Jury Awarded $82,000,000 Punitive Damages Against Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC. It Didn’t Stop Them.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC buys junk debt for pennies on the dollar, and then the army of attorneys file about 3,000 lawsuits per week against alleged debtors, knowing 90% won’t even go to court to protect themselves. PRA takes a default and starts garnishing bank accounts and wages. They even settled a claim by the attorney general of Massachusetts who said that the company took old folk’s pensions.
Some people might owe the alleged debts. It does not matter to PRA though whether the debt is a clerical error or the result of fraud. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, hundreds of thousands of people fall victim to PRA’s impermissible collection of inauthentic debt each year.
Federal District Court Judge Lee P. Rudofsky is presiding over a case in the Eastern District of Arkansas in which I am plaintiff against Portfolio Recovery Associates. It is not looking too good for me. I know I should win. I have known since before discovery and two years of research that I should win. But Judge Rudofsky already dismissed the vast majority of my claims on a motion for summary judgment.
I recently was dismissed as a defendant in a case where the plaintiff’s attorney, judge and court reporter fabricated hearing dialogue. Portfolio Recovery recently agreed to pay $12M in restitution and $12M in a civil fine for violating the same statutes against hundreds of thousands of victims that I claim they violated against me. So, why not believe them more than he believes me?
All I am asking for is to present my case to a jury. Another PRA victim sued the company in 2015 and was awarded $82M in punitive damages on top of $250,000 in actual damages and $1,000 in statutory damages. PRA appealed. The case was remanded after settlement and before the appellate court issued an opinion based on the briefs.
You can scroll down to download the original version of the trial court order below. The footnotes were deleted or made part of the text body in this cut and pasted version. I added a few comments of my own in straight parenthesis or red.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI
AT KANSAS CITY
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY
ASSOCIATES, LLC, A LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
Case No. 1216-CV34184
v. Division 9
GUADALUPE MEJIA,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.
JUDGMENT/ORDER
Pending before the Court is Counterclaim Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates,
LLC’s (“Defendant’s”) Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, Or In The
Alternative, To Amend, Modify, And/Or Remit The Judgment. The Motion is denied.
Background
On October 31, 2014, this Court entered Judgment for the Plaintiff on her malicious
prosecution counterclaim and her Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) counterclaim
and ordered that trial proceed on damages only. On May 4, 2015, this case came before the
Court for trial on damages only. On May 11, 2015, the jury awarded Maria Guadalupe Mejia
Alcantara (“Plaintiff”) $250,000.00 in compensatory damages and $1,000.00 in statutory
damages on her FDCPA claim. The jury also awarded her $250.000.00 in compensatory damages on her malicious prosecution claim and found Portfolio liable for punitive damages.
After further deliberation, the jury awarded $82,009,549.00 in punitive damages.
Following trial, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
for punitive damages in the amount of $82,009,549.00, compensatory damages in the amount of
$250,000.00, statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00. The Court further awarded Plaintiff
attorney’s fees and expenses as follows: (a) actual damages in the amount of $9,995.00 for the
attorney’s fees associated with the her defense; (b) attorney’s fees in the amount of $276,025.00
under the FDCPA; and (c) expenses in the amount of $33,222.97 under the FDCPA.
The pending motion was timely filed and contains numerous issues. The Motion is
denied, but the Court will specifically address the Defendant’s request for review of the jury’s
punitive damage award.
The Court acknowledges the purpose of punitive damages is to serve the State’s interest
in punishment and deterrence, and that these interests cannot be served unless potential
defendants have fair notice, not only of the conduct that will subject them to punishment, but
also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose. “The decision to punish a tortfeasor
through an award of punitive damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and with
Article I, section 10, of the Missouri Constitution.” Mansfield v. Horner, 443 S.W.3d 627, 643
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, the Court must review the punitive damage award to determine whether it is
“grossly excessive.” Id. Such analysis includes review of three guideposts: 1) the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct, 2) the ratio of the punitive award to the actual and
potential harm from the defendant’s wrongdoing, and 3) the criminal and regulatory sanctions for
comparable misconduct. BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
[Such as the 2015 civil fine against PRA for $8,000,000 and the agreement to pay a civil fine of $12,000,000 made on March 23, 2023.]
Guidepost One
“The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme
Court suggested several factors should be considered when determining reprehensibility of
conduct: “the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct
had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident;
and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” Id. at 419
(citation omitted).
Here, although the potential harm to the Plaintiff may be considered economic, there was evidence Defendant’s conduct had a physical and health-related impact on this particular Plaintiff, her financial vulnerability was particularly concerning. Plaintiff, although working, was in financial distress. She spoke limited English. She did not understand the legal system and had no
financial ability to hire an attorney. She was afraid she would lose all she had worked for – her
home of twenty years, her family, and her freedom. And, throughout this litigation, Defendant
preyed upon those fears. Further, Defendant’s conduct “involved repeated actions” in many
respects.
From the beginning of the litigation, Defendant attempted to use the fact Plaintiff had no
social security number to intimidate her. Defendant represented to the Court and Plaintiff it
could not mount a defense to Plaintiff’s claims or dismiss its claim against her until her social security number was revealed.
[In my case, PRA is well aware that I have had biased judges make Draconian orders against me and that I dread fighting anymore of my own cases without an attorney to represent me.]
Eventually it was discovered an attorney had disclosed to Defendant, before Plaintiff filed her counterclaim, Plaintiff had no social security number. And at trial, evidence established Defendant resolved claims, in many instances, without disclosure of
a social security number.
[PRA demanded that I tell them the last four digits of my social security number before they would tell me what company was calling me.]
Defendant repeatedly was put on notice Plaintiff was not the correct person, but pressed
forward with the lawsuit against her anyway. To locate the debtor account holder, Defendant
relied on a Lexis Nexis search of a very common Hispanic name – the accuracy of which was
specifically disclaimed. Defendant was warned it should independently verify the information.
Defendant’s collection law firm, Gamache and Meyers, P.C., reviewed an Experian report that
did not verify Plaintiff’s address, and in fact, indicated a Kansas address.
The day after the collection suit was served on Plaintiff, she appeared at legal aid
distraught and crying. Suzanne Gladney, a practicing attorney for thirty-seven years, testified
she spoke to three people at Gamache and Meyers and told them they had the wrong person,
gave them identifying details about Plaintiff (she lived in Missouri, owned her home, never had a
credit card) and attempted to fax to the law firm Plaintiff’s passport, which the firm refused. She
told them Plaintiff did not have a social security number, and Gladney attempted to obtain the
fraud affidavit Defendant wanted filled out. In response, Defendant arrived in Court prepared to
seek a default judgment against Plaintiff.
[PRA and Judge Rudofsky faulted me for not filling out the fraud affidavit presented to me, as if filling it out would make one bit of difference.]
As the lawsuit progressed, Defendant obtained account documents showing credit card
payments were being made on the account from the Kansas address, as opposed to Plaintiff’s
address.
[The account documents in my case did not even show where any purchase was made. For the first eight months of litigation PRA claimed there were no statements at all. Then they claimed to find the “charge-off statement” but did not produce any statements that showed payments or purchases. It seems likely that PRA has those statements, and they would show that the charges were made by some other “Laura Lynn”, someone named “Laura Lyman” whom PRA named on one letter it addressed to me, or one of my less than honest exes. Like, if the charge was made at a brothel in Nevada while I was at a family function in Los Angeles, it was probably made by the fraudster Mike Pietrczak who wrote that his lawsuit against me was part of a fraudulent scheme.]
Plaintiff denied the debt in her Answer and responded, under oath, to interrogatories,
document requests, and requests for admissions (63 questions but ironically Defendant did not
request Plaintiff’s date of birth or social security number) providing even more personal
information establishing Plaintiff was not the debtor Defendant was seeking. But, Defendant
continued to pursue its suit.
At trial, Defendant admitted it maintained its lawsuit against Plaintiff, not merely to
collect the $1,137.14 credit card debt owed, but because she filed a counterclaim.
[PRA attorney James Trefil of Troutman Pepper said it zeroed out my balance “in light of” the lawsuit I filed.]
When Defendant did dismiss the case against Plaintiff, it did so “without prejudice” and threatened to
refile against her even though it had no reason to question her and the conclusive evidence she
was not the debtor.
[PRA said it waived the alleged debt against me, but, after seeing how partial Judge Rudofsky was to them, tried to intimidate me into confessing to the debt.]
Defendant testified through its attorneys and corporate representative that its business
model did not include independent investigation of an accused’s claim she did not owe the debt
at any point from purchase of the debt to litigation – even if legitimate concerns were raised. It
maintained it is the wrongly accused’s burden to dispute the debt, prove it is not theirs, and
provide to Defendant personal information.
[And Judge Rudofsky agrees with PRA.]
Defendant testified the fault for the present litigation was Plaintiff’s. Defendant made no apologies, testified its policies were sound, and no changes were anticipated.
[All the while, as in my case, PRA was negotiating with the CFPB to curtail its miscreant conduct.]
Throughout the case, Defendant demonstrated a disrespect for the law. Numerous
discovery abuses resulted in the Court sanctioning Defendant. Defendant argued at trial, had
Plaintiff merely filled out a “fraud affidavit,” the case could have been resolved.
[Pff.]
However, that fraud affidavit would have required Plaintiff to perjure herself, a fact communicated to
Defendant through Plaintiff’s counsel.
[PRA did not tell me anything about where or on what my alleged debt was incurred; they wanted me to swear under penalty of perjury who I suspected made the charge. I mean, come on guys, give me a little hint here.]
During trial, collection counsel testified about a manufactured letter, supposedly representative of a letter sent to Gladney, but containing an address different than the address provided by Gladney. Counsel acknowledged that the original should have been maintained but was “lost.”
[PRA has a bit of practice now. Since there was no Old Account Level Documentation on my account, PRA “found” a statement eight months after their investigation was supposedly “completed”.]
Evidence was presented establishing Plaintiff’s experience was not an isolated incident.
Brian Logan, an active member of the military, was harassed for years by the Defendant until he
complained to the Missouri Attorney General’s Office. He offered to fill out a fraud affidavit
and when he provided his address for that purpose, he received only bills and no fraud affidavit.
Defendant accused Logan’s wife of having an affair as an explanation for the existence of the
account.
Dr. Ronald Harstad and his wife were harassed and berated by Defendant even though
he disputed the debt in writing. His hiring of an attorney and filing of a counterclaim finally
ended the matter, and he did not have to fill out a fraud affidavit. Evidence showed Defendant
receives more complaints than any debt buyer in Missouri. And, at least 375 mistaken identity
claims have been raised against Defendant. These claims were the subject of discovery abuse litigation. The Court read an adverse
inference instruction because it was determined Defendant never did provide all the claims
discovery as ordered by the Court.
[Portfolio Recovery did not tell me who provided their phone service and Judge Rudofsky acted like their own notes would suffice as evidence of when and how many calls they made to me.]
Based on the evidence before it, the Court finds
Defendant’s conduct to be intentional and malicious.
Guidepost Two
In awarding punitive damages, “courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is
both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general
damages recovered.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426. The Court has repeatedly rejected that the
difference between a reasonable and grossly excessive award can be determined by “a simple
mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive
award.” Id. at 424-25 (internal quotation and citation omitted). And, while the Supreme Court
noted “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still
achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500
to 1,” id. at 425 (citation omitted), due process may still be satisfied by a higher ratio where “a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages,” id.
(citation omitted), or “where the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harm might have been difficult to determine.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
Where larger discrepancies between the size of the compensatory damages and punitive
damages have been allowed, the Court has relied on the idea that they must weigh the actual and
potential harm to the plaintiff the defendant’s conduct caused. See TXO Prod. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) ($19,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive
damages, a 526-to-1 ratio, for slander of title); see also, Lynn v. TNT Logistics N. Am. Inc., 275
S.W.3d 304, 311-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (9 to 1 ratio applied by the trial court too low to punish
and deter a defendant; 75 to 1 ratio applied); Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat’l Auto
Sales, 361 S.W.3d 364, 373 (Mo. 2012) (ratio of 111 to 1 upheld); Lewellen v. Franklin, 441
S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2014) (double-digit ratio endorsed after considering defendant’s lack of
remorse, refusal to rectify reckless practices, and refusal to comply with discovery); Smith v.
New Plaza Pontiac Co., 677 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ($400 in actual and $30,000 in
punitive damages, a 75-to-1 ratio, for making misrepresentations about the condition of a used
car); Kemp v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) ($115 in compensatory
damages and $250,000 in punitive damages, a 2,172-to-1 ratio, for fraudulent billing practices);
Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 107 P.3d 473 (Or. 2001) ($11,496 in compensatory damages and
$1 million in punitive damages, an 86-to-1 ratio, for misrepresentations related to the sale of a
vehicle). Here, the Court finds the Defendant’s actions are particularly egregious. After review
of the jury’s awards and the evidence before the Court, the measure of punishment is both
reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm and potential harm to the plaintiff and to the
general damages recovered.
Guidepost Three
“A reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is
excessive should ‘accord ‘substantial deference’ to legislative judgments concerning appropriate
sanctions for the conduct at issue. ’” BMW of North America, Inc., 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996)
(quoting Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301
(1989)) (O’Connor, J., opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). There are no
comparable criminal penalties to be considered here.
Conclusion
The Court finds the harm to Plaintiff was the result of intentional malice and not mere
accident. This Defendant owns debt in all 50 states – 750,000 accounts in Missouri, 37,500 of
which are in litigation. It shows no remorse. It’s business model is irresponsible and preys
against the financially vulnerable. The Court does not intend to make any comment on the debt buying industry generally and is
limiting its analysis to the evidence presented in this case about this Defendant.
This Defendant does not respect the Court’s rules. And,
especially reprehensible is Defendant’s use and abuse of our court system to harm the Plaintiff.
Under the facts presented in this case, the Court cannot find that the jury’s punitive damage
award – equating to half of Defendant’s net profits for one year – is grossly excessive. The Court is not relying on the wealth of the Defendant to justify the award, but rather the reprehensibility of Defendant’s conduct.
It is hereby ORDERED Counterclaim Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC’s Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, Or In The Alternative, To Amend, Modify, And/Or
Remit The Judgment is denied.
JOEL P. FAHNESTOCK, JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was hand delivered/faxed/emailed/mailed and/or sent
through the eFiling system to the following on 4th day of November, 2015:
EDWARD J. MYERS, Attorney for Plaintiff, GAMACHE & MYERS PC, 1000 CAMERA AVE – STE
A, SAINT LOUIS, MO 63126, (314) 835-6604, EdwardMyers@GMCollects.com
GINA MARIE CHIALA, Attorney for Defendant, 1627 MAIN STREET, SUITE 900, KANSAS CITY,
MO 64108, (816) 531-2147, GinaChiala@jobsandfreedom.org
SUNMIN JEREMIAH HONG, Attorney for Plaintiff, 231 S BEMISTON AVE, SUITE 1111, ST LOUIS,
MO 63105,
DALE K IRWIN, Attorney for Defendant, SLOUGH CONNEALY IRWIN, & MADDEN LLC, 1627
MAIN STREET, SUITE 900, KANSAS CITY, MO 64108, (816) 531-2147, dirwin@scimlaw.com
JOSHUA C DICKINSON, Attorney for Plaintiff, 1000 WALNUT ST STE 1400, KANSAS CITY, MO
64106, (816) 474-3216, jdickinson@spencerfane.com
KERSTEN LEIGH HOLZHUETER, Attorney for Plaintiff, SPENCER FANE BRITT & BROWN LLP,
1000 WALNUT STREET, SUITE 1400, KANSAS CITY, MO 64106, (816) 474-3216,
FRED L SLOUGH, Attorney for 3rd Party, SLOUGH CONNEALY IRWIN & MADDEN, 1627 MAIN
SUITE 900, KANSAS CITY, MO 64108, (816) 531-2147, fslough@scimlaw.com
ELIZABETH C CARVER, Attorney for Plaintiff, BRYAN CAVE 3600, 211 N BROADWAY, ST
LOUIS, MO 63102-2733,
ROBERT M. THOMPSON, Attorney for Plaintiff, ONE KANSAS CITY PLACE, 1200 MAIN ST, STE
3800, KANSAS CITY, MO 64105, (816) 855-3233, rmthompson@bryancave.com
Law Clerk, Division 9
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC Caught Again
This is a press release from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. I am suing PRA for violating the FDCPA on an alleged debt against me. Thus far, Cornell and Harvard educated Federal District Court Judge Lee P. Rudofsky has swallowed every lie told by PRA’s attorneys from Rose Law Firm and Troutman Pepper, hook line and sinker.
CFPB Orders Repeat Offender Portfolio Recovery Associates to Pay More Than $24 Million for Continued Illegal Debt Collection Practices and Consumer Reporting Violations
Debt collection giant filed lawsuits even when it lacked documentation about the debt
MAR 23, 2023
SHARE & PRINT
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) took action today against Portfolio Recovery Associates, one of the largest debt collectors in the nation, for violating a 2015 CFPB order and engaging in other violations of law. The CFPB filed a proposed order today that, if entered by the court, would require Portfolio Recovery Associates to pay more than $12 million to consumers harmed by its illegal debt collection practices, in addition to a $12 million penalty that would be deposited into the CFPB’s victims relief fund. Portfolio Recovery Associates violated the 2015 order by collecting on unsubstantiated debt, collecting on debt without providing required documentation and disclosures to consumers, suing or threatening legal action against consumers without offering or possessing required documentation, and suing to collect on debt outside the statute of limitations. Portfolio Recovery Associates also failed to properly investigate and resolve consumer disputes about the company’s credit reporting. Today’s action is one of many actions the CFPB has recently taken to hold repeat offenders accountable.
“After getting caught red-handed in 2015, Portfolio Recovery Associates continued violating the law through intimidation, deception, and illegal debt collection tactics and lawsuits,” said CFPB Director Rohit Chopra. “CFPB orders are not suggestions, and companies cannot ignore them simply because they are large or dominant in the market.”
Portfolio Recovery Associates is a wholly-owned subsidiary of publicly traded PRA Group (NASDAQ: PRAA), and is one of the largest debt collectors in the United States. The company’s principal headquarters is in Norfolk, Virginia. PRA Group reported net income of over $183 million in 2021.
In September 2015, the CFPB ordered Portfolio Recovery Associates to pay more than $27 million in consumer refunds and penalties for deceptive debt collection tactics. In that case, the CFPB found that Portfolio Recovery Associates collected on unsubstantiated debt, filed misleading affidavits in debt-collection actions, misrepresented that it intended to prove debts if consumers contested them, and misrepresented that the company had legally enforceable claims to debts outside of the applicable statutes of limitations.
The 2015 order required Portfolio Recovery Associates to adhere to provisions including prohibitions on:
- Collecting debts without a reasonable basis,
- Selling debt,
- Threatening or filing collection lawsuits without an intent to prove the debt,
- Filing false or misleading affidavits in debt-collection actions,
- Making false or misleading representations, and
- Collecting or suing on debt that was outside the statute of limitations.
In today’s complaint, the CFPB charged Portfolio Recovery Associates with violating numerous requirements of the 2015 order during the five-year period the order was in effect and engaging in deceptive conduct in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Consumer Financial Protection Act, including:
- Making representations about unsubstantiated debts: Portfolio Recovery Associates made at least tens of thousands of representations about unsubstantiated, disputed debts, failing to review the required documentation to support the claim.
- Threatening consumers with potential legal actions and initiating debt collection lawsuits without offering or possessing required documentation: Portfolio Recovery Associates’ lawyers sent millions of form letters to consumers notifying them of potential legal action without offering to provide all required documents. Portfolio Recovery Associates also initiated thousands of legal actions against consumers when it lacked proper documentation about the debt.
- Misrepresenting that it would provide certain documents within thirty days: The form letter notifying consumers of potential legal action stated that, upon receipt of a written request from the consumer, Portfolio Recovery Associates would provide within 30 days of request the proof of documentation mentioned in the letter. On numerous occasions, Portfolio Recovery Associates failed to timely provide these documents after receiving a consumer’s written request for them. This impeded consumers’ ability to determine whether a debt was truly owed and how they should respond to allegations of outstanding debts.
- Collecting on time-barred debt without making required disclosures: On numerous occasions, Portfolio Recovery Associates did not provide the required disclosures to consumers when collecting on debts beyond the statute of limitations. When the company purchased debt, it estimated the statute of limitations that governed the debt, and in some cases that date was later than the actual statute of limitations.
- Suing to collect on time-barred debt: Portfolio Recovery Associates initiated at least dozens of lawsuits for debt that was too old to legally enforce. In doing so, Portfolio Recovery Associates falsely represented that those consumers had legally enforceable obligations to pay those debts when in fact they did not because the debt was outside the statute of limitations.
The CFPB also alleges that Portfolio Recovery Associates committed numerous violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and its implementing Regulation V, which include:
- Failing to inform consumers about investigation outcomes: On numerous occasions when Portfolio Recovery Associates determined that a consumer’s dispute was frivolous or irrelevant, it failed to timely inform the consumer about what information would be necessary for Portfolio Recovery Associates to investigate the dispute.
- Failing to timely resolve disputes: On at least tens of thousands of occasions, Portfolio Recovery Associates failed to resolve disputes within the required time.
- Conducting unreasonable investigations: On numerous occasions when a consumer alleged fraud or identify theft, Portfolio Recovery Associates did not conduct a sufficient investigation that considered all necessary information.
Enforcement Action
Under the CFPA, the CFPB has the authority to take action against institutions violating consumer financial laws, including engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. The CFPB alleges that Portfolio Recovery Associates violated the 2015 order, the CFPA’s prohibition on deceptive conduct, the FDCPA, FCRA, and Regulation V.
If entered by the court, the order would require Portfolio Recovery Associates to:
- Provide redress to consumers: Portfolio Recovery Associates would pay at least $12.18 million to consumers harmed by its illegal collection practices.
- Clean up its faulty operations: The order prohibits Portfolio Recovery Associates from collecting debts unless it has access to certain documents that meet its obligation to have a reasonable basis to believe it is collecting debts that consumers actually owe.
- Fix its failures to properly respond to consumers: The order requires Portfolio Recovery Associates to improve their response when consumers report that they do not owe a debt because of fraud or identity theft. And it ensures that Portfolio Recovery Associates adequately responds to consumer disputes in a timely manner about information Portfolio Recovery Associates has furnished to consumer reporting agencies.
- Pay $12 million in penalties: Portfolio Recovery Associates would pay a $12 million penalty to the CFPB, which would be deposited into the CFPB’s victims relief fund.
Read the 2015 order against Portfolio Recovery Associates.
In December, the CFPB proposed a new registry to help detect and deter repeat offenders like Portfolio Recovery Associates. The public can submit comments on the proposal until March 31, 2023.
If you or someone you know needs help dealing with a debt collector, the CFPB publishes resources on how to protect your legal rights and navigate your financial future.
Consumers can submit complaints about financial products or services by visiting the CFPB’s website or by calling (855) 411-CFPB (2372).
Employees of companies who they believe their company has violated federal consumer financial laws are encouraged to send information about what they know to whistleblower@cfpb.gov.###
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is a 21st century agency that helps consumer finance markets work by making rules more effective, by consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by empowering consumers to take more control over their economic lives. For more information, visit www.consumerfinance.gov.
“Our justice system has become lawless.” – Former President Donald Trump
In a speech given at Mar-a-Lago this morning, Former President and now indicted Donald Trump said, “I immediately thought of the fourth amendment that protects against unreasonable search and seizure, but [‘gun toting FBI agents who took whatever they wanted including my passports and medical records’] [raided] it anyway because our justice system has become lawless.”
How right he is.
Our judicial officers from both sides of the aisle are transferring property from the common man to the moneyed elite at record pace, all under the guise of common law and technicalities that produce absurd and unjust outcomes.
Wake up. Remember. Germany, 1939. Slave ships bringing Africans to the United States as slave labor. The massacre of Native Americans as Europeans generations back “deeded” property to themselves. In Arkansas, their great-great-great-great-grandchildren now proudly claim that being sixth generation makes them uniquely qualified to run the government, including the courts.
In the present circumstances it is those sworn to protect our Constitution who are the ones putting a match to it.
A Little Light Music for Your Listening Pleasure
When I finally obtain a copy of the audio recordings of the hearings Backwoods Judge Susan Kaye Weaver and side kick Court Reporter Jana Perry fictionalized in the transcripts of the hearings, I hope rap singer “Afroman” will collaborate with me on a song or two that will memorialize the corrupt court’s conduct.
Joseph Edgar Foreman, AKA Afroman, is being sued by some Adams County, Ohio sheriff deputies. Afroman used surveillance video of the sheriffs breaking down his door and searching his home to illustrate two music videos. I chuckled a few times while I watched the videos that already have millions of views on YouTube. Apparently, the police officers found no humor in the videos what-so-ever.
Watch the music videos Lemon Pound Cake and Will You Help Me Repair My Door here and here.
The invasion of privacy lawsuit would be humorous if there was not a good chance that corrupt judges would let it proceed and maybe even let the police officers prevail. That is the direction our legal system has taken. First judges gave themselves absolute judicial immunity from civil lawsuits. It takes an act of God to get the judicial ethics commissions and public integrity unit of the FBI to rein in the corrupt courts. Then just about every public employee, including cops, were extended “quasi-judicial” immunity.
Now these Adams County cops are demanding that video footage of them searching a man’s home and taking about $5,000 of his cash not be played for the public. (There was no illegal substances nor kidnapping victims found on the property, despite the police making claims that resulted in a search warrant.)
Here’s my music video concept. First an intro that says something like “Arkansas Injustice. Arkansas Injustice. Just listen and learn about Arkansas Injustice.”
Then we will use segments of the recording that Judge Weaver does not want the public to hear; but we will change the cadence when repeating certain phrases. “The motion for continuance must be in writing, must be in writing, must be in writing.”
We will use the read-along tool used in children’s videos, with a bouncing ball touching each word of the transcript in order. But the words spoken will not be the same as the written words, because they are not.
Where attorney William Zac White very loudly says “Bitch” and that was not captured on the transcript, the bouncing ball can land on red text alone on the screen that says “BLEEP”.
There will be an animated reenactment of the hearings interspersed with the lyrics. During this animation, the lip movement of the characters will be pronounced but inconsistent with the words spoken. It will be like watching a Japanese Karate movie dubbed poorly in English. The lip movement will be completely out of sync with what was said.
Citizens who have their Constitutional rights violated by rogue government officials usually cannot recover civil damages for the misconduct. Will the courts also try to limit our ability to create art and literature that exposes the bad behavior?
Amicus Briefs Encouraged by Judge Rudofsky
A week got away from me without the time to cheer for Judge Lee P. Rudofsky and his fantastic idea. No really. This is not said sarcastically.
Unlike Judge Susan Kaye Weaver, Judge Rudofsky is not pure evil. He has some fine qualities. One is a brilliant mind.
He is so smart, in fact, that when he makes an error, I question whether he is playing dumb like a fox. How can someone so smart get it so wrong, unless the error is intentional?
He came out with an order on March 21, 2023 in which he gets it all right. See the entire order in the Judge’s words posted below.
Basically, this is an invitation to encourage attorneys to write amicus briefs for non-clients, pro-bono at the Federal District Court.
Amicus means “friend”. The Amicus Brief is not written by a litigant or the litigant’s attorney; it is written by a “friend of the court”. This is a practice that is common at the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, but it is done rarely at the district court.
The reason I am excited about this new tool for litigants is that most pro se litigants don’t have the money to hire an attorney and in all but limited kinds of civil cases, most attorneys will not work on contingency.
If the case involves an important issue, an attorney may agree to get involved for the one specific task of writing an amicus brief.
For example, I brought a pro se case against a debt buyer named Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC in the Eastern District of Arkansas. Judge Rudofsky is presiding.
One claim I made was that the debt collection activity was “outrageous”. Judge Rudofsky said no reasonable juror could agree with me and dismissed the claim at the motion for summary judgment stage. Had someone from the CFPB or Institute for Justice been able to submit a brief, it might have carried more weight for the argument that the legislature enacted the FDCPA to deter debt collectors from PRA’s exact conduct, and that PRA is a repeat offender that knows it is doing wrong. A licensed attorney should be able to present argument better than I can. And it always helps to have extra eyes on the case.
Though the decision on my case will not set precedence, it will be persuasive. Judges often rely on what another judge or even what he himself did previously to rule the same way again, even if it does not comport with statutory text written by the legislature. It seems like attorneys who represent plaintiffs in similar cases would want other plaintiffs to prevail, paving the way for more and grander awards.
Have Nots Barred from Justice by Law Bars: The Case of Faridian v. The World’s First Robot Lawyer (DoNotPay, Inc)
Can you afford an attorney?
If not, chances are that you may receive assistance from an overworked, sometimes substandard public defender. (These lawyers are referred to by some as “public pretenders”.)
Worse, the right to representation only extends to criminal defense. If you have a civil matter, such as a consumer protection case against Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC or a custody case, you are out of luck.
There are legal aid services. I applied for legal aid to defend me against a case filed by attorney William Zac White on behalf of Mike Pietrczak, supposedly through his father Walter Pietrczak who had a power of attorney. Legal Aid said I would qualify, but the Pietrczak’s consulted them first, so even though legal aid declined to pursue the case on behalf of the Pietrczaks, they had a conflict of interest and could not represent me.
There is a wonderful public interest firm called Institute for Justice that works pro bono for regular folk, mostly on consumer cases, but they are way too small to make a significant impact on obtaining justice for the masses.
Back in the day, before the internet, legal research was extremely difficult. You had to find a law library, then bury yourself in the stacks, sifting out cases and following a trail to find legal precedent.
Legal research is not so difficult now, especially if you can afford a subscription to Westlaw or Lexus-Nexus. (I am told the subscription for non-attorneys is quite a bit more expensive than for attorneys.)
And there are plenty of forms online for simple matters like transferring title to real estate. But BE AWARE. Filling out these forms on behalf of a trust or limited liability company is considered to be the unauthorized practice of law by some courts.
It is highly questionable whether offering those forms online is the “unauthorized practice of law”.
There is a company that took it a step further and markets itself as “the world’s first robot lawyer”, DoNotPay, Inc.
A class action lawsuit was filed by a licensed attorney on behalf of a customer of the robot lawyer and other customers similarly situated. A copy of the complaint is posted below for you to download and read.
The attorneys for the plaintiff argue that there is a good reason a person not “barred” should be barred from practicing law. (Only attorneys would decide to say a person who is not barred from practicing law is “barred”.)
“The State Bar Act sets baseline standards for attorneys in the state in order to protect California residents from being harmed by unskilled or unscrupulous laymen passing themselves off as bona fide practitioners.” (Paragraph 14)
My personal experience is that I provide myself with much more competent and zealous legal representation than an attorney gives me. I do agree with the Bible, that “in a multitude of counselors is wisdom.” I want to be allowed to discuss my case with a variety of attorneys and non-attorneys. If I am ill or unable to make it to a hearing in a far-off jurisdiction, I want to be able to enlist co-counsel. Many jurisdictions, such as the Federal District Court for Southern California forbid this kind of piecemeal representation.
The most difficult part of advocating on my own behalf is the clerical work. I want to be able to hire a paralegal, but the government forbids paralegals from working without the supervision of a licensed attorney.
In the Pietrczak case, I represented myself so well against the attorney William White of Heber Springs that he eventually asked the court to dismiss me with prejudice. I “prevailed”. But I was not allowed to represent my living trust, of which I was sole settlor, trustee and beneficiary. So, Arkansas Judge Susan Weaver found against the Trust and gave all the property held in trust and all my personal property that was on the real estate, my personal right to use of the property and money the Pietrczaks defrauded from me to the Pietrczaks and their attorney, Willy White.
Judge Weaver also decided that a deed that was “prepared” by me, meaning I filled in the blanks in an online form at the direction of Mike Pietrczak, was “void ab initio” because I am not an attorney. The deed was otherwise perfect.
Hypocritically, attorneys including William White often use forms like these.
I am not an attorney and this is not legal advice. I am just wondering about one other section of the complaint filed against the world’s first robot lawyer. “There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class.” (Paragraph 38)
It seems to me that defense attorneys for big businesses love to argue that cases cannot be subject to class actions because the damages to each victim are not the same as to the class representative. First American Home Warranty Company used that excuse on cases. One customer might have a water heater that was not repaired, the next might have a furnace that did not heat the home. Unethical “minors counsel” or social workers in custody cases have argued that when sued by the parents and children they harm.
The customers who were allegedly harmed by using DoNotPay’s service to fight a parking ticket were obviously harmed or not in a different way than a customer who used the service to create a limited liability company.
It will be interesting to follow this case. I wonder if DoNotPay, Inc will pay a licensed attorney to represent it, or if it will use its own robot lawyer and use this case as a platform to determine if a person or entity is allowed to use these kinds of legal tools to assist in obtaining justice.
UPDATE: One of my favorite readers gave me a link to an interview on Tik Toc, discussing how a company called ChatGBT designed software that has passed a bar exam. https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZTRv6rCyL/
Stink Eye: Should Judge Weaver be allowed to dictate a litigant to keep a good pokerface?
“Lucky” was playing in a poker game with me last night; a 1/2 NLH at the Hard Rock in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Lucky is a tough looking young man, about the same age as my son. He is Hispanic, wears a full beard, dark shades and muff style headphones. He has a take no prisoners style of play.
I was dealt an AQ off-suit, which I consider to be a good playable hand. If I was leading off with the betting, I’d probably raise from the minimum $2 bet to $6. But Lucky got to bet before me. With a dramatic display of calculation, picking out a few chips, then pausing and adding a few more from a different color stack, he announced his bet as $23 dollars and strew the chips across the table with aplomb.
Any bet over $20 pre-flop at this table meant a premium hand (or a bluff). He probably had an AK, KK, or AA and dominated me. So, after glaring at him, I folded.
Lucky took off his headphones and addressed me personally for the first time since I joined the game. Really he was talking about me in the third person to the whole group, but he intended to engage me. I don’t remember his exact words. It was something to the effect of look at the way she stared at me. She was harsh.
The hand played out and Lucky took down a sizable pot when the last remaining caller folded after the river. Lucky showed us his pocket jacks. JJ against AQ is actually a coin toss. There was an Ace on the turn, so if I had not folded, I would have won the hand.
I acted contrary to my own rules and told the players what I folded. We had a good laugh together and I told the men about a comment that Judge Susan Weaver made to me. It was during the hearing where she trampled all over my rights to due process and announced her intention to give my personal property and real estate held in trust to a man who put his intention to defraud me of $75,000 in writing.
Judge Weaver said to stop giving her “stink eye”. At the time she said that, I had a credible fear that the judge also intended to find me in contempt of court and incarcerate me. Her stink eye comment sounded like a set-up to find me in direct contempt.
Judges have gotten away with throwing people in jail for less. They should not. They should not be allowed to tyrannize litigants who are merely expressing disapproval of the judges’ errant denial of civil rights through a non-disruptive facial expression.
It is not as if I called Judge Weaver a bitch. Opposing counsel William White called me “bitch” loudly in court that day and Judge Weaver pretended not to hear it. Judge Weaver’s longtime colleague Court Reporter Jana Perry pretended not to hear it either, when she fabricated what was said in the fictionalized transcript she created.
My look of righteous anger, though, that Judge Weaver found worth noting for the record.
Lucky made me realize just how evil Susan Kaye Weaver was to demand that I hide my dismay with her Draconian commands. Lucky noticed the intense look I gave him, also. And we were playing poker. The whole idea behind poker is to mask your emotions, because showing your emotions conveys information that can help your opponent make educated decisions on future hands. You’re not playing a hand, you’re playing a game.
When the unethical jurist abused her power by forbidding me from defending my own property rights, I was justifiably angry. There is nothing disruptive about me looking at the judge with an angry look on my face. Had she not commented, there would be no record of my disapproval until I filed my appeal.
Judge Susan Weaver wants to bully and bluff and for me to maintain my best poker face. I complied that day in court, for fear of having my 60-year-old body thrown in jail. If I had the energy, I would have protected my Constitutional right to a fair trial from being treated as a game. (Hopefully the Court of Appeals addresses the issue when ruling on my unopposed appellate brief.)
Federal Courts Errantly Allow Non-Attorneys to Represent Corporations, as Long as They Lose
Supposedly, an individual who is not authorized to practice law is not allowed to represent another person in court. This applies even if the representative is a licensed attorney in another state.
But Judge Janis L. Sammartino, a Federal District Court Judge in Southern California allowed me to represent a limited liability company in what is called a “derivative action” until I discovered the error myself. She then required me to defend against a bogus attorney fee award.
After Judge Sammartino was transferred off the case, replacements Todd Robinson and Linda Lopez affirmed the ongoing proceedings and astronomical attorney fee award.
I have a pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Here are excerpts of the opening brief with the entire document below.
Silver Strand Plaza, LLC was formed in 2005. In 2009, there was an amendment that resulted in my ownership of 14.1571% of the shares.
Ellis Stern and his firm, Stern & Goldberg (“Stern”) represented my mother’s, SSP’s and the other individual members’ interests in SSP. The retainer agreement with SSP specified that Stern would oppose me, singling me out by name.
At the end of 2013, I demanded to see the company books and records. Stern allowed me to go to his office and make copies of what he claimed were the entire books and records. There were indications that pertinent documents were excluded.
I found discrepancies that concerned me and brought these to the attention of the other members in a special meeting by telephonic conference. The other members, who had the right and obligation to make “major” decisions in good faith and fair dealing, did not agree to have a professional accounting. Stern made an inaccurate written record of the meeting. I corrected him in writing.
On June 9, 2015, I wrote this in an email to my sisters, mother and Stern:
“It is about 18 months since I was included in any meeting of partners of SSP, LLC. I had a few concerns come up in the last couple days. My conclusion is that we would all be better off if the other partners bought me out of SSP, LLC.” I used the “tax basis” of my shares as the offer price, $516,839.
Stern authored a counter-offer couched as his opinion presented on June 15, 2015, of $218,000 from SSP for my share of SSP. My offer was clearly a transaction between me on the one side and my sisters on the other side. The counter-offer looked like it was from SSP. There was no company meeting of the members that I was informed about to decide how to handle the offer. There was no explanation about if I would be required to provide 14.1571% of the $218,000 capital to purchase the property from myself, as would be the literal meaning of the operating agreement, dropping my net to $187,138. I used $218,000 in my pleadings to the lower court, because my offer was to my sisters, not SSP. The statutory buyout provisions of the Cal. Corp. Code provide defendants in an involuntary dissolution action with a mechanism for avoiding dissolution by purchasing the plaintiff’s shares or other interests. It is not the corporation buying out the shares.
I rejected the counter-offer.
In May 2016, Sherman recommended selling the shopping center, and the members accepted that recommendation. (This came at about the time our sister Roberta Kramer (deceased) discovered she had cancer.) In October 2016, only 16 months after Stern wrote an offer of $218,000 for my interest in SSP, the shopping center went into escrow at a purchase price that valued my interest at nearly $1.5 million.
[After advising the manager to make four other breaches of fiduciary duty to me], in that same February 2, 2017 e-mail, Sherman used the excuse of the time spent communicating on the withhold issue as the reason she could not wire my distribution to me, even though other members were being paid, and even though Sherman’s e-mail claiming that she “will not have time today to go to the bank” was sent at 10:45 a.m. When I responded only an hour later that Sherman had a fiduciary obligation to wire the amount of my distribution less whatever amount Sherman believed had to be withheld for California taxes, Sherman responded through Stern and asserted for the first time that, in addition to California taxes, Sherman was required to withhold the amount of a Child Support Division lien against other property unrelated to SSP, and that determining the amount of the lien would further delay payment to me of my distribution. Sherman and Stern had been aware of the Child Support Division lien against other property for over a year and had never previously indicated that money would have to be withheld to pay that lien. With this excuse, Sherman delayed wiring any of my distribution (even the amount that was undisputed) until February 6, 2017.
Again, instead of Stern advising Sherman to make a full payment and leave the issue alone, he advised her to improperly withhold and convert $50,000 from my distribution wired on February 6, 2017. The stated reason: the funds were held as a litigation fund that Mary Sherman could use if I litigated to obtain the funds! Through Stern, Sherman not only defended this unlawful conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, Stern informed me that the funds would not be released until I released any of my claims against Mary Sherman for breach of fiduciary duty: “Perhaps we can discuss a method to protect the Manager [Mary Sherman] in connection with release of the reserved funds. Otherwise, they will be withheld to cover the litigation expense or for the period of time until the statute of limitations has run its course.”
Stern reiterated this effort to extort a release from me in a second e-mail to my attorney on February 9, 2017, in which he wrote: “The $50,000.00 will be released promptly upon your furnishing to me a signed General Release by your client [me], releasing Mary Sherman from all claims in her capacity as Manager of the LLC.” I did not respond to this blatant effort to extort a release from me. Realizing that she was only compounding her breach of fiduciary duty, Sherman released the $50,000 by wiring the funds to me on February 10, 2017.
Attorney Michael Early, Stanford and Hastings trained and with over two decades of experience, agreed that the books and records presented to me were inconsistent with the arm’s length valuation of the property. He represented me on contingency in an attempt to obtain a full disclosure of the financials and recover the capital in my account that was owed to me. We saw that the “corrected” prospectus stated expected income that was significantly higher than the income reported to me.
When I pressed for an explanation for the difference in NOI after the sale, Sherman responded through Stern, in pertinent part, as follows: “The numbers of the package were developed by the broker as part of his sales effort to maximize the sales price of the property, since the sales price is proportional to the net operating income. Our broker added back certain expenses to obtain a higher net operating income, and he reviewed these add backs with the buyer.”
When I then asked for 1) evidence that would verify the statement and 2) a brief description of the “certain expenses” that were added back “to obtain a higher net operating income,” Stern forwarded an e-mail from Sherman in which she stated that the buyer of the SSP property received the same financials that were used to prepare SSP tax documents and that: “the Buyer bought the building based on these numbers (with certain add backs, such as all management fees, earthquake insurance, and other costs that they deemed irrelevant since they would not be paying those costs once they owned the building).” No further explanation was provided.
When I inquired further of Sherman, Stern further muddied the waters by responding that: “There apparently were certain non-recurring expenses that formed the basis for the financial statements presented to the buyer, which, as [Mary Sherman] indicates, were fully identified and explained to the buyer.” In this “explanation,” items such as management fees and earthquake insurance are apparently described as “non-recurring expenses.”
Michael Early filed a lawsuit in the Central district of California on my behalf against SSP, and Mary Sherman as an individual and as manager of SSP about April 27, 2018.
In early May 2018, I was informed through Michael Early that SSP retained Patrick McGarrigle and his firm (“McGarrigle”) to represent it in the litigation.
McGarrigle said I would receive the full disclosure of SSP records if I dismissed the first lawsuit. I fell for his fraudulent statement and withdrew the suit.
I still have not received a full disclosure.
During the six years following the post-sale distribution, Sherman has not distributed any funds to me, even though the K-1s provided on behalf of SSP show over $70,000 in my capital account which fell by $54 this year.
There were a few random line items on the K-1s and bank records that were disclosed to me that indicate there is a loan and a property bought in part with my capital account that are self-dealing by the Shermans: “THE SHERMAN FA” as payee; “MSFP Loan”; “MSFP II LP”; and a “Sherman Family Limited Partnership” as real estate owned by SSP listed on a K-1. Sherman, Stern, McGarrigle and the current SSP attorney all refused to tell me what these line items indicate and there is a second bank account, “CBB”, for which they did not produce statements.
It is apparent to me that the Defendants intend to withhold my capital account indefinitely, so I agreed that Michael Early cannot afford to work on contingency for the protracted litigation that was threatened. I agreed to release him and handle the matter on my own with substitute counsel on limited scope. The attorney I consulted, LaToya Redd (“Redd”), informed me that the Southern District of California “frowns on” attorneys helping pro se litigants for distinct pieces of the case. She said I must obtain leave to hire her piecemeal before I could retain her.
Throughout 2019, McGarrigle advocated on behalf of the individual defendants. Dennis is the only member who communicated significantly with me directly in 2019. She wrote over 50 emails, most copied to the other members and McGarrigle. While Dennis showed some interest in getting an accounting, over 30 of her emails were disturbing, as detailed below.
McGarrigle authored over 40 emails, advocating for the position of the individual members and manager. It was obvious he was speaking on behalf of each member, Kramer as an individual, as well as for SSP. He claimed my emails used “pejorative”, “inflammatory language”, and “wild accusations”. Yet he said not a single word to rein in Diane Dennis.
Dennis sent several emails that are considered “defamation per se” in all but three states. I live in one of the states that breaks from the availability of “per se” protection against these kinds of comments. The recipients of the malicious emails and my business interest in SSP are in states that recognize “per se”.
McGarrigle admonished me for discussing SSP business, yet refrained from admonishing Dennis for completely inappropriate and disturbing emails.
McGarrigle, and Stern before him, represented both the competing interests of individuals connected to SSP and SSP as a separate entity. The money used to pay for representing the individuals was a distribution of capital to each member, without a distribution to me.
Early in the proceedings I moved the court for leave to retain an attorney on limited scope, which I described as for the purpose of [], to explain derivative actions and other issues that were too complex for me, [], or handle issues that have a fee shifting provision, such as [] if I could prove the anti-SLAPP motion was filed maliciously [by the attorney defendants], as it was. I filed two motions and was denied twice.
Issue:
Whether the court and licensed attorneys were allowed to proceed on the FAC or more specifically the derivative causes of action included in the FAC, even though the complaint was written and filed by someone unauthorized to practice law. It was clear legal error to allow the void proceedings.
Law: [allowed to exclude citations as a pro se litigant]
The Ninth Circuit employs a de novo standard of review for issues addressing the unauthorized practice of law.
It is clear on the face of the FAC that I chose to file the cause of action for legal malpractice as a derivative action only. It is therefore a nullity.
If this court upholds the opinion of the lower court that certain rights that I claimed were violated were not my rights, but belonged to SSP, and must be brought as a derivative action, then amendment is not futile, as long as I can hire an attorney on limited scope for the derivative causes.
Judge Lopez’s spin on my motion to vacate the void orders that were the fruit of the void pleading is found in Doc. 266. Her conclusion: “Because no judgment was rendered on Plaintiff’s now-dismissed claims against the Attorney Defendants, none of the cases cited by Plaintiff support a finding of clear error by this Court.” It is well settled that a presiding judge must strike any document written by one not licensed to practice in that jurisdiction on behalf of anyone but herself. In Pietrczak v. [Hammett] and the Rural Revival Living Trust, Searcy County case 65CV-21-20, I was named as a common defense doctrine defendant. I prevailed as an individual. But the court granted default judgment against the trust after a hearing in which the court forbid me from defending the trust in any way or giving testimony as the trustee of the trust. (That case is on appeal. One reason, I was sole beneficiary, settlor and trustee of the trust, and therefore would only be representing myself.) In two related cases against Goodman Manufacturing Company Inc., et al in which I am plaintiff, an answer written by a Texas attorney was found void, and a Home Depot attorney’s signature on a settlement agreement was struck out with a written admonishment that he was not licensed to practice law in Arkansas. California usually treats this situation the same as Arkansas, but if the district court is allowed to veer from the California law on my case alone, and if choice of law is Arkansas law for defamation per se, then it must be choice of law for this issue also.
When the Attorney Defendants and their counsel first read the cover page of the FAC, they knew or should have known I was not allowed to proceed on a derivative cause of action. There is caselaw stating this. The court failed to deem the impermissible pleading void ab initio and then ordered me to pay attorney fees to the licensed attorneys who purposefully multiplied the proceedings by continuing to file hundreds of pages of argument and alleged evidence in support of the unnecessary anti-SLAPP motion.
Judge Lopez titled section “A” of her order “Plaintiff’s Voluntary Dismissal is Not Void”. I argued that all the proceedings on the derivative cause were void. The court should have dismissed the derivative cause or the entire pleading on her own or by motion of the Attorney Defendants on those grounds alone.
Judge Lopez wrote: “There is no merit to Plaintiff’s contention that the Attorney Defendants or the Court failed to adequately aid in the prosecution of her claim.” I never demanded “aid in the prosecution” of my claim. I notified the court of something the court knew or should have known, that the pleading on the derivative action and everything based on that pleading was a nullity.
An Arkansas court, if honorable, would disregard the California judgment as it is void ab initio. But this does not protect me, because most of my assets and anticipated assets are in California, (one indication the choice of law for all issues including defamation should have been California law).
Judge Lopez quoted me as writing, “[w]ith diligence, [P]laintiff could have known the law.” She left out the following sentence. “But as discussed earlier, the one exception to knowing the law is when the law makes an order void.” The derivative action did not become less void because I could have known it was void.
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The court awarded the attorney defendants over $70,000 in fees paid to their attorneys to advocate to strike the pleadings against them on the grounds that a malpractice and conversion cause of action were filed as a Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation. Neither cause is subject to the “anti-SLAPP” statute. The pleadings could easily be stricken as void because I was not authorized to practice law. But that would carry no fee shifting provision.
So, Judge Sammartino, Robinson and Lopez (the Three Stooges?) decided to let me practice law for a limited period of time, in order to rack up fees for other attorneys.
A Higher Law 