“Nanny, Nanny, You Can’t Catch Us” – UAMS Doctors
Arkansas law supposedly gives competent adults the right to refuse medical treatment—even treatment that doctors believe could save their lives. Supposedly, if a patient refuses treatment, a physician must obtain legal authority before overriding that decision.
That sounds reassuring on paper.
My son’s experience was different.
According to our allegations and the records produced in litigation, Sean Lynn was restrained, heavily sedated, and billed more than $100,000 by UAMS despite his refusal of treatment.
When Sean attempted to pursue civil remedies, the response was not an examination of whether his rights had been violated. Instead, defendants sought dismissal based on technical objections to the summons. Ironically, I located a UAMS collection case using the same summons language defendants claimed was defective in Sean’s case. In another recently filed UAMS case, the summons language differed substantially from the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approved form.
Readers can draw their own conclusions.
What I have learned is that rights written in statutes and rights enforced in practice are not always the same thing. A right that can be ignored without consequence is not much of a right at all.
Criminal prosecutions of state-employed physicians appear to be extraordinarily rare. Civil claims face procedural hurdles that often prevent courts from ever reaching the merits. Meanwhile, the bills continue to arrive.
If you have had a similar experience and would like to share your story, contact me at bohemian_books@yahoo.com.
VERBATIM BRIEF THAT CAN BE DOWNLOADED ABOVE
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Joint Opposition to Jennings R. Boyette and Sriram Navuluri’s Motion to Dismiss Each Plaintiffs’ Claims
Co-Plaintiffs Sean Lynn (“Sean”)[1] and Laura Hammett (“Laura”) joined on a complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 20. Their claims arise from the same two-week-long continuous transaction or occurrence and share a common nucleus of both fact and law.
Separate defendants Jennings R. Boyette and Sriram Navuluri moved the Court to dismiss all claims against them, and to make the dismissal of Sean’s claims with prejudice.
The motion to dismiss is premature because the plaintiffs’ refiled extension motion is pending per the Court’s own invitation; any dismissal must be without prejudice because Sean Lynn’s § 1983 claims—not yet asserted in any proceeding—carry a three-year statute of limitations that has not expired. The caselaw strongly supports denial of the motion, or in the alternative, dismissal without prejudice only.
- The Motion to Dismiss Is Premature While the Plaintiffs’ Refiled Extension Motion Is Pending.
Under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), service must be accomplished within 120 days of filing the complaint, but a plaintiff may move within that period to extend time upon a showing of good cause. Henyan v. Peek, 359 Ark. 486, 199 S.W.3d 51 (2004). Critically, the Court’s May 12, 2026 Order expressly authorized the plaintiffs to refile their timely filed extension motion with greater specificity, and plaintiffs did so on May 19, 2026—within seven days, well inside any reasonable reading of the Court’s invitation.
Boyette and Navuluri filed their motion to dismiss while that refiled motion remained pending and undecided. The Court should rule on the extension motion first. A motion to dismiss predicated on a service defect that is the subject of a pending and court-authorized motion for extension is simply premature. As Henyan makes clear, the circuit court has authority and jurisdiction to act on a timely extension motion; that authority should be exercised before entertaining dismissal. Henyan, 359 Ark. at 491, 199 S.W.3d at 53. The Henyan Court found a lack of any cause shown in the first three untimely motions, and a poor excuse offered after the motions were filed. Id. The plaintiff is not required to “get an extension of time from this Court” in 120 days. It is required that a motion be made; the Court then has discretion to entertain an amendment.
Furthermore, Hawkins-Luckett v. Crossett Health Foundation, 2024 Ark. App. 539 (2024) illustrates by contrast that courts examine the sufficiency of good-cause showings in extension motions on their merits—a process that cannot occur if a motion to dismiss is granted before the extension motion is resolved. Defendants’ tactic of moving to dismiss while the extension motion is pending, without even acknowledging the Court’s May 12 Order permitting refiling, should be viewed unfavorably by the Court.
- Any Dismissal Must Be Without Prejudice Because Sean Lynn’s § 1983 Statute of Limitations Has Not Expired.
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1) mandates that dismissal for failure to timely serve is without prejudice. The sole recognized exception—where dismissal without prejudice operates effectively as dismissal with prejudice—arises only when all applicable limitations periods have already run so that refiling is impossible. McCue v. Dominguez, 2022 Ark. App. 332, 13, 53 S.W.3d 372, 380. That exception does not apply here.
Sean Lynn’s potential § 1983 claims against Boyette and Navuluri have never been asserted in any proceeding. They arise from the same underlying conduct as the medical negligence claims but are governed by Arkansas’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations, which the Eighth Circuit has consistently applied to § 1983 claims in Arkansas. Hill v. Reyes, 344 Fed.Appx. 291 (2009). A deprivation of constitutional rights is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right, such as the right to be free from medical injury, and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right. Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 1970).
Because those claims have not yet been filed and the three-year period has not expired, there is no basis for dismissal with prejudice. Defendants’ request that medical negligence claims be dismissed with prejudice cannot be bootstrapped into preclusion of the § 1983 claims, which are legally distinct, governed by a different limitations period, and have never been litigated.
In McCoy, cited by Boyette and Navuluri, The Friday Firm represented the UAMS doctor defendants, including a defendant in this case, Dr. Mary Katherine Kimbrough. Associate General Counsel Sherri Robinson represented the nurse defendants. McCoy v. Robertson, 2018 Ark. App. 279, 550 S.W.3d 133. McCoy is differentiated from this case because McCoy alleged run-of-the-mill medical negligence resulting in paralysis. McCoy, 2018 Ark. App. 279, 1, 550 S.W.3d 33, 34. There were no allegations of false imprisonment or exposing the captives genitals with no articulated reason. See id. McCoy did not have a viable claim for deprivation of rights, as Sean has.
Further, all the McCoy doctors were able to establish insufficient service of summons. See id. In fact, one defendant’s certified mailing was signed for by a third party, invalidating it. Id., at 16. This indicates that service on Dr. Natalie J. Applebaum in this case should probably be attempted again, even though her certified mail was signed for by a third party. Br. in supp. of mot. for an extension of time to serve summonses at 3 (differentiated though because McCoy mailed the defendant’s process to his work, instead of a home address as Sean and Laura used for Natalie J. Applebaum).
Also, Boyette and Navuluri informed the Court that “no extension of service time was ever granted” in McCoy. Boyette/Navuluri Br. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss, at 3. What they left out is that McCoy never filed a motion for extension of time to serve. He claimed that he thought service was proper, based on speaking with UAMS associate general counsel Robinson, who confirmed she had received the service packets for all the defendants, including the doctors. McCoy, 2018 Ark. App. at 5, 550 S.W.3d at 36.
- The Court Detests an Absurdity, Such As Granting a Motion to Dismiss Claims of Confinement Without Due Process Based on an Unartfully Written Motion.
The defendants’ own zealous use of procedural process—filing this motion while ignoring the Court’s May 12 Order—is relevant context. This conduct is admissible as evidence in future proceedings that Boyette and Navuluri were fully aware of their own procedural rights while denying due process protections to Sean Lynn under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-9-604, 20-47-207, 20-47-209(a)(1), 20-47-210, 20-47-211, and 20-47-220.
Wherefore the plaintiffs ask that Jennings R. Boyette and Sriram Navuluri’s motion to dismiss be denied, or if granted, that all claims are dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiff pray that whether their civil claims are dismissed or not, that this Honorable Court will refer the allegations of criminal false imprisonment by Dr. Boyette and Dr. Navuluri to an appropriate prosecutorial agency.
Respectfully Submitted,
[1] Common names are used because UAMS employees wrote versions of Laura Lynn in the medical report, and using “Lynn” may be confusing.
A Higher Law 