Listen in On a Chat with My new Best Friend, ChatGPT: What to do about judge Susan Weaver
http://www.chatGPT.com My questions, their answers.
A plaintiff committed fraud upon the court. The defendant suspected the fraud, but took a year to find evidence. The plaintiff slipped up and put a handwritten note describing the intended fraud, written before the case was filed, into a discovery production. When the defendant presented the evidence to the court in a motion for contempt, the court dismissed the defendant, but gave default judgment against a common defense doctrine defendant, and took rights to the property away from the dismissed with prejudice defendant. Is it still fraud upon the court if the court is complicit? What can the dismissed defendant do to rectify the situation?
This situation involves a complex set of legal issues, including fraud upon the court, the court’s potential complicity, and remedies available to the dismissed defendant. Let’s break it down:
1. Is it still fraud upon the court if the court is complicit?
Yes, it can still be considered fraud upon the court, even if the court appears complicit. “Fraud upon the court” refers to fraud that directly interferes with the administration of justice and affects the integrity of the judicial process. It typically involves egregious conduct, such as fabricating evidence, bribing a judge, or other deceit that taints the proceedings in a way that prevents the court from performing its impartial role.
If a party has engaged in deliberate misconduct, and the court is either unaware or knowingly allows it to proceed, the fraud itself remains. The court’s involvement or negligence doesn’t erase the fraudulent act; it may just complicate efforts to rectify it.
2. What can the dismissed defendant do to rectify the situation?
The dismissed defendant still has potential avenues to challenge the judgment, particularly if they believe fraud upon the court was involved:
- Motion to Vacate Judgment: Under Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or similar state law), a party can file a motion to vacate the judgment if there was fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse party. There is a one-year time limit from the judgment, but for fraud upon the court (which is a more serious offense), there is no time limit under Rule 60(d)(3).
- Appeal the Court’s Decision: If the defendant was dismissed, and the court made adverse rulings that affected their property rights, they may be able to appeal the dismissal or the court’s treatment of their rights. The appeal could argue that the court’s actions were improper based on the newly discovered evidence of fraud.
- Request an Investigation or File an Ethics Complaint: If the defendant believes the court acted improperly or was complicit in the fraud, they may also consider filing a judicial misconduct complaint. This would be a separate process from the case itself but could bring attention to any inappropriate actions by the court.
- Reopen the Case on Grounds of Fraud: If the defendant was dismissed with prejudice but their property rights were affected by the fraud, they could argue that the dismissal was based on a fraudulent proceeding. This could lead to reopening the case or filing a new case seeking relief.
3. Next Steps for the Dismissed Defendant
- Legal Strategy: The defendant should consult with a lawyer to develop a clear strategy to bring a Rule 60 motion, reopen the case, or file an appeal. The discovery of the handwritten note suggesting fraud could be key evidence.
- Timing: Since time is often a factor in these motions, especially under Rule 60(b), the defendant should act quickly if they are still within the allowable time frame.
- Fraud Upon the Court Arguments: The defendant could make strong arguments that the plaintiff’s behavior constituted fraud upon the court, which justifies setting aside the prior rulings or judgments. If successful, this could result in the reinstatement of the defendant’s rights or even a new trial.
Ultimately, if a court is truly complicit in the fraud, it makes the situation more difficult but not impossible to rectify. Higher courts or disciplinary bodies may provide the checks and balances necessary to correct the injustice.
What would You say to corrupt cops, courts and kin? Speech at Jamey Noel sentencing.
Ah, that I ever get a chance to speak directly to Judge Susan Kaye Weaver, the witch that gave my living trust property to a known fraudster, Mike Pietrczak and his attorney William Zac White.
Judge Lee P. Rudofsky, who used his academic gift and privilege to help out notorious debt buyer Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC.
Jeff and Mary Sherman, no matter how much money they were given, it wasn’t enough.
James Trefil. He can’t even win a case against a pro se litigant unless a lower court judge throws it. So he makes up lies about his victims. (Yes, when you are a dishonest lawyer, they are your victims.)
Well, it does feel good to get that out.
Applause to the fine people who didn’t let politics and cronyism scare them away from the Jamey Noel case, who investigated, prosecuted and presided over the trial. Three cheers for Judge Larry Medlock!!!
Court Confirmed it Banned a Citizen from the “Justice Building”.
Click on this Tic Tok. Hear it for yourself. https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP88Ftygp/
Who is the female in the background whispering to her fellow government employee? It sounds like they are telling Mrs. Betty Figueroa to stay out of the courthouse because Mrs. Figueroa complained that Judge Susan Weaver, with a total lack of jurisdiction, evicted Mrs. Figueroa from the courthouse under threat of incarceration.
This same Arkansas judge took my personal property and real estate rights from me by a court order after I was dismissed from the case with prejudice. Susan Weaver is out of control but seems to have protection for her alleged criminal activity.
If you are also a victim of Judge Susan Weaver in Searcy County, Faulkner County or Van Buren County, please call the FBI public integrity unit.
Watch a Pro Se Litigant Beat Big Business
I love the look on opposing counsel’s face (lower right).
FREE Doc of the Day Download audio of Nebraska Supreme Court hearing. Pro Se takes down Charter West Bank
Filed Eighth Circuit Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied as Inexplicably as the Order Challenged – Will SCOTUS Give Relief?
Excerpt. Download the FREE Doc of the Day above to read the entire petition. Try to figure out why the Eighth Circuit judges would ignore this and allow it to go to the United States Supreme Court.
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 35(b) Statement
The proceeding involves many questions of exceptional importance. (FRAP Rule 35(b)(1)(B)) This petition focuses on three.
1) Whether pro se litigants with meritorious cases lose because of what appears to be a bias against them.
2) Whether the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas discriminates systemically against litigants who can’t afford attorneys, by forbidding pro se litigants from filing electronically based solely upon class, instead of criteria that will allow everyone who is technically and ethically
qualified access to this valuable tool.
3) Whether the regulatory opinions resulting from civil investigations by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau are authoritative and may be used as evidence of the respondents’ practices.
The panel decision conflicts with the following decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions. (FRAP Rule 35(b)(1)(A))
A) Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978), well settled. “Common-law right of access to judicial records provides a measure of accountability to the public at large, which pays for the courts.”
B) Whittington v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 21 F.4th 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2021), well settled.
“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).”
C) U.S. v. Melton, 738 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2013)
“The recusal statute sets forth an objective standard for assessing a judge’s duty to recuse: the question is whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned by the average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of a case. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).”
D) U.S.A. v. Taleb Jawher, No. 22-2844 (8th Cir. 2023)
A party’s fabrication of business records exemplifies knowledge that the authentic evidence is adverse to that party. Extrapolating, spoliation of evidence gives a reasonable inference that the spoiled evidence is adverse to the party that altered or destroyed it.
E) Friedman v. Farmer, 788 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2015), well settled.
“A district court ‘should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).”
Pro Se Petition for Writ of Certiorari Served: Can Appellate Court Say “ya, ya, what he said”?
Excerpts. Please download the FREE Doc of the Day posted above to read the entire petition.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Whether the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals violated the appellant’s due process rights under U.S. Const. amend. XIV by affirming each of the district court’s orders—particularly those requiring de novo review—without addressing clearly erroneous findings of fact and apparent errors of law, thereby necessitating Supreme Court guidance on the revision or abolition of its local rule allowing such summary affirmance.
This petition also presents three cert-worthy subsidiary questions that remain unanswered:
Whether denying access to electronic filing for pro se litigants constitutes discrimination against the majority property class, in violation of due process and the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights Article Two. The courts held that non-attorneys may not file electronically.
Whether, consistent with Skidmore and the recent Loper decision, individuals have the right to raise a genuine dispute of material fact by citing factual records compiled through Civil Investigative Demands by government agencies. The courts ruled that CFPB findings against the defendant were irrelevant. Whether a court must apply a negative inference for spoliation of evidence to preserve fairness and due process when a party, or its predecessor in interest, destroys or alters evidence it knew would plausibly be needed for future litigation. The implication of spoliation was left unaddressed.
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B. Why Review by the Supreme Court is Necessary
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in a single paragraph, stating there was ‘no basis for reversal’ and deferring to the lower court’s analysis of Hammett’s claims and costs. It then denied both motions to settle the record and unseal the evidence, undermining the transparency that is the cornerstone of justice.
This Court has acknowledged the risk of appellate courts ‘gloss[ing] over complexities in the evidence’ by relying on clearly erroneous factual findings, as in Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. ___ (2024).
Intermediary appellate courts throughout the country too often fail to provide adequate oversight to the lower courts, as they failed to do for Hammettin this and three other civil actions since 2020. These appellate courts give undue deference to lower court decisions, even where, as here, the standard of review is required to be de novo. “When de novo review is compelled, no form of appellate deference is acceptable.” Regina College v. Russell (89-1629), 499 U.S. 225 (1991)
The motivation for this failure cannot excuse the denial of fundamental due process. It is unacceptable, whether the cause is to save costs for an overburdened system, a party preference, or to protect the image of colleagues.
Even the district court recognized that the appeal was not without merit, stating it was “not frivolous”. (App- F at 5, f.n. 27). At a minimum, the appellant was entitled to a reasoned opinion from the Eighth Circuit, explaining its disagreement with the well-reasoned arguments presented in the appellant’s briefs.
Although the Eighth Circuit did not explicitly cite Local Rule 47B (App-I at 5) when summarily affirming the district court’s decision in this case, its actions are consistent with a troubling pattern of the court using this rule to deny meaningful review—especially in cases involving pro se litigants. Rule 47B allows the court to affirm without issuing an opinion when the judgment below involves no clear factual errors or errors of law. However, this rule should not be used to sidestep a thorough de novo review, particularly in cases such as this, which raise multiple serious issues of fact and law that were overlooked or misinterpreted by the district court.
Petitioner addressed ten serious legal issues on appeal, also exposing the district court’s significant factual misstatements. Several of the issues were raised by the District court in his order on motion for reconsideration. (App-E) The Court’s appearance of bias due to his connection with PRA and distaste for the CFPB was not raised until appeal, so the Eighth Circuit had no prior opinion to affirm.
Justice Samuel Bernard Goodwyn, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, put it perfectly.
“I feel like that transparency makes just a big difference in people’s perception of fairness…I always wanted to explain to people exactly what I had done and if they wanted to appeal it, that’s how I’m going to get better, right? If it comes up to the Supreme Court and they told me I made a mistake, I know not to do it next time.
“Whereas I understand some circuit court judges felt like you never explain why you do what you do because that’s how you get reversed. Why? Why would you be afraid of being reversed?
“I never understood that. Aren’t you more concerned about getting it right? And if you can’t articulate why you’re doing it, I always felt like you shouldn’t do it.
“[laughs] You’re not ready to decide the case if you can’t explain why you’re deciding it.” The Art of Appellate Advocacy, Williams & Mary Law School, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6InzU3szzUY @ 1:49:00 This petition may be treated either as a writ of mandate to compel the Circuit Court to address non-frivolous arguments or as a standard writ of certiorari. If treated as the latter, the Supreme Court would answer the principal question, along with their choice of subsidiary questions fairly included under Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) and presented herein.
Pro Se Litigants Must Bring A Crayon to a Gun Fight
Busy, busy getting my pro se petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court ready to serve.
Just wanted to share this FREE Doc of the Day. It is a letter to the court for a man who was incarcerated at the time of filing. He was having troubles like I’ve heard from other pro se litigants, and even have suffered through myself. Documents not getting filed. Docket entries changing magically.
The difference between this poor guy and me is that I have a degree in journalism and a computer. He has to hand-write his documents.
Why not let prisoners use computers? There must be programs like people use for kids, to restrict usage to court websites, government websites and maybe a few select others. Empower people. Improve their minds and their skill sets. Give them a chance to fight for their rights. And don’t expect them to bring a crayon to a figurative gun fight.
How the Credit Card Companies and Debt Buyers May Be Ripping Off the Taxpayers.
I am working on my petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, due in the mail by Monday. This passage shows how scrutiny of the debt buying and selling market may result in tightening a loophole and saving our nation a pile of money lost by tax evasion.
According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), Portfolio Recovery Associates has a practice of buying debt that it knows is invalid. (reference to the consent order in the appendix) The Laura Lynn debt falls into that category.
There is a plausible case of illegal tax fraud arising from this conduct. If credit card companies are selling phantom debt to PRA, and PRA knowingly purchases worthless data (with some legitimate debt interspersed to maintain appearances), both parties could be engaging in tax evasion.
For instance, Capital One claimed an unsubstantiated debt of $2,297.63. PRA likely purchased the data for $229.76, assuming a common rate of 10 cents on the dollar. Capital One then wrote off $2,067.87 as a loss ($2,297.63 minus $229.76). With a corporate tax rate of 21%, Capital One paid $434.25 less in taxes because of the illegitimate debt write-off.
PRA, unable to collect any money from Hammett, wrote off its $229.76 expenditure, reducing its taxable income by $48.25. The People of the United States, through the IRS, lost a combined $482.50 in tax revenue from these two transactions. If repeated across thousands of accounts, this scheme could cost taxpayers millions. Meanwhile, PRA’s business model is sustained by collecting on some of the data, more than offsetting its minimal investment. This setup relies on exploiting a loophole while pretending ignorance of the fact that destroyed records would reveal the disputed debts were never valid.
This scheme only applies to debts that were not created by fraud of third parties, for instance if the Debt was created by Hammett’s former romantic partner frequenting seedy bars and putting his tab on a credit card he intercepted in the mail; but the original account level documentation was destroyed, so there should be an inference that there was no transactional history bringing the balance from zero to $2,297.63.
This case illustrates the systemic impact when aggregated across countless cases, that this conduct could amount to millions in taxpayer losses. This isn’t an isolated incident but potentially a large-scale practice of unverified tax deductions, coupled with a drain on judicial resources and government sanctioned corporate violations of privacy.
It looks bad that the judge on the case was counsel to one of the debt originators who sells to Portfolio Recovery Associates immediately before he became a judge. It will be poetic justice if this tax scheme gains public attention because Judge Lee P. Rudofsky threw the case and Circuit Judges Gruender, Erickson and Stras of the Eighth Circuit rubber stamped his orders.
A Higher Law 