s common law right of access without disclosing the substance of the material whose sealing is at issue.

In the public attachment, the party shall file a copy of the public chart filed in support of sealing, adding an additional column indicating whether the party agrees or disagrees that each citation listed in the chart refers to material that should be sealed.

In the sealed brief, the party shall, for each sentence, paragraph, page, figure, chart, etc. of the document(s) whose sealing is at issue, provide a detailed argument with supporting legal authority as to why the risk of disclosing the material does not outweigh the public’s common law right of access to the material. This sealed brief must be as specific and detailed as possible.

See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 79.3.

Within fourteen days of the filing of the response in opposition, if any, the party filing the briefs in support of sealing may file (1) a public, unsealed reply brief and (2) a sealed reply brief.

In the public reply brief, the party shall respond generally to the broad arguments in the public response brief.

In the sealed reply brief, the party shall specifically address the arguments in the public and sealed response briefs.

SO ORDERED

Signed November 20th, 2023.

*********************************

Respect to Judge Kinkeade and Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge, the other wise and honorable justices of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and all other Courts that uphold the important protections to our liberties.

Soon to be hit song: Faulkner co. Corrupt

This is a cool song by a woman named Betty Figueroa who claims she was hit in the head with a gun by a Faulkner County Sheriff officer and forcibly confined to a chair for about 17 hours in 2019.

Mrs. Figueroa filed a pro se lawsuit for violation of her civil rights. It was dismissed without prejudice.

Mrs. Figueroa is also having trouble with Arkansas Circuit Court Judge Susan Weaver.

With my own caseload and holiday plans, I won’t have the opportunity to dig into Mrs. Figueroa’s complaints deeply until the new year.

In the meantime, let’s make her song go viral.

Judge Susan Weaver Orders Continuance of Trial on Her Own Initiative to Benefit Big Bank

In yet another act of vexatiousness toward pro se litigants, Judge Susan Kaye Weaver of Faulkner County, Arkansas sua sponte decided to continue a trial against a big bank defendant. Judge Weaver claimed there was good cause to order the continuance; There was improper service of the complaint on the bank. The plaintiff said she served the summons and a subpoena at the same time, and she thinks that the defendant’s acknowledgment suffices.

It is the fact that Judge Weaver delayed a continuance for a pro se defendant on a separate case who wrote a motion for the continuance and two proposed orders because the defendant was not served at all, until the day of the trial and after the pro se defendant filed exhibits to be used at trial.

The errant judge appeared to be collecting discovery for the represented party. The attorney for that party, William Zac White failed to file exhibits before the scheduled trial.

Instead, he filed an opposition to the motion for continuance a couple days before trial, six weeks after the motion was filed. More bizarre, Zac White asked for a continuance verbally at the trial and it was granted by Judge Susan Weaver. The very same Susan Weaver who took it on herself to continue the trial against U.S. Bank for lack of proper service, refused to grant a continuance for an unserved pro se litigant and then granted a continuance for the represented party who failed to serve summons.

The pro se defendant was dismissed after about two years, but her property rights were still transferred by Judge Susan Weaver to Mr. White’s client, without allowing the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to speak in her own defense.

That case was briefed on appeal over a year ago, with no response from Pietrczak, and is still on the Arkansas Court of Appeals docket, undecided. 65-CV-21-20, Pietrczak v. Laura Lynn and Rural Revival Living Trust.

FREE Docs of the Day

Continuance granted in Betty Figueroa v. U.S. Bank, et al.

Continuance motion in Pietrczak.

As you can see, William Zac White is an embarrassment to the legal profession and Judge Susan Weaver should be removed from office.

Do not believe anything you read in an opinion by Trump appointed Judge Lee P. Rudofsky.

Judge Rudofsky granted summary judgment to debt buyer Portfolio Recovery Associates and denied leave to amend to change Doe 1 to PRA Group, Inc. (traded as “PRAA”).

Summary judgment is an extreme measure and should only be granted if the non-moving party raises no genuine dispute of material fact, with all positive inferences taken for the non-moving party.

Judge Rudofsky misstated and misinterpreted evidence by the non-moving party. He also flat out ignored it.

The non-moving party filed a “verified complaint” under penalty of perjury. This should be given the same weight as an affidavit. Yet Judge Rudofsky ignored it completely.

Here, as FREE Doc of the Day, is the verified complaint Judge Rudofsky did not mention. The appellate brief follows.

This case was fought pro se. If there is an attorney who thinks the billion dollar per year revenue debt collector should pay more than $5,000 for every time it gets caught making harassing, intrusive phone calls, please contact Laura Hammett at bohemian_books@yahoo.com.