Tag Archive | Arkansas Court of Appeals Judge Rita W. Gruber

Arkansas Attorney William Zac White Running and Hiding, Again

[5] A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process. A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

Section – Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities, Ark. R. Prof. Cond. Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities

Refusing service seems to be using procedures to harass, rather than uphold legal process.

“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Rule 3.2 – Expediting Litigation, Ark. R. Prof. Cond. 3.2

COMMENT

[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

Rule 3.2 – Expediting Litigation, Ark. R. Prof. Cond. 3.2

Besides being tacky and obnoxious, refusing service of legal documents is done to frustrate an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress. It should not be tolerated by the bench.

The documents refused were petitions for reconsideration and rehearing of an appeal. Zac White failed to file an opposition to the appeal. Then Judges Rita Gruber, Cindy Thyer and Brandon Harrison dismissed the appeal errantly on a jurisdictional issue. They ignored the jurisdictional issues that should have dismissed the appellee’s case at the lower court.

Even though attorney White did not oppose the petitions, the Court of Appeals denied the relief requested. No explanation was given.

A Universal Problem: World Courts Show More Concern for Procedure than Merits

Thank you to Jojy George Koduvath for his insightful WordPress blog IndianLawLive.net. Indian law is not precedential in the United States, but it is informative.

Also, the LAWPHiL Project for posting the following court document from which I quote. This caselaw puts my thoughts on the error of our courts in relying on procedure instead of merit so well.

“The court has [the] discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The ‘discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.’ Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court’s primary duty is to render or dispense justice. ‘A litigation is not a game of technicalities.’ ‘Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.’ Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. (Citations omitted)” 582 Phil. 600 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division] at 612-613.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/nov2017/gr_208224_2017.html#fnt56